Governing neo-nationalism,trade unions and industrial relations: the cases of Hungary and Poland

Abstract

Neo-nationalist parties emerged victorious in Hungary and Poland after the financial crisis as a political consequence of disenchantment with the neoliberal approaches ushered in by EU accession and subordinate economic integration. This article analyses, in a comparative perspective, the strategies adopted by the governing neo-nationalist parties in Hungary and Poland with regard to trade unions and industrial relations as part of their broader political-economic projects.

When they began EU accession talks in the late 1990s, Central and Eastern European governments embarked decisively on a course of foreign direct investment (FDI)-led and export-oriented development. In line with EU demands, governments further radicalised the prescribed neoliberal reforms. EU accession and deeper economic integration were supposed to facilitate an eventual catch-up with EU core economies and higher living standards, although the chosen integration patterns implied a subordinate integration into Germany-centred production chains. The ensuing crisis led to widespread disillusionment with the FDI-centred catch-up strategy and to a certain alienation from pro-EU liberal forces and their pro-austerity and anti-social welfare orientation (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2022: 179). In response to the crisis and the broad disenchantment with the neoliberal policies promoted by the EU, right-wing nationalist parties in the Central and Eastern European industrial periphery increasingly introduced national conservative elements into their state projects, and economic and social policies. The accentuation of nationalist elements is not confined to the region, however, and can be regarded as part of a broader neo-nationalist tendency. French political scientist Bertrand Badie (in Badie and Foucher, 2017: 12 ff) characterises this wave of nationalism as ‘neo-nationalist’ because it emerged after the end of a period of international bi-polarity and as a reaction to enhanced globalisation. Neo-nationalism can be subdivided into several ideational currents, in particular a neoliberal and a national-conservative current (Becker, 2018).

The neo-nationalist turn proved to be electorally very successful for Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség; Fidesz) in Hungary and Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość; PiS) in Poland. These two parties’ prolonged periods in government enable us to analyse what right-wing neo-nationalist parties do when they are in office. This article is focused on the question of how the above-mentioned governing neo-nationalist parties have reshaped access channels to the state in the area of industrial relations, and more generally how they have reshaped industrial relations in the wider context of their political-economic projects. The comparative analysis will also address the ideational foundations on which these socio-economic strategies are based.

Ideationally based comparative analysis is a rather neglected dimension of research on the industrial relations policies of governing neo-nationalist parties. Industrial relations are at the intersection of accumulation regimes and social reproduction, as well as related economic and social policies. They must therefore be analysed in the wider context of the ruling parties’ state project, economic strategy and social policies. The governing experiences of Fidesz and PiS are particularly instructive cases for a comparative study. The two parties’ strategies have wrought substantial changes; they have managed to avoid any need to enter into broader coalitions; and they have governed over an extended period. At the same time, their governing experiences differ somewhat. The governing experiences of Fidesz and PiS are particularly relevant because they have served as an inspiration to neo-nationalist parties in other countries.

We shall develop a classificatory framework that identifies the key conceptual traits of neoliberal and conservative-nationalist state projects, economic policies, social policies and industrial relations as an analytical framework for examining their governing practice. The analytical framework will be applied to the two cases after a brief overview of state transformation, and economic, social and industrial policy directions in the wake of EU accession. The study relies on secondary literature, press reports and trade union confederation websites.

Debates on neoliberal and national-conservative varieties of (neo-)nationalism

There are two different strands of analysis in relation to the partial turn away from neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. One strand addresses this turn within the framework of the older debate on varieties of capitalism in the region. It seeks to identify new national forms of capitalism and their stabilised institutional settings. They attach ideational labels to some forms of capitalism, but not all. Thus, the ideational foundations are not a systematic guiding principle for identifying specific forms of capitalism. The other strand approaches the issue in terms of the ideationally based socio-economic concepts guiding different nationalist right-wing parties. It provides a framework for analysis of the strategies of various neo-nationalist parties. It does not concern stabilised institutions, but combinations of party strategies and visions. It helps us to deal analytically with different combinations of nationalist neoliberal and national-conservative elements in party strategies.

