Abstract
The emergence of an internal control system to guide operations along the Rideau Canal beginning in 1832 is examined through analysis of a book of directives (the
Introduction
We examine the transfer of control technologies and labour processes from the British Royal Engineers to the civilian workforce on the Rideau Canal in the period 1832–1854 based upon a primary source accounting artefact (Francis and Samkin, 2014), the
Our first contribution is our identification of the transfer of control practices from the military to civilian workers in a non-war period. Our second contribution is our explicit focus on the Royal Engineers, which extends the work on accounting and the military to this branch of the British military and confirms ‘the importance of the role of military engineers in management history’ (Lemarchand, 2002: 26). Our third contribution is our assessment of a broad system of internal control practices, including the general control environment and specific control activities. For most papers on accounting and the military, control systems and internal control practices are addressed secondarily as part of broader research objectives (e.g., Black, 2015; Mayer-Sommer, 2010; Scorgie and Reiss, 1997). Furthermore, we focus on labour processes to show how discipline and self-discipline (Foucault, 1979) are fostered through the control practices, and how these controls function at a distance (Robson, 1992). We note most controls in the
The remaining part of this article proceeds as follows: the next section describes the context for the Rideau Canal’s construction and early operations; a discussion of principles of internal control being used by the Royal Engineers at the time follows. Relevant literature on accounting and the military and internal control is presented next. We then describe our method, and present findings and interpretations. A final section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
Context
The Rideau Canal – construction
The connection between the Rideau Canal and the military is intimate. Planning for the canal began during the War of 1812 which recognized the need for a secure transportation corridor at some distance from the St. Lawrence River (which forms the boundary between Canada and the United States) (Legget, 1986). The canal’s purpose was to enable troops and supplies to move safely, securely and rapidly to the British Naval base at Kingston, Ontario, from which point troops and supplies could sail Lake Ontario to the heart of Upper Canada at Fort York (present-day Toronto). The Rideau Canal avoided the narrowest part of the St. Lawrence River, across which it was feared a future invasion of Canada by the United States would take place. The approximate route of the Rideau Canal was mapped out as early as 1783 (Legget, 1986), preliminary estimates were developed in 1823–1824 (Bujaki, 2015) and detailed plans and estimates were prepared beginning in 1826. The canal was built as a military undertaking ‘in anticipation of war as the tangible means by which future wartime capabilities can be delivered or as a deterrent against potential aggression’ (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018: 3).
The Rideau Canal was constructed (1826–1832) under the superintendence of the British Royal Engineers in the colony of Upper Canada (now the Province of Ontario, Canada). 1 Managing the canal’s operations required coordinating activities through 49 locks, grouped around 24 lockstations, each managed by its own lockmaster. Water levels, labour processes and maintenance activities all required coordination. A particular challenge ‘was the lack of communication between lockstations. Messages had to be carried between lockstation[s] by a person on foot, on horseback or boat’ (Watson, 2019: The Early Years, para. 4). From its opening in May 1832 until its transfer to civilian control under the Province of Ontario in 1854, the Rideau Canal operated under the auspices of the British Royal Engineers (Tulloch, 1981). Despite its military roots, the Rideau Canal ultimately transported predominantly commercial goods. While manufactured goods typically transited the canal from Bytown (now Ottawa) to Kingston, natural resources, particularly logs for the British Royal Navy, moved north through the canal. 2
The Royal Engineers in Canada were headquartered at Quebec City. A Royal Engineers Office was established at Bytown to oversee the Rideau Canal. Captain (later Major) Daniel Bolton was Senior Royal Engineer for the Rideau Canal, John Burrowes was Overseer of Works and William Clegg was Clerk. To manage operations, the canal was divided into northern and southern sections. The northern section was managed from Bytown and the southern section from the southernmost lockstation, Kingston Mills. The watershed between the canal’s north- and south-flowing waters was at the Isthmus locksite (see Figure 1). 3 The Isthmus was overseen from Kingston Mills. Table 1 identifies individuals responsible for operations and internal control on the Rideau Canal and at the Isthmus lockstation, by position and tenure.

