The theory of formal organization has been burdened, particularly in sociology, by a conceptual flaw deriving from Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy. Weber's assumption that the functional rationality of an organization is achieved by a structurally rationalized authority system is shown to be incorrect through the use of a number of examples. Principles for the design of a functionally rational organization are specified in the concluding section of the article.
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