Until the great financial crisis of 2008, comparative capitalism research, such as that of Bohle and Greskovits (2012), revolved closely around neoliberalism. With the partial moves away from neoliberalism in the wake of the financial crisis, the basically pre-crisis comparative classification became insufficient. An ambiguity is discernible in Orenstein and Bugarič’s (2022) definitions of new ideational directions in a comparative study on changing economic strategies in Central and Eastern Europe, although they identify the incorporation of some conservative elements into the ideologies of nationalist parties. They relate this conservatism mainly to values of patriotism, religion and the traditional family (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2022: 182). They do not however discuss in detail the relationship between overarching ideological notions, the guiding socio-economic concepts for more statist economic policies and concrete economic practice.

Recently, Bohle et al. (2022) have developed an analytical framework that defines different forms of contemporary capitalism: neoliberal capitalism, authoritarian neoliberalism, conservative developmentalism and authoritarian capitalism. The latter three forms are conceived as pathways towards more authoritarian forms of capitalism whose features they want to identify. Although the authors attach ideational labels to some forms of capitalism, they are not interested in their ideational guiding concepts. To that extent, their analytical approach is not well suited to identifying the different currents of neo-nationalist parties and their guiding socio-economic concepts.

A different strand of the debate refers to an ideational differentiation among neo-nationalist political forces (for example, Becker, 2018: 5 ff; Bluhm and Varga, 2020; Buzogány and Varga, 2018) regarding socio-economic issues. For example, Buzogány and Varga (2018) identify strong conservative ideational filiations of the re-positioned Central and Eastern European (neo-)nationalist right, for example, regarding the role of the state, the shape of economic policies or gender relations. Bluhm and Varga (2020: 645 ff) discuss new conservative concepts of a conservative developmental state and family-centred conservative social policies developed in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the practice of nationalist governments in Russia, Hungary and Poland.

The narrower literature on the industrial relations policies of neo-nationalist governments in Central and Eastern Europe has not been closely related to the debate on different strands of neo-nationalism. In an early paper, Tóth et al. (2012: 145) characterised Fidesz’s approach as a ‘conservative revolution’. In a subsequent text, Tóth (2015) labels the Fidesz project as ‘selective economic nationalism’ without going into the debate on its rather conservative or neoliberal orientation. In this text, Tóth (2015: 242) characterises the Fidesz state project and industrial relations approach as ‘omnipotent government’ in terms associated with Ludwig von Mises, a (neo-)liberal economist strongly opposed to state intervention. Analyses of the Polish case identify a more accommodating approach to tripartite structures and focus rather on the relations between the PiS and the national-conservative trade union federation Solidarność (Self-Governing Independent Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ – Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy ‘Solidarność’ or NSZZ Solidarność) (for example, Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018). Thus, the individual case studies identify different approaches to industrial relations among neo-nationalist parties in the region. A more systematic comparative analysis of the different neo-nationalist approaches to industrial relations thus makes sense. A recent study by Kim et al. (2022: 219 ff) provides comparative insights into the strategies of right-wing trade union actors and the reaction of non-right-wing trade unions on the factory floor in six European countries, including Hungary and Poland. It confirms the variety of right-wing parties, their relations with trade unions and strategies at the firm level. With its primarily micro-level focus, it differs from the research interest of this article, but confirms the relevance of a systematic comparative approach to right-wing parties and their trade union strategies.

Analytical framework

This article is situated in a strand of comparative research into the various socio-economic concepts of neo-nationalist parties, and not only in Central and Eastern Europe. It develops a framework of key socio-economic concepts for two neo-nationalist currents: neoliberalism and national conservatism. Neo-nationalist parties draw selectively on ideas from these two currents. In order to reconstruct these socio-economic concepts, we have to draw on conceptual contributions from theoreticians of these currents, in particular the important contemporary contributions from the region (Buzogány and Varga, 2018). The secondary literature is also referred to. The neo-nationalist state project is of central importance. The state project defines the structuring of access to state decision-making centres of various social and political forces. What is at stake is thus the issue of changes in ‘strategic selectivity’ in Jessop’s sense. By ‘strategic selectivity’, Jessop understands

the ways in which the state considered as a social ensemble has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political forces to pursue particular interests and strategies in specific spatio-temporal contexts through their access to and/or control over given state capacities – capacities that always depend for their effectiveness on links to forces and powers that exist and operate beyond the state’s formal boundaries. (Jessop, 2002: 40)

