Game-theoretical analyses of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) supergame aim to deduce the existence of wholly endogenous solutions to collective action problems. So far, however, game theory has been unable to identify a unique equilibrium solution to the PD supergame. This lack of success, together with the assumption of complete and perfect information, suggests that these purely deductive searches for endogenous solutions are insufficient for understanding collective action problems in the real world. To be of use in the social sciences, applied game theory must be oriented toward specifying the links between its abstract categories and actual social structures.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Aumann, Robert J.
1985. Repeated games. In Issues in contemporary microeconomics and welfare, edited by George R. Feiwel, 209-242. Albany; State University of New York Press.
2.
Axelrod, Robert
. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3.
Bendor, Jonathan
, and Dilip Mookherjee. 1987. Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action. American Political Science Review81:129-154.
4.
Boyd, Robert
, and Peter J. Richerson. 1988. The evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. Journal of Theoretical Biology132:337-356.
5.
Coleman, James S.
1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6.
Crawford, Vincent P.
, and Hans Haller. 1990. Learning how to cooperate: Optimal play in repeated coordination games. Econometrica58:571-596.
7.
Elster, Jon
. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. New York: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Fudenberg, Drew
, and Eric Maskin. 1986. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information. Econometrica54:533-554.
9.
Grunbaum, Adolf
, and Wesley C. Salmon. 1988. The limitations of deductivism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
10.
Hardin, Russell
. 1981. Collective action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (for Resources for the Future).
11.
Harsanyi, John C.
1977. Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. New York: Cambridge University Press.
12.
Harsanyi, John
, and Reinhard Selten. 1988. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
13.
Heckathorn, Douglas
. 1989. Collective action and the second-order free-rider problem. Rationality and Society1:78-100.
14.
Kliemt, Hartmut
. 1990. The costs of organizing social cooperation. In Social institutions: Their emergence, maintenance and effects, edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler, 61-80. New York and Berlin: Aldine/de Gruyter.
15.
Milgrom, Paul
, Douglass C. North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. The role of institutions in the revival of trade: The law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs. Economics and Politics2:1-23.
16.
Radner, Roy
, Roger Myerson, and Eric Maskin. 1986. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. Review of Economic Studies53:59-69.
17.
Renner, K. E.1964. Delay of reinforcement: A historical review. Psychological Bulletin61:341-361.
18.
Scharpf, Fritz W.1990. Games real actors play: The problem of mutual predictability. Rationality and Society2:471-494.
19.
Schofield, Norman
. 1985. Anarchy, altruism and cooperation. Social Choice and Welfare2 (3):207-219.
20.
Taylor, Michael
. 1976. Anarchy and cooperation. London: Wiley.
21.
Taylor, Michael
. 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