Rideau Canal system – Ottawa to Kingston, showing the location of the Isthmus.
Rideau Canal organizational structure and incumbents – extracts.
The Isthmus was of critical importance given its location on the watershed. A military blockhouse was built in 1832–1833 at the Isthmus for defence, one of only four built on the Rideau Canal. In addition, the Isthmus was one of seven locations designated to store supplies to support canal maintenance (
In the early years of its operation, orders for the running of the Rideau Canal were given by Captain Bolton and generally written up by William Clegg. These orders covered labour processes, documentation and authorization requirements. They were transmitted from the Rideau Canal Office (RCO) at Bytown or from one of the canal’s two district offices. Orders would transit the canal from lockstation to lockstation, with lockmasters required to copy each order into an
The Rideau Canal – objectives and control
The British Royal Engineers were charged with governance and management of the Rideau Canal. As noted, the canal was constructed with the primary objective of offering a secure water link between Ottawa and Kingston to enable the movement of troops and supplies should the United States try to invade Canada. A secondary objective for the canal was to generate a profit based upon tolls for water-based transportation of goods and settlers (Legget, 1986; Tulloch, 1981). These broad objectives were to be implemented throughout the navigation season in Canada (usually late April to November). We examine how general controls and control activities for the canal were manifest in the
The Royal Engineers’ Orders and Regulations
The British War Office published the
The The Master General having approved of the following Orders and Regulations for the guidance of the Corps of Royal Engineers and Royal Sappers and Miners, desires that every Officer belonging to those Corps shall provide himself with a Copy of them; that he shall make himself thoroughly acquainted with their contents; and that no deviation from them shall be allowed. (p. 1)
The
Literature review
Accounting and the military
Cobbin and Burrows’ (2018) review of papers on accounting and the military calls for additional research in this area. In particular, they identified only 10 articles addressing accounting and the military in peacetime. There is also a paucity of research on the use of internal controls in the early nineteenth century. We extend work in these areas using a single-site case study to examine internal controls during the early peacetime operation of the Rideau Canal. We focus on a microhistory of the Rideau Canal based upon the
Cobbin and Burrows (2018) note prior research on accounting in the military during peacetime focused on ‘four accounting themes – procedures, costing, disclosure and efficiency’ (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018: 13). We add to this coverage by examining workplace internal controls and oversight practices during the first decades of the Rideau Canal’s operation. Cobbin and Burrows (2018) argue ‘Advancements emerging from the demands of the military during peacetime are likely to emerge in a measured manner unaffected by the urgencies of war and so may have lasting impacts’ (p. 11). We assess developments in accounting (broadly defined to include internal control and reporting) in the context of the Rideau Canal through orders documented in the
Foreman (2002) focused on the transfer of accounting technologies between government military factories in Australia in 1910–1916. Regarding the transfer of technologies, Foreman (2002) noted ‘technology transfer may . . . include useful knowledge, including systems and procedures, and more specifically accounting systems and procedures’ (p. 34). Foreman concluded that accounting systems developed based on both the internal organizational contexts and external environments in which they were situated. The embeddedness of accounting systems is a theme picked up subsequently by Cinquini et al. (2016) and Djatej and Sarikas (2009). Foreman, building on Carnegie and Parker (1996), observed the transfer of accounting technologies between military factories was facilitated by ready access to, and a clear understanding of, the originating system. Furthermore, Black and Edwards (2016) noted that individuals moving from government to industry or vice versa were frequently responsible for ‘transferring accounting technology from one to the other’ (p. 307).