Changes in the strategic selectivity of the state affect the ability of different social and political actors to influence and shape policies. The state project defines the relationship between the state, parties and civil society (which includes business organisations and trade unions). Industrial relations are closely linked to the state project as they define the relationship between capital, labour and the state. For the purposes of this article, it is not sufficient to focus only on industrial relations policies. These have to be seen in the wider context of economic and social policy strategies, dealing respectively with accumulation and reproduction, as they impact industrial relations policies. Thus, the analytical framework in this article highlights four areas: the state project, economic policy, social policy and industrial relations. In different ways, the concepts relate critically to aspects of EU integration.

The classification presented in this article relies heavily on an earlier study (Becker, 2018: 5 ff) that deals with the conceptual debates, programmes and practices of neo-nationalist forces in both western and Central and Eastern Europe. It also goes beyond it, however, as it deals explicitly with neo-nationalist approaches to industrial relations.

State project

The neoliberal conception emphasises a strong norm-setting state that is insulated from societal influences. From a Hayekian perspective, such a state should give primacy to economic freedom (Hayek, 2011: 166). Because democratic processes might lead to different priorities, neoliberal theoreticians envisage circumscribing the powers of parliaments and curbing the institutionalised influence of collective interest groups, in particular trade unions (Rüstow, 2001: 132). They favour rule-based policies and the empowerment of technocratic institutions, which are not subject to democratic control. Supiot (2015: 312) characterises these conceptions of the state as ‘limited democracy’. Nationalist neoliberals are in line with traditional neoliberal concepts regarding insulating the state. They want strong decision-making powers for nation states in the EU, however (Becker, 2018: 39 ff).

In contrast to the neoliberal depoliticising and technocratic conceptions of the state, contemporary national-conservative intellectuals pursue an agenda of re-politicisation. Krasnodębski (2003: 54), a key national-conservative intellectual from Poland, accentuates the importance of the ‘will of the majority’. Krasnodębski (2003: 299) draws on republican concepts of the state and democracy. In his national republicanism he posits a strong link between ‘demos’ and ‘nation’. From a national-conservative point of view, an electoral victory by nationalist forces should be regarded as a strong national mandate that gives the new government sweeping powers and the ‘moral right to start from zero’ (Bucholc and Komornik, 2016: 87). This might also include interference in the judiciary if judicial institutions are regarded as an impediment to the national agenda. National conservative theoreticians such as Márton Békés have formulated a state project that goes beyond the narrow confines of the state. From a right-wing ‘Gramscian’ perspective Békés (2022: 94 ff, 133), an ‘organic intellectual’ associated with Fidesz, highlights the formation of a ‘national bloc’, including a nationalist civil society, aiming at achieving ‘cultural hegemony’ (Békés, 2022: 115). The national-conservative conception of the state (and civil society) tends to limit the field of legitimate political forces to ‘national’ forces. The national-conservative state concept implies a critique of the depoliticised form of EU policy-making. In addition, national-conservatives seek to strengthen the role of national governments in the EU and have strong reservations about any supranational elements of EU integration (Becker, 2018: 46).

Economic policies

In line with their conception of the state, neoliberals favour rule-based economic policy-making, leaving little discretionary space to the state (Supiot, 2015: 228 ff). The forms of neoliberal economic nationalism are implicit, for example, demanding national policy spaces for lowering standards in peripheral states (Becker, 2018: 38 ff).

National conservatives’ contemporary economic policy concepts cannot be defined so neatly. In general, however, they exhibit interventionist and developmentalist trends (Bluhm and Varga, 2020). They share an emphasis on a fairly pro-active developmental role for the state and selective protectionism with earlier conservative inclined currents (see for example, Woźniak, 2017: 57).

