Formal theories of majority voting suggest that the organizing rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) present the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the opportunity to sway the policy statements of the JCUS in favor of his preferred language. Existing political science literature on the Chief Justice demonstrates that Chiefs use their authority to pursue their policy agendas in a variety of other settings. The membership of the JCUS Executive Committee - a particularly important committee in the Conference - is examined over the 1970-98 period. Both Chiefs during this period consistently stacked the committee with conservative policy outliers, and did so in a sophisticated strategic fashion.
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