Within research on accounting and the military, a number of insights on audit and control practices have been documented. These observations have appeared within papers that have a broad focus on accounting. In contrast, our article is the first in this area to examine internal controls in depth. Scorgie and Reiss (1997) identified the importance of prior naval experience on accounting and control over inventory in the first penal colony in Australia in 1788. Specifically, they noted the first Commissary in the colony ‘drew on his prior experience in the navy and applied it to the management of the government store’ (Scorgie and Reiss, 1997: 66). A particularly strong feature of the naval system for control over inventory (or stores) was that no items could be issued without authorization. Mayer-Sommer (2010) examined the case of Isaac Henderson, a civilian Navy Agent and government disbursing officer during the US Civil War who was accused of defrauding the government. Mayer-Sommer identified a lack of segregation of incompatible duties in disbursement processing, noting clerks who approved disbursements also audited these disbursements. He concluded the control system was focused on maintaining an appearance of effective, efficient operations and functioned primarily as a legitimizing activity. We next turn to a brief review of literature on internal control.
Internal control
A brief history of internal control
Prior research provides some indication of the origins and evolution of accounting controls. Jones (2008) finds evidence of the ‘general concept of internal control and specific principles (such as authorisation, division of responsibility and observation) [being] well-entrenched in medieval England’ (p. 1056). He describes basic control activities in the thirteenth century suggestive of defined areas of responsibility, and expectations for documentation, authorisation, segregation of incompatible duties and safeguarding assets.
Cobbin and Burrows (2010) note that prior to the Audit Acts of 1832, 1846 and 1866, the focus in examining public expenditures in Britain was on stewardship of public funds, rather than efficiency or effective administration. Prior to 1846, these requirements focused predominately on checks that ‘departmental financial procedures had been followed; all expenditures were correctly authorised and total spending had not exceeded the total amount appropriated by parliament’ (Funnell, 1997: 16). Black and Edwards (2016) also noted an emphasis on authorization.
Technologies of audit or verification were also identified in prior research. Funnell (1997) noted that public sector audit requirements arose beginning in 1832 in the British Navy, then migrated to the British Army. Black (2015) identified auditors’ ticks on paylists and found that when British Army accounts were audited by the Office of Military Accounts, ‘each entry was supported either by an auditor’s red tick or observation’ (p. 73). Black and Edwards (2016) follow the careers of two civil servant accountants who worked together in the War Office of Victorian Britain. The accountants helped develop accounting practices in the 1860s such as tracking production costs for military expenditures and assessing make or buy decisions for guns supplied by the Royal Gun Factory. In describing the transfer of accounting practices from the private sector to the public sector and vice versa, Black and Edwards noted audit activities were common, but audit reports were frequently confined to the single word ‘Examined’.
Many military control procedures in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries focused on controls over assets (including inventory or stores). Scorgie and Reiss (1997) noted the importance of controls to manage inventory during the establishment of the first penal colony in Australia. Black (2015) noted many non-officer members of the British Army possessed the literacy and numeracy skills needed to keep detailed clerical records, including over stores, as required following financial reforms in the late 1700s designed to enhance parliamentary control over the military. Heier (2010) identified the importance of protecting and rebuilding railway assets during the Civil War in the United States. Djatej and Sarikas (2009) observed extraordinarily strict recordkeeping in Soviet accounting during World War II was part of a focus on protecting assets, needed due to shortages of raw materials and resources.
Schoderbek (1994) notes trial and error was relied upon in 1801–1802 to refine administrative and record keeping practices associated with the Land Act of 1800. Some checks and balances were used by land officers to detect errors, including preparation of duplicate receipts sent to the Treasury Department (‘Treasury’) and preparation of certificates of payment by Treasury. While individual land offices provided some internal control, oversight by Treasury was seen as ‘critical’ (Schoderbek, 1994: 210).
Internal control and governmentality
Foucault’s (1991) writings on discipline address how individuals come to discipline or control themselves and their activities. In this way, disciplinary technologies (Graham, 2010) achieve ‘the submission of bodies through the control of ideas’ (Foucault, 1991: 102). Governmentality (Foucault, 1991) is ‘the mentalities, rationalities and techniques through which subjects are controlled or governed’ (Gomes et al., 2014: 90). Governmentality is thought to function through mechanisms making individuals and their actions visible to those able to discipline bodies into ‘governable people’ (Foucault, 1991; Miller and O’Leary, 1987). Graham (2010) defined accounting as an ‘assemblage of calculative practices used to produce periodic reports within a relationship of accountability’ (p. 25). Accountability relationships imply differences in power between individuals and those to whom they report. Neu and Heincke (2004) applied governmentality concepts to subaltern or subordinate groups. Among their definition of ‘subordinate’ are groups subordinated in terms of their office or position. Given strict hierarchical relationships within the military, concepts of governmentality may be particularly apt in describing internal control in such environments.