Social policy

In the tradition of the liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26 ff), neoliberals advocate state provision of social security mainly for the poor. Such state support is linked to stigmatising means tests. In a nationalist framework, stigmatising rules and exclusionary practices are particularly targeted – explicitly or implicitly – at ethnic minorities (for example, Roma), migrants and refugees. Higher income groups are supposed to rely rather on private forms of security, such as private health insurance and private pensions.

National-conservative social policy concepts are in the tradition of the conservative welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 10 ff). Conservative social policies aim at conserving existing hierarchies and ‘traditional’ gender roles (men as the main breadwinners and women primarily relegated to house work). Social security provision is closely linked to wage labour. Social insurance plays a key role. Contemporary national-conservative thinking emphasises the family, conceived in traditional way, as the basis of society (for example, Zárug, 2022: 16) and professes pro-natalist aims. In this vein, family policies are aimed at restoring the male (main) breadwinner model. National conservatives view the family as the basis of the (usually ethnically defined) nation. Family policies are supposed to link the preservation of both ‘family’ and ‘nation’ (Graff and Korolczuk, 2022: 26 ff). National-conservative social policy can take the form of open or subtle discrimination against ethnic minorities and LGBT groups, as well as an anti-migration stance.

Industrial relations and relations with trade unions

Neoliberal intellectuals denounce trade unions as a form of monopoly power in line with their individualistic approach. They prefer to make individual contracts the cornerstone of labour relations. Collective bargaining is at the very least to be drastically decentralised. From the outset, they sought to reduce trade union influence over government policy-making (for example, Rüstow, 2001: 134 ff). This results in a downgrading or even dissolution of tripartite structures.

National-conservative positions are more open to collective forms of interest representation, including trade unions. Class-based organisations are necessary, admitted Schmoller (1920: 452), a key representative of the late Historical School of economic thinking, but state and law should ‘build channels’ to make them work for the sake of society. From such a perspective, forms of social concertation can be viewed as contributing to finding (and conserving) a social balance and as being in the national interest. From contemporary conservatives’ more politicised perspective, trade unions can also be viewed as a potential part of a ‘nationalist’ civil society, and a form of integration into a ‘national bloc’ (Békés, 2022: 122). In order to win over or retain national-conservative trade unions as part of nationalist civil society, nationalist forces in the state have to make them a concrete offer, for example, regarding consultation and policies.

But how do Fidesz and the PiS balance neoliberal and national-conservative elements and to which socio-economic groups do they offer forms of protection? This article focuses on how their approaches to industrial relations fit into this wider picture.

Capitalist transformation, EU accession and incipient industrial relations

The Hungarian and Polish governments, generally speaking, applied neoliberal formulae from the very beginning. The remodelling of state institutions was also shaped on this basis. The neoliberal governance structure became more firmly institutionalised with the start of EU accession talks, when the European Commission gained significant leverage over Central and Eastern European governments (Vachudova, 2005).

Neoliberal state structures were geared closely towards business interests. While in Hungary foreign capital was in the focus of economic policy from the very beginning, Poland was more of a late starter (Drahokoupil, 2009: 100 ff). As EU accession talks proceeded and the associated pressures grew, the economic policies of both countries became focused on attracting foreign capital. They provided appropriate incentives and a favourable regulatory framework. Domestic capital was relegated to secondary status, especially in Hungary. The export orientation and financial vulnerabilities were more pronounced in Hungary than in Poland.

After efforts to tackle the social emergencies of the early transformation period, a neoliberalisation of the initially fairly conservative welfare state was launched, with a focus on pensions in the late 1990s (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2011: 194 ff).

