Julian Simon proposes a model of resource allocation decisions that not only explains market transactions but that also makes sense of the seemingly noneconomic phenomena of gift giving. However, Simon's model can be seen as just one case of a more general formal model of rational decision making on the basis of particular constraints and preferences. This general model produces both positive, testable predictions and (despite Simon's denials) a useful basis for normative debates. It could also provide a common theoretical framework for all the behavioral sciences.
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