Internal control from a distance
According to Miller and Rose (1990), accounting internal control systems ‘allow knowledge of distant sites to be mobilised and brought home to centres of calculation’ (p. 9), which facilitates control at a distance (Robson, 1992). Gomes et al. (2014) note ‘it is the quantitative orientation of accounting which facilitates the use of inscriptions, including accounting writing, numbers, lists and reports, in the form of accounting documents, to assist in enabling action at a distance’ (p. 91). Mouritsen et al. (2001) understand inscriptions as all narratives and numbers by which individuals are subject to calculation and discipline. Gallhofer and Haslam (1996) consider the form and structure of accounting statements and reports, including the use of prescribed formats, headings and columns as devices that make performance visible and subject to discipline. Graham (2010) describes ‘banal technologies’ as ways of knowing an individual and having individuals discipline themselves. Mennicken and Miller (2012) call these ‘technologies of calculation’ and note the political nature of these technologies which are used for ‘intervening in economic and social life’ (p. 6). Neu and Heincke (2004) consider reporting requirements a ‘technique of governmentality’ which translates policies into administrative practices and result in indirect power.
We next describe the method by which we explore the transfer of internal controls from the Royal Engineers to civilians in the context of the operation of the Rideau Canal in a manner that promoted discipline and governmentality at a distance.
Method
Beginning with an ‘opportunistic discovery’ (Francis and Samkin, 2014; Freeman, 1986) of an accounting artefact as part of a larger project on the Rideau Canal (Bujaki, 2010, 2015), we expanded our exploration to consider the social and organizational context in which the
Hollister and Schultz (2007) use microhistory in connection to the records of two stores in the 1790s. They focus on issues of power and control among the residents of a rural community, including unequal treatment of residents at the stores based on gender. They also describe basic accounting relating to inventory and customer accounts receivable. Samkin (2010) describes microhistory as using a reduced scale of observation, such as an event or locality to help convey the lived experiences of everyday life to readers. He uses microhistory to assess the transfer of British-style accounting technology in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth century by John Pringle of the East India Company. A microhistory approach allows us to focus on the local context of the Rideau Canal, specifically the Isthmus lockstation, in the early years of the canal’s operation. It also allows us to examine the context in which lockmaster Daniel McDonald worked and to observe the transfer of control systems and labour processes from the Royal Engineers to civilian canal workers.
We obtained a copy of the
Findings and interpretation – Order Book
Order Book, Isthmus – Overview of contents
The
The

Number of orders entered by year.
The first order in the

Panel A: Original image of ‘Instructions to Lockmasters’. Panel B: Transcription of ‘Instructions to Lockmasters’ [relevant control activities].
Orders by internal control classification
Each of the orders in the
Panel A: Orders by type of control activity.
General controls are addressed in 30 orders (Table 2, Panel A). Over 100 orders address documentation (Table 2, Panel B). This focus on documentation is not surprising as the
Findings and interpretation – general controls
General controls address proper conduct and list characteristics and other expectations of lockmasters and locklabourers. General controls are intended to influence the ‘control consciousness’ of people, suggesting employees are to internalize these and govern themselves accordingly (Foucault, 1991). The general controls, together with the more specific control activities discussed subsequently, enhanced the ability to remotely exert surveillance, punishment, discipline and normalization (Foucault, 1979; Macintosh, 2005) over lockmasters and locklabourers. We describe illustrative orders below, grouped by category of general controls.
