This article discusses the value and limitations of game theory's use in the social sciences. The role of game theory is discussed and contrasted with exaggerated expectations of the subject. The importance of a modeling dialogue between theorists and empiricists is reviewed. The basic limitations of game theory are discussed, including the rationality and intelligence assumptions and the problem of multiple equilibria. The appropriate interpretation of randomized equilibria is illustrated.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Harsanyi, J. C.1967-68. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” Players. Management Science14:159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
2.
Harsanyi, J. C.1973. Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory2:1-23.
3.
Hechter, M.1992. The insufficiency of game theory for the resolution of real-world collective action problems. Rationality and Society4:33-40.
4.
Hillman, A. L.
, and D. Samet. 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders. Public Choice54:63-82.
5.
Mertens, J.-F.
, and S. Zamir. 1985. Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory14:1-29.
6.
Myerson, R. B.
1991. Game theory: Analysis of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7.
Schelling, T. C.
1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
8.
Tullock, G.1992. Games and preference. Rationality and Society4:24-32.
9.
Von Neumann, J.
, and O. Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
10.
Wildavsky, A.1992. Indispensable framework or just another ideology? The Prisoner's Dilemma as an antihierarchical game. Rationality and Society4:8-23.
