The anomalous position of the four ‘territory’ senators representing the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, whose terms expire with the dissolution of each House of Representatives, is a consequence of the Commonwealth Parliament's broad powers under s 122 of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the territories and does not affect the basic composition of the Senate as a ‘States’ House’: see generally Western Australia v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201 (‘First Territorial Senators Case’).
2.
See, eg, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 6 April 1891, 759–60 (WrixonHenry); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 17 September 1897, 709—10 (SymonJosiah).
3.
See CravenGregory (ed), The Convention Debates 1891–1898: Commentaries, Indices and Guide (Legal Books, 1986) 470–7.
See HanksPeterGordonFrances and HillGraeme, Constitutional Law in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2012) 158–9. See also WintertonGeorge, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne University Press, 1983) 16–17, 150, 158, 199 n 32, 211, n 142; ZinesLeslie, ‘The Double Dissolutions and Joint Sitting’ in EvansGareth (ed), Labor and the Constitution 1972–1975 (Heinemann, 1977) 217, 218–22; TwomeyAnne, ‘Advice to Vice-Regal Officers by Crown Law Officers and Others’ (2015) 26Public Law Review193, 204–6; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 April 2016, 3866 (TurnbullMalcolm, Prime Minister).
Supply Bill (No 1) 2016-17; Supply Bill (No 2) 2016-17; Supply (Parliamentary Departments) Bill (No 1) 2016–17.
8.
See ClarkeJenniferKeyzerPatrick and StelliosJames, Hanks Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (LexisNexis, 9th ed, 2012) 816–7. See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 May 2016, 3958 (Pat Conroy). See generally TwomeyAnne, Explainer: Pulling the Double Dissolution Trigger is Harder than You Think (4 March 2016) ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-04/twomey-double-dissolution/7221152>.
9.
Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 2016 (Cth).
10.
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Interim Report on the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2013 Federal Election (2014) 11 [2.35].
11.
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 239(2).
12.
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 272, as repealed by Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Act 2016 (Cth) s 28.
Day v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of South Australia; Madden v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of Tasmania (2016) 331 ALR 386, 393 [19]; Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181,207 [64].
15.
Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181, 192, quoted in Day v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of South Australia; Madden v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of Tasmania (2016) 331 ALR 386, 393 [19].
16.
Day v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of South Australia; Madden v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of Tasmania (2016) 331 ALR 386, 401 [48]–[50].
The one exception can be found in s 15 of the Constitution which deals with casual Senate vacancies and was inserted in its current form following a successful 1977 referendum.
26.
See generally TwomeyAnne, The Governor-General's Role in the Formation of Government in a Hung Parliament’ (2011) 22Public Law Review52.
27.
See generally HarrisICWrightBC and FowlerPE (eds), House of Representatives Practice (Department of the House of Representatives, 5th ed, 2005) 316–9.
28.
Ibid47. See also Winterton, above n 5, 81–2.
29.
The Governor-General would generally only bring about such a dissolution where Parliament cannot function and no alternative government can be formed by the leader of the opposition: Twomey, above n 26, 56–7.