Communication of proper conduct and expectations
Although Black (2015) notes there were more literate soldiers in the British Army in the early 1800s than previously thought, many workers on the canal were illiterate. This was particularly true for temporary locklabourers (usually hired as workers for the navigation season only). Expectations regarding proper conduct were communicated in writing to lockmasters, who were to communicate these expectations to their labourers verbally. Orders under this category of general controls addressed matters such as punishment: the suspension of a locklabourer for ‘highly improper conduct’ (25 March 1838) and the communication of this to other locklabourers; discipline: the need for ‘the utmost vigilance’ (27 September 1841) to ensure protection of the canal works (infrastructure); normalization through the description of characteristics of desirable labourers; and prohibitions against lockmasters employing relatives as labourers or engaging in political activities. Each of these orders seeks to discipline lockmasters and locklabourers ‘at a distance’ (Robson, 1992), even when no representatives from the RCO were on site. Additional examples of general controls are provided in Table 3, Panel A. The characteristics of a ‘superior class of men’ noted in Table 3, Panel A, suggest locklabourers should be subject to both discipline by the lockmaster and self-discipline (Foucault, 1991). That example also indicates orders were intended to intervene in economic and social life (Mennicken and Miller, 2012) along the canal.
General control examples (e.g., communication, proper conduct, competence).
Expectations of lockmaster and locklabourers
Several canal orders address competence. In approving an exception when a temporary locklabourer was appointed to a permanent locklabourer’s position, the usual competencies required of permanent workers are made clear: literacy, ‘good character’ and self-discipline, comprising ‘industry, obedience and sobriety’ (15 November 1847). Concerns related to intoxication among locklabourers were not uncommon. In one order, two locklabourers were reprimanded for intoxication and for ‘using disrespectful language (interspersed with Oaths) with reference to the Officers of the Royal Engineers’ (25 May 1849). When repair work on the canal took place after the season, it was preferable temporary locklabourers be hired to assist permanent locklabourers to complete these repairs (16 November 1840). This helped ensure competent individuals completed the repairs. Numerous orders reproach lockmasters for inadequacies in maintaining their journals, as the presentation of inadequate information made it ‘extremely difficult’ (26 May 1842) to monitor their performance. Directions for maintaining their books in the future (26 May 1842) taught them how they should govern themselves going forward.
As we examine only orders issued to lockmasters, it is not possible to assess directly the involvement of Royal Engineers in governing the canal. However, there are indications of surveillance by engineering officers regularly conducting inspections of locksites and lockmasters’ records (2 March 1836). Several orders illustrate the approach taken by Royal Engineers in directing activities on the canal. For example, Captain Bolton issued a number of directives to lockmasters in 1836. His first observation expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of care taken by several lockmasters in their duties (2 March 1836). He reprimands the lockmasters and reminds them to be more disciplined in their activities and recordkeeping. In addition, he reminds lockmasters their activities are subject to periodic monitoring and disciplinary action. Generally, orders reiterate management’s expectations of workers at the beginning of each navigation season and locklabourers are reminded that ‘zeal’ and ‘devotion’ (23 March 1849) are expected of them. Failing this, even permanent employees were subject to discipline and dismissal.
Although most orders addressed the performance and behaviour of lockmasters and locklabourers, one order indicated the Rideau Canal officers were also concerned about working conditions encountered by lockmasters. In particular, the officers expressed concern about verbal abuse directed at lockmasters by individuals passing through the canal. While the officers communicated support for lockmasters in conducting their duties, they also reminded lockmasters to exercise self-discipline (be ‘decorus’, ‘conciliatory’ and ‘abstain from speaking’ (11 September 1844)) in discharging their duties. Other indications of management’s attitude towards labourers are evident in the officers’ concern for workers in two orders issued in 1847. The first addresses introducing a form of pension, while the second touches on the possibility of medical benefits. An additional order in 1851 instructed lockmasters to be ‘most particular in not permitting a [lock] gate to be moved on any account until vessels approaching the Locks have lost their head way [stopped moving forward], or are properly secured’ (4 November 1851). This order was issued following the injury of a locklabourer, which was ‘of a similar nature [to an accident which] occurred in 1842 on the Ottawa Canal by which the man lost his life’ (4 November 1851). Finally, concern for canal workers’ employment prospects was expressed in 1853, in the lead up to transfer of the Rideau Canal to the Province of Ontario. These orders indicate concern for safety, the need for assistance during the transition between military and civilian oversight of canal operations, and that good conduct and self-discipline are to be rewarded with pensions. Many of these orders regarding expectations for lockmasters and locklabourers are similar to orders governing the Royal Engineers at the time. Additional examples are provided in Table 3, Panel B.
