Abstract
Objective:
‘Theory of mind’ will be further examined firstly by looking at the experimental situation that was used to put forward this notion. A fundamental difficulty regarding the failure of ‘theory of mind’ to account for the misunderstandings of everyday life will be discussed. Other difficulties in the experimental conceptualisation of this notion will then be studied. Critiques that have previously been made of ‘theory of mind’ will also be examined.
Conclusions:
‘Theory of mind’ proposes an ideal of limpid understanding of the other. It is argued here that this notion of mind-reading is belied by its failure in our everyday lives. The experimental results by which this notion was proposed are neither sensitive nor specific. It is argued that there is also a fundamental error in this conception and its experimental design due to assessing a second-person phenomenon by a third-person method. Critiques of ‘theory of mind’ emphasise the epistemological difficulties and the fact that it is a poor explanation for the interactions of non-autistic subjects.
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