This note is a contribution to the debate on Steven Brams's Theory of Moves. In particular, it aims to show that standard game-theoretic concepts can both account for and explain the statistics concerning mugging incidents that Brams presents to support the better predictive power of his own theory.
Brams, S. J.
1994. Theory of Moves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2.
Brams, S. J.1997. `Game Theory and Emotions.'Rationality and Society9: 91-124.
3.
Brams, S. J.
and M. Kilgour1992. `Putting the Other Side “On Notice” Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control.'Journal of Conflict Resolution36: 395-414.
4.
Brams, S. J.
and C. B. Jones1999. `Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power.'Rationality and Society11: 139-167.
5.
Conklin, J. C.
1972. Robbery and the Criminal Justices System. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott.
6.
Goyal, S.1997. `Review: Theory of Moves.'Economic Journal107: 216-218.
7.
Harsanyi, J. C.1973. `Games with Randomly Perturbed Payoffs: a New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points.'International Journal of Game Theory2: 1-23.
8.
Matthews, R.2000. `We Can Work It Out.'New Scientist2241: 36-40.
9.
Woerdmann, E.2000. `Rationality and Stability in the Theory of Moves: The Case of the Prisoner's Dilemma.'Rationality and Society12: 67-86.