Organizational structure and accountability
Orders in the
Lockmasters were responsible for sending documents or reports to other stations and the RCO. After a ‘letter of importance’ went missing, an Order was circulated that All the letters &c on the public service directed to be forwarded to any particular or from Station should be sent by persons connected with the Department and not with strangers, as they cannot be held responsible for the safe delivery of them . . . (5 October 1851)
This order helped to ensure communications were not disrupted or delayed.
Orders constrained lockmasters’ authority regarding staffing matters. Lockmasters were able to select locklabourers, subject to the complement set by the RCO. For example, the Lockmaster at the Isthmus was authorized to hire two temporary labourers (13 April 1844). However, lockmasters were not able to dismiss locklabourers (5 December 1848). Further examples of orders concerning interactions with locklabourers are presented in Table 3, Panel C (including a clear hierarchy of positions that seems to have been transferred from the military
Lockmasters were accountable to the Royal Engineers. When there were changes in military staff appointments, lockmasters were told to whom they should now submit their reports (17 January 1837). Thus, a formal organizational structure and clear expectations for responsibility, authority and accountability were established. In addition, written warnings were provided about the consequences of individuals failing to perform their duties. For example, ‘The [senior] Royal Engineer . . . find[s] fault with the Lockmaster of the Detached Lock at Smiths Falls and if not more attentive he will be discharged’ (24 March 1840). Furthermore, The lockmasters on the canal are cautioned against this irregularity [absence from their station without leave] and should it come under the notice of the respective officers that any deviation is made from this order a report of the circumstance will immediately be made to the master General and Board with a recommendation that the party should be removed from his station. (4 July 1844)
The
Findings and interpretation – internal control activities
We now turn to an examination of specific internal control activities in the
Documentation
The largest number of orders in the
The first order recorded in the

Panel A: Weekly progress report. Panel B: Transcript of Format Weekly Progress Report of Works.
In several instances, deficiencies in the format, timeliness or content of reports were noted in the orders, usually along with calls for greater care in reporting (e.g., 19 December 1835). Sometimes these instances referred explicitly to deficiencies, and in other cases, the deficiencies need to be inferred. For example, the order ‘The Lockmasters will be carefull [
Directives regarding adequate documents and records related to labour matters included the format in which the list of temporary locklabourers was to be submitted (April 1838) and notification of punishment in the form of suspension notices (‘In consequence of the highly improper conduct of Locklabourer Baldwyn the senior Royal Engineer Considers it necessary to suspend him for three months’ (25 May 1838)). Lockmasters were further directed to ‘enter the above [disciplinary action] in their journals and will read it to their several locklabourers’ (25 May 1838), thus communicating norms of proper conduct. Other reporting requirements addressed reporting annually on inventory at their lockstation (30 March 1848). Orders regulate the daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal activities of lockmasters; mandatory reports document activities to make their performance visible. Additional orders addressing reporting requirements for water management and navigational matters are illustrated in Table 4, Panel A.
Internal control activities examples.
The final category of records and documents addresses collection of tolls from boats transiting the canal and certifying work done by contractors. Requirements for adequate documents and records helped define expectations and discipline lockmasters. In addition, these requirements helped make the activities of locklabourers, lockmasters, contractors and canal users visible to, and subject to discipline by, officers at the RCO.