The influence of EU integration was indirect because industrial relations policies are a national competence in the EU. Neoliberal integration made wages a key element of competitive strategies in Central and Eastern Europe. This occurred directly within the framework of FDI-based subordinated integration into industrial production chains, and indirectly through tax competition, constraining the tax base and resulting in underfunded public services often paying public employees low wages. This is not favourable terrain for building strong unions and collective bargaining structures. In both Hungary and Poland, competing trade union confederations emerged with diverging and conflicting political orientations. Hungarian trade unions were particularly fragmented. The Hungarian Trade Union Confederation (Magyar Szakszervezeti Szövetség, MASZ) and two public sector trade union federations were rather centre-left, while the Democratic League of Trade Independent Trade Unions (Független Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligája, LIGA) and the National Confederation of Workers’ Councils (Munkástanácsok Országos Szövetsége, MOSZ) leaned towards the right. In Poland, there are three major trade union confederations: the national-conservative NSSZ Solidarność, the social democratically inclined All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolski Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ) and the rather apolitical Forum of Trade Unions (Forum Związków Zawodowych, FZZ).

Most confederations established links to political forces, initially quite strong ones in some instances (Gardawski, 2009; Ost, 2001; Tóth, 2001). Political links were a way of building institutional power in the face of difficult organising conditions. NSZZ Solidarność went the furthest in its political commitments. In the early 1990s, it prioritised backing the political forces that had emerged out of Solidarity and their transformation strategy, together with the controversial Balcerowicz plan’s privatisation policy, over defending workers’ immediate material interests in the face of frequent factory closures (Ost, 2001: 81 ff; Ost, 2005: 50 ff). For the 1997 elections, it initiated an electoral alliance, Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza ‘Solidarność’, AWS), emphasising ‘nationalist, religious and anti-communist issues’ (Ost, 2001: 88) rather than a workers’ agenda. AWS became a key component of the coalition government (1997–2001) that enacted sweeping neoliberal reforms. The experiment of a trade union-sponsored electoral alliance failed. Under the 1997–2001 neoliberal coalition government, the AWS policies led to deep disenchantment with trade unions (Czarzasty, 2019: 467; Gardawski, 2009: 497). Over time, the links between trade unions and political parties loosened in both countries.

In addition to establishing political links, trade unions banked on strengthening institutional power also through tripartite structures. The EU also encouraged this. In Hungary, tripartite structures were founded as early as 1988, in the final stage of the state socialist period (Neumann and Tóth, 2017: 142). In Poland the same process occurred in 1994, after a period of strong informal links between the trade unions and the government (Ost, 2001: 89 ff). In both countries the fate and role of tripartite structures depended to a significant extent on the current political constellation. Polish trade unions proved more capable of defending tripartite structures and their institutionalisation than their Hungarian counterparts (Bernaciak, 2017; Neumann and Tóth, 2017).

Fragmented and decentralised industrial relations with fragile tripartite institutions were in line with a dependent industrialisation model based on low wages and flexible (deregulated) labour conditions.

Political watershed: post-crisis elections

While simmering political and social discontent was already observable by the mid-2000s, the great financial crisis proved to be a political watershed and opened up for neo-nationalist forces a broader space for manoeuvre in the two countries, neither of which is in the eurozone. Hungary’s high foreign exchange debts exposed the Hungarian economy much more to the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. The social-liberal government adopted a tough austerity programme under the aegis of the IMF as early as autumn 2008. This exacerbated austerity policies already in place and contributed to the deligitimisation of social-liberal political forces. The liberal Polish government also took unpopular measures, such as increasing the pension age.

In both countries, but perhaps especially in Hungary, domestic businesses were unhappy with their subordinate position to foreign capital and favoured a more statist model (Gardawski, 2013: 299 ff; Scheiring, 2019: 203 ff). The indebted Hungarian middle class was also disenchanted with the ‘market transition’ (Scheiring, 2021: 195), while substantial sections of the working class were disillusioned with the broken welfare promises of the social democratic parties during their periods in office in the 2000s (Scheiring, 2019: 171 ff; Scheiring, 2021: 197).

Both Fidesz and the PiS were able to exploit this social discontent. Fidesz obtained 52.7 per cent of the votes, which the electoral rules translated into a two-thirds majority in Parliament in 2010. In a joint list with two smaller parties, the PiS managed to attract 37.6 per cent of the votes in 2015, which sufficed to win them a majority of parliamentary seats.

