See the Australian, 13 August 1999, p.4 for Senator Stott Despoja's statement.
2.
While some critics have pointed to the severity of the special majority requirement, only five proposals have failed because they did not receive the necessary majorities in the States. In 1974, the desire to make ratification of constitutional referendums easier led the Whitlam government to an unsuccessful attempt to water down the required majorities for a referendum to pass.
3.
Note that while the final cost of the recent referendums on the Republic and the preamble will not be known until March/April 2000, it was in the order of $91m, excluding the cost of holding the Constitutional Convention of 1998 which cost around $27.5m. Thanks to Ian Stringall from the Australian Electoral Commission for information on the cost of the 1999 referendums.
4.
The images of the voter in the referendum process are explored in MilesRichard, ‘Australia's Constitutional Referendum: A Shield, Not a Sword’, (1998) 35(4) Representation: Journal of Representative Democracy237–46.
5.
This evidence is detailed in MilesRichard, Partisanship and Explanations of Voting in Australia's Constitutional Referendums, unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of Western Australia, 1997.
6.
Note that it was proposals of this kind, on the issue of proportional representation, that succeeded in New Zealand in the early 1990s.
7.
For an index estimating the relative difficulty of constitutional amendment processes, see LutzDonald S., ‘Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in LevinsonSanford (ed.), Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp.237–74. Note though that Lutz incorrectly calculated the index of difficulty for Australia to a value of 4.7. It should be 4.25. For comparison of the Australian record of formal constitutional amendment with the United States, see AltmanDennis, ‘Obstacles to Constitutional Change’, (1979) Australian Quarterly103–112 at 105; GalliganBrian, ‘The referendum process’, in A Federal Republic: Australia's Constitutional System of Government, University of Cambridge Press, 1995, p.121; and HuntErling M., ‘The Australian and American Provisions for Amendment’, in American Precedents in Australian Federation, Columbia University Press, 1930, pp.210–21. For comparison with New Zealand, see HughesC.A., ‘Australia and New Zealand’, in ButlerDavid and RanneyAustin (eds), Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy, Macmillan, 1994, pp.154–7. For comparison with Canada, see RussellPeter H., ‘The Politics of Frustration: The Pursuit of Formal Constitutional Change in Australia and Canada’, in Bruce W. Hodgins and others (eds), Federalism in Canada and Australia: Historical Perspectives, The Frost Centre for Canadian Heritage and Development Studies, Trent University, 1988, pp.59–85; and GibbinsRoger, ‘Constitutional Turmoil and Frustration: From Trudeau to Mulroney’ in WhittingtonMichael S. and WilliamsGlen (eds) Canadian Politics in the 1990s, Nelson, Canada, 1995.
8.
See Russell, above, ref 7, p.3.
9.
Note that Mr Beazley's plan for the republic is drawn from the Australian, 8 November 1999, p.3.
10.
See WranNeville, ‘The merits of minimalism’, pp.20–6 in UhrJohn (ed.), The Australian Republic: The Case for Yes, The Federation Press, 1999, p.20.
11.
LiJason Yat-Sen was an elected, independent delegate to the 1988 Constitutional Convention, co-chair of the NSW Yes coalition and federal government appointee to the national Yes committee for the 1999 referendum. The complaint was made in a radio debate broadcast on the ABC, Thursday, 4 November 1999.