Comparing the above internal control activities to documentation in the
Physical control over assets and records
The second largest category of orders addressing control activities focused on physical controls over custody or access to assets or records (as noted in Table 2). Lockmasters were responsible for the maintenance of, and restricting access to, their
locksites and surrounding land. Lockmasters had custody and control over several types of assets: stores, tools (2 March 1836) and houses. Four locksites, including the Isthmus, also had blockhouses built for protection of the canal. Subcategories of orders addressing physical controls included those focused on restricting unauthorized access to the canal or other assets, protecting canal infrastructure from damage, the lockmaster’s responsibility for resources under his charge, and records of tolls collected and vessels passing through the locks.
Maintaining physical control over assets and records helps ensure canal assets are available for use when needed, not used inappropriately or by unauthorized individuals, and that proper control over records is maintained. The greatest number of these orders relate to unauthorized access to canal lands or assets. Orders to prevent unauthorized access, prohibited depositing wood for the use of steam boats on the canal (10 March 1834), ensured houses were adequately secured (18 September 1835), maintained control of tools and stores at the lockstation (2 March 1836), and addressed regaining control over canal houses when lock personnel change (14 July 1848). Additional examples of controls to ensure physical control over assets and records are provided in Table 4, Panel B.
One way to encourage the protection of assets and records is to clearly identify the individual responsible for resources under their charge. Generally, this was the lockmaster. For example, ‘Lockmaster Broad will proceed to Black Rapids and take charge of that Station Receiving over from L[ock]master Clegg the stores & Tools &c &c’ (15 October 1840). Lockmasters were also clearly identified as responsible for tools located on site (15 September 1834; 17 November 1845) and for resources such as writing paper (13 April 1846). These orders served to outline lockmasters’ responsibilities and discipline their activities.
A focus on physical control over assets and records is also evident in the Royal Engineers’
Authorization
Seventy-eight of the orders for the operation of the canal represent control activities addressing authorization. Most of these orders addressed labour processes, frequently the taking on, or laying off, of temporary locklabourers (e.g., 7 April 1847). Orders addressing authorization related to stores or materials were next most common, followed by orders authorizing the passage of boats through the canal. Three orders addressed tolls and one authorized a uniform for lockmasters to wear. For example, lockmasters were authorized to select temporary locklabourers within the complement of staff approved by the RCO (7 April 1847). Some orders signalled the limits of lockmasters’ authority, for example, their inability to purchase supplies (15 September 1834) or dismiss labourers (5 December 1848) without authorization. Within the limits of their authority, however, lockmasters had considerable discretion.
Lockmasters are alone responsible, that the navigation of the Canal is not unnecessarily impeded – Therefore the[y] have full authority to suspend as a temporary measure for the security [protection] of the works or in order to pass Boats &c what ever repairs may be in execution . . . (10 July 1837)
In contrast, Section VII of the where Works or Repairs may become necessary that have not been sanctioned by the Master General or Board, the Engineer must not, of his own accord, undertake to perform them . . . [and] he is on no account to incur any expense, to be charged to the Ordnance, that they have not previously authorised. (
Thus, the lockmasters enjoyed greater authority over emergency repairs than engineering officers.
Independent checks of performance
Thirty-seven orders included in the
Numerous orders indicate lockmasters’ records or their locksites are to be inspected (e.g., 9 May 1835; 28 August 1840), remind lockmasters that periodic counts of stores are expected (29 April 1841), explanations (or payment) for any shortages will be required (2 March 1836) and advise lockmasters their performance is being monitored (19 August 1837). In these ways, lockmasters were put on notice their actions were subject to oversight.
Evidence of inspection was noted in the margins of several orders in the

Panel A: Image of order dated 14 August 1840, showing evidence in margin of examination on 8 September 1840. Panel B: Transcription of 14 August 1840 order and marginal note showing evidence of examination 8 September 1840.
Surveillance, including independent checks of performance, took place at many levels on the canal. Lockmasters’ actions were verified by canal officers. In turn, lockmasters verified the performance of locklabourers. For example, locklabourers were to focus on their ‘public duty’ during work hours (30 May 1840), and lockmasters were to inspect the works at their locksite daily to identify and address any defects (17 March 1845). Lockmasters also conducted independent checks of work done by contractors (see examples in Table 4, Panel C), verified quantities of goods passing through the canal and calculated tolls, especially for the movement of timber or logs (22 March 1836; 24 February 1840).