Both Fidesz and the PiS formed socially broad electoral alliances. The socio-economic profile of their voters differed, however. While the PiS gained particularly strong support among the (socio-economically) lower classes, Fidesz did not appear to have a clear class base in 2010. In 2018 and 2022, however, it did particularly well among higher-income earners, although it also did very well among unskilled workers (Huszár, 2022: 98 ff; Lindner et al., 2021: 286 ff).

Fidesz and the PiS in government: state project, and economic and social policies

Fidesz and the PiS regard restructuring the state as fundamental to their politico-economic projects. Fidesz has had more leeway than the PiS in the endeavour because its two-thirds majority enabled it to write a new constitution according to its own design and also, by passing new constitutional laws, to overrule the Constitutional Court. Generally, the two parties sought to extend party control over the central state apparatus, public media and regulatory bodies (Becker, 2018: 75 ff, 99 ff). Both parties have also striven to develop a friendly NGO sector and politically close private media (Becker, 2018: 77 ff, 102 ff). They have thus systematically constructed national conservative-inspired party states. The pervasive role of the ruling party is at the very heart of the state’s changing strategic selectivity. In response, in late 2022 the European Commission started to make use of various instruments at its disposal to discipline these neo-nationalist governments by withholding funds (Gutschker and Löwenstein, 2023: 10).

This new EU policy approach poses a threat to the economic strategies of Fidesz and the PiS. Both countries rely heavily on EU funds for public investment. Public tenders are a key component of Fidesz policies designed to boost the domestic economy, especially that part of it closely linked to the governing party (see, for example, Bohle and Greskovits, 2019: 1078). Strengthening the role of domestic capital has been the central plank of selective economic nationalism for both parties (Gerőcs, 2021: 186; Toplišek, 2020: 394).

The two governments otherwise differ in their economic strategies and policy mixes, however. The national-conservative component of Fidesz’s economic policies is basically limited to building a stronger domestic business sector. It does not include a transformative developmental strategy. Fidesz’s efforts to this end are confined to inward-looking sectors. In export manufacturing, the Fidesz government continues to rely on FDI and has provided ample incentives in a neoliberal vein (Bohle and Greskovits, 2019: 1076 ff). Fidesz regards FDI-based export manufacturing as essential for the stability of its economic model because it earns foreign currency, which is crucial for balancing the current account.

The PiS’s economic nationalism is more comprehensive and integrated into a broader developmental framework. It is aimed at strengthening domestic business, including manufacturing.

In line with the emphasis on export manufacturing based on flexible and relatively cheap labour, Fidesz has substantially increased the neoliberal workfare character of unemployment and social assistance policies. Its national-conservative protective mechanisms are confined mainly to family policies, which are designed in such a way that they mainly benefit the middle class (Szikra, 2018). National-conservative family policies are also crucial for PiS social policy, but the key Rodzina 500+ programme has particularly benefited poorer families. The PiS government took up trade union demands to revise the pension age increase introduced by the previous PO government, which was acting on EU recommendations, and has also introduced measures that structurally increase annual pension payments.

Ruling parties, trade unions and industrial relations

In pursuit of its goal of ensuring relatively low-paid and flexible labour for the strategically important export manufacturing sector, Fidesz has consistently reduced the institutional power of trade unions and weakened tripartite institutions. Fidesz moved swiftly against the existing tripartite body, which had enjoyed substantial powers, during its first term of office in 1998–2002. In June 2011 it abolished it. In its place it established the National Economic and Social Council (Nemzeti Gazdasági és Társadalmi Tanács, NGTT). This includes representatives of trade unions, business organisations, economic chambers, NGOs, churches and other government-friendly associations, but not the state. The NGTT has a consultative role and can make submissions to the government. Under pressure from trade unions and employers’ organisations, the government established a second consultative body for the private sector, the Consultative Forum for the Private Sector and the Government (Versenyszféra és a Kormány Állandó Konzultációs Fóruma, VKF). The existing body for the public sector still exists, but ‘its activity became insignificant’ (Borbély and Neumann, 2019: 297). The new bodies have considerably less power than the old tripartite body. For example, their role in fixing the minimum wage has been reduced to mere consultation (Borbély and Neumann, 2019: 297, 303; Pásztóy, 2019: 86).

