An important task in the application of game-theoretic rational choice models to collective action problems consists in linking elements of the social structure to abstract concepts used in the modeling of game situations. Michael Hechter correctly identifies three major research areas in game theory (equilibrium selection, incomplete information, imperfect information) where such links are needed. However, we disagree with most of his conclusions on the problem situation in these areas.
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