Both the narratives and numbers (Gomes et al., 2014) produced or certified by the lockmasters were components of the disciplinary system of internal controls. Lockmasters were enmeshed in independent checks of performance. Their own performance was monitored and verified, and they in turn monitored and verified the work of others. Unlike early single-site factory settings such as the New Lanark Cotton Factory (Walsh and Stewart, 1993) and Wedgwood (Macintosh, 2005), the widely separated canal locksites presented challenges that were addressed using quasi-military practices to make the activities of lockmasters, locklabourers, contractors and canal users visible at a distance.
There are strong similarities between the orders in the
Segregation of incompatible duties
Only seven orders in the
In some cases, the orders explicitly prohibited conflicting activities, while in other circumstances, restrictions were placed on the incompatible duties (lockmasters could accept wages on behalf of labourers, but were not to authorize this themselves). There were, however, some incompatible duties that could not be carried out by different individuals at the lockstation. In particular, the lockmaster’s duties necessitated him both collecting and recording tolls, as he may have been the only literate employee on site. In the absence of opportunities for segregation of some incompatible duties, and given limitations on physical surveillance due to the distances involved, other internal control mechanisms were introduced. For example, lockmasters were asked to swear oaths before a justice of the peace, or to issue affidavits attesting to the veracity of their reports, particularly relating to tolls collected. The prescribed format for such oaths included the following wording: [he] ‘. . . maketh oath and saith that the before mentioned is a true and faithful statement of the several sums received by him on account of Lock dues within the period from [blank] to [blank]’ (16 May 1836). Internal controls addressing the segregation of incompatible duties served to constrain lockmasters’ discretion and limit their opportunities to take financial or personal advantage of their positions. However, the effectiveness of these controls was limited because the actions of lockmasters were not always observable. When this was the case, the general controls which had been established served to support the control activities, by ensuring lockmasters were clear on their ethical obligations (e.g., by swearing an oath or signing an affidavit), ensuring their competence and characteristics (including literacy, sobriety, honesty and commitment to the canal), and clarifying their authorities and accountabilities.
Conclusion and directions for future research
Our study focuses on a non-war period and considers the control systems implemented to foster operational efficiency in preparation for possible military conflict. The canal was intended to serve both military and civilian uses, and the control system needed to accommodate and reflect both uses. We identify controls relevant to the general control environment, as well as more specific control activities. This singular focus on controls is unique in the accounting and military literature. We focus on the following aspects of the control system and control technologies: the transfer of accounting technologies from the Royal Engineers to the canal workforce; the control environment; authorization; examination; custody of assets; record keeping; and segregation of incompatible duties. Many orders address controls over documentation, safeguarding assets and authorization. We find relatively few controls addressed segregation of incompatible duties in the
The microhistory of the early operations of the Rideau Canal’s Isthmus lockstation provides evidence that internal controls, inscriptions, calculative practices, narratives and numbers were used to discipline the canal’s operations and employees. In particular, directives in the
We extend prior work undertaken on accounting and the military based on the Royal Navy and Army (Funnell, 1997; Scorgie and Reiss, 1997) to the British Royal Engineers. We focus specifically on internal control practices and find control technologies were transferred from the Royal Engineers to civilian workers on the Rideau Canal during peacetime. On the canal, civilian lockmasters were subordinate to the military officers overseeing the canal and the ‘calculative practices’ established in the
Several additional avenues for future research are suggested by these findings. Although Foucault (1991) notes discipline and techniques of governmentality can be resisted, we noted only limited evidence of resistance in the orders recorded in the
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the CPA Ontario Centre for Capital Markets and Behavioural Decision Making Research for financial support. We thank reviewers and participants at the World Canals Conference, Athlone, Ireland, September 2018; the 10th
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article aside from financial support for the research detailed in the acknowledgements above.
