Since the data necessary to make a formal quantitative analysis of Work for the Dole employment outcomes is not available to researchers who are independent of Commonwealth Government Departments, this article examines the (then) Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) net impact report, finding in it a number of weaknesses. The combined effect of these is to inflate the estimated value for net impact but a corrected estimate is still higher than many consider likely. Any figure for the net impact estimate of an Australian labour market program can only be a broad indicator. This article argues that in the case of Work for the Dole the net impact is definitely positive and by more than a trivial amount.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
CallesenP. (2000) ‘Active and Preventive Approaches: A Note Based on the Recent Danish Experience’, in Policies Towards Full Employment, OECD, Paris.
2.
DEWR (2002) Job Network Evaluation, Stage three: effectiveness report, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Canberra.
3.
DWER (2003) Labour Market Assistance Outcomes, Issue 10, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Australian Workplace web site, Canberra.
4.
DEWRSB (1999) Evaluation of the Work for the Dole Pilot programme, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Canberra.
5.
DEWRSB (2000) Work for the Dole: A Net Impact Study, Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business, Canberra.
6.
FriedlanderD.GreenbergD.H. (1997) ‘Evaluating government training programs for the economically disadvantaged’, Journal of Economic Literature, December, pp 1809–1855.
7.
HeckmanJ.J., LaLondeR.J. and SmithJ.A. (1999) ‘The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Markets Programs’, in AshenfelterO. and CardD. (Eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 3A, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
8.
HeckmanJ.J.SmithJ.A. (1995) ‘Assessing the case for social experiments’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp 55–110.
9.
JamesM.WoodenM.DawkinsP. (2002) ‘Minimum wage and the fallacy of the deflated denominator’, Economic Papers, September, pp 59–70.
10.
KrieslerP.HaleviJ. (2001) ‘Political aspects of Buffer Stock Employment’, Economic and Labour Relations Review, Supplement to Volume 12, pp 72-82
11.
KrieslerP. and NevileJ.W. (2003) ‘Macroeconomic Impacts of Globalisation’ in BlochH. (Ed) Growth and Development in the Global Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK.
12.
MartinJ. (2000) ‘What Works Among Active Labour Market Policies: Evidence from OECD Countries' Experience’, in Policies Towards Full Employment, OECD, Paris, pp 191–219.
13.
NevileJ.W. (2000) ‘Can Keynesian Policies Stimulate Growth in Output and Employment’ in BellS. (Ed), The Unemployment Crisis in Australia, Which Way Out, Cambridge University Press, pp 149–174.
14.
NevileJ.W. (2002a) ‘Should award wage rates be frozen’, Economic Papers, June, pp 26–35.
15.
NevileJ.W. (2002b) ‘Distorting the wage debate: a reply to James, Wooden and Dawkins’, Economic Papers, September, pp 71–74.
16.
NevileJ.W.NevileA. (2003 forthcoming) Work for the Dole: Obligation or Opportunity?Centre for Applied Economic Research, University of New South Wales, Sydney.
17.
OECD (2000) Economic Survey of Australia (Electronic version), Paris.
18.
OECD (2002) Innovations in Labour Market Policies: the Australian Way, Paris.
19.
Productivity Commission (2002) Independent Review of the Job Network, Report No. 21, Ausinfo, Canberra.
20.
RyanP. (2001) ‘The school-to-work transition: a cross-national perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature, March, pp 34–92.
21.
WebsterE. (2000) ‘What Role for Labour Market Programs’, in BellS. (Ed), The Unemployment Crisis in Australia, Which Way Out, Cambridge University Press, pp 149–174.
22.
StrombackT.DockeryA.M. (2000) Labour Market Programs, Unemployment and Employment Hazards, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.
