This article comments on the works by Michael Hechter, Gordon Tullock, and Aaron Wildavsky that are critical of game theory. Although most of the points raised by the authors have merit, some are not relevant to game theory (as opposed to the misuse of game theory within social science). Those points pertaining to game theory vary in importance from quite central to exceedingly peripheral.
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