This exploratory research utilized a nationwide survey to examine CEO dismissals by boards of directors on which venture capitalists serve. The findings demonstrate that it is a CEO's failure in strategic concerns, rather than operational ones, that typically lead to CEO dismissal. In addition, replacing a CEO typically has a strong positive effect on new venture performance. These performance gains are not significantly different if replacement CEOs are internal or external to the venture.
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