On the Need to Make a Better Job of Justifying Rational Choice Theory

Abstract

Smelser sees the principle attraction of the rational choice approach as its potential to produce “analytically simple” models that generate clear empirical predictions and its fundamental problem as the “lack of realism,” which he believes this necessitates. It is argued that, on the contrary, it is the ontological realism of the approach that is its strength. Rational choice theory assumes that humans are purposive actors. This insight is more general than the culturally specific assumptions (e.g., of wealth maximizing behavior) common in economics, and, appropriately embedded in institutionally and culturally specific models, it generates explanatory theories whose power rests on their claim to correctly identify the mechanisms that produce observable social consequences. Such rational choice models can be demonstrated to have clear retrodictive empirical implications. These provide a better test of the power of the explanations than any attempt to predict future social outcomes, because, of its nature, the human social world is relatively unpredictable and uncertain.