The theory of spatial voting games suggests that majority winners are extremely rare phenomena, and hence that there may be no such thing as a “volonté generale.” It is argued in this article that the theory is founded on an empirically unrealistic assumption. This assumption is relaxed and an empirically meaningful criterion for stability is derived.
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