Business organisations have used the Consultative Forum (VKF) occasionally to put such issues as labour shortages on the agenda (Neumann, 2018: 297). But there are other channels for business besides the NGTT and the VKF. Some business people have strong informal links with Fidesz. Because Fidesz attaches high priority to export manufacturing, it is attentive to the demands of foreign manufacturing firms and their representative bodies. The export lobby played a crucial role, for example, in deregulating working hours in 2018, as well as in reducing corporate taxes and introducing dual technical training along German lines (Gerőcs and Pinkasz, 2019: 192 ff). Confederation-governing party relations have often been informal, at times even very personalised. After the 2010 elections, Fidesz channelled finance to LIGA, apparently in an attempt to make it the biggest federation. This attempt failed, however. Apparently, the funding was not well used and Fidesz did not have much to offer beyond money. Subsequently, Fidesz built a privileged relationship with MOSZ (Kim et al., 2022: 198 ff). LIGA and MOSZ have informal channels to high-ranking government officials. In some areas, these two confederations have taken more accommodating positions towards the government (Kim et al., 2022: 203). Even MASZSZ and its member unions, which are not close to Fidesz, have confined their policy statements to narrowly trade union-related issues (Kim et al., 2022: 212 ff). Although there has been a tendency towards political co-optation, it seems that a stable form of trade union clientelism has yet to be established (Neumann, 2018: 88 ff). The Fidesz government has given priority to the neoliberal strategy of sidelining trade unions over any attempt to integrate them into the nationalist current of civil society. All major trade union confederations have at one time or another expressed a joint position.

Since 2010 Fidesz-controlled parliaments have enacted major legislative changes detrimental to workers and trade unions. Without consultation with unions, amended legislation has made strikes in ‘essential services’ in the public sector more difficult (Neumann, 2018: 84). In 2012, a new Labour Code was passed. Selected representatives of trade unions and employers were consulted in this case. The new Labour Code laid down ‘flexible regulations adjusted to the needs of the local labour market’ (cited in Borbély and Neumann, 2019: 304) as an overarching aim. It allowed collective agreements to deviate from the Labour Code not only in favour of workers, however, but also to their detriment. For example, collective agreements can fix higher maximum working hours (Borbély and Neumann, 2019: 305). Otherwise, drastic deregulation of working time has been a key object of Fidesz labour legislation, with the most drastic measures being passed in 2018 (Gerőcs and Pinkasz, 2019: 193). In 2020, the government used emergency regulations imposed during the COVID-19 crisis to authorise ‘employers to implement a time reference period of up to 24 months without consultation with work councils or trade unions’ (Podvršič et al., 2020: 34). All these laws were passed in the face of trade union opposition. Diluting and sidelining neo-corporatist institutions and weakening collective bargaining structures, Fidesz’s industrial relations policies have been predominantly neoliberal.

The PiS has taken a different approach to institutionalised trade union power and tripartite bodies. Shortly before the 2015 elections, a tripartite council was re-established with slightly enlarged powers in the form of the Social Dialogue Council (Rada Dialogu Społecznego, RDS) after a period of trade union mobilisation. Consultations on labour legislation have been uneven, however (Bernaciak, 2017: 168; Surdykowska, 2020: 51 ff). The PiS government is not willing to discuss far-reaching institutional changes to the state apparatus in the Council. The manner in which key institutional reforms have been pushed through has been criticised by all RDS member organisations except for NSZZ Solidarność (Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018: 114). At the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, the Social Dialogue Council’s autonomy came under pressure. The government passed legislation that empowered the prime minister to dismiss Council members. All Council member organisations protested in a joint statement. They viewed it as ‘an attack on the independence of trade unions and employers’ organisations’ and as contravening Polish legislation and international obligations (FZZ et al., 2020). This piece of legislation ‘met