Considerable evidence suggests that CEOs often behave myopically. It is open to debate, however, whether managerial myopia is equally prevalent among founder-led firms. Drawing on agency theory and stewardship theory, we analyze whether founder-led firms are less likely than nonfounder-led firms to cut R&D expenditures in order to meet the short-term earnings goals suggested by these firms’ past performance histories. Our analysis of Standard & Poor’s 1,500 companies from 1992 to 2013 indicates that myopia is an enduring phenomenon and prevalent among very large companies. However, founder-led firms are less likely than nonfounder-led firms to exhibit myopic behavior.
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