‘Rational choice theory’ and moral behavior: A reconsideration

Abstract

A recent development in ‘Rational Choice Theory’ (RCT) is the emergence of a ‘broad’ version where emotions stemming from transgression and conformity of norms are interpreted as psychic costs and benefits respectively. Some rational choice theorists claim that a ‘broad’ standard version of RCT can account for all forms of moral behavior. By contrast, I argue that deontological moral behavior (i.e., based on categorical norms) cannot be explained by a ‘broad’ standard version of RCT. Advocates of RCT may retort that a ‘broad’ non-standard version of RCT that includes infinite utility and lexicographic preferences can, however, account for it. I evaluate these two possibilities and conclude that deontological moral behavior is not utility-maximizing. But, according to RCT, this implies that such behavior is irrational. I argue that this conclusion leads to an unpleasant paradox: While the behavior of an individual who can be bribed into violating her moral code is deemed rational (i.e., she trades-off norm-violation against a compensation), the behavior of an individual who cannot be bribed into violating it is deemed irrational. To elude this conclusion I propose (i) the adoption of a broad account of rationality according to which deontological moral behavior is axiologically rational, and (ii) a theory of moral behavior in which deontological and utility-maximizing moral behavior complement each other. I conclude that, while a ‘broad’ version of RCT cannot, on its own, account for all possible forms of moral behavior, deontological ethics cannot explain, on its own, many forms of moral behavior.