McConvillJamesSmithDarryl, (2000) 25(4) Alternative Law Journal177.
2.
See SinghNagendra, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, Kluwers Academic Publishers incorporating Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p.10.
3.
Ambassador Shabbai Roseanne in 1965, described Article 34(1) as being 'commonly regarded as the most out of tune with the requirements of modern law. As cited in JanisM., ‘Individuals and the International Court’, in MullerA.S., (eds), The International Court of Justice Its Future Role after Fifty Years, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1997 at p.207. For further discussion see, JanisM., ‘The International Court’, in JanisM., (ed.), International Courts for the Twenty-First Century, Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporating Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1992, p.31.
4.
JanisM., ‘Individuals and the International Court’, in Muller, above, pp.206–8.
5.
JanisM., ‘Individuals and the International Court’ in Muller, above, p.206.
6.
See the series of articles in MullerA.S., above. For example Szasz, ‘Granting International Organisations Ius Standi in the International Court of Justice’, pp.169–88.
7.
JanisMark, ‘Individuals and the International Court’, in Muller, (eds), above, at pp.205–16.
8.
Singh, above, p.5.
9.
McConvillSmith, above, p.177.
10.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, p.66. See the series of articles in de ChazournesLaurence BoissonSandsPhilippeInternational Law the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 1999, for example, Virginia Leary's article, ‘The WHO Case: Implications for Specialised Agencies’ pp.112–27.
11.
International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal Case (1956) ICJ Rep. 77, p.86.
12.
The Council of the League of Nations was the guarantor of the constitution for the Free State of Danzig under Art 103 of the Versailles Treaty, and so was authorised to deal with disputes over the legality of decrees made by the Senate of Danzig.
13.
This matter involved whether and on what basis, the UN General Assembly could refuse to give effect to the awards of the UN Administrative Tribunal.
14.
Under the instruction of the President of the Permanent Court, KeithK., The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice, AW Sijthoff, Leyden, 1971, p.169.
15.
Keith, above, p.169.
16.
Keith, above, pp.168–72.
17.
ILO case, ref 11, above, p.86, as cited in Keith, above.
18.
ILO case p.86.
19.
Keith, above, p.180.
20.
Keith, above, p.180.
21.
Judge Winiarski in his separate opinion made this point very clearly. And further argued that this dependency on its own would breach the principle of equality and therefore the Court should not have complied with the request for the advisory opinion. See (1956) ICJ Rep. 77, at p.107.
22.
Singh, above, p.29.
23.
The example of the USSR delegate asserting that the advisory opinion in the Expenses Case was beyond the UNC. See Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.245.
24.
See the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania ICJ Rep. (1950) 65, at p.71.
25.
Bulgaria, Hungry and Rumania in the Peace Treaties case; South Africa in the series of opinions of the South West Africa cases, refused to accept all three opinions; the former USSR and France in the Expenses case. Also whileno nation state argued against the UN's right to its claim and so accepted the ICJ's opinion, only Israel has paid any damages. See Pratap, above, pp.246–7.
26.
OjoB., Human Rights and the New World Order: Universality, Acceptability and Human Diversity, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 1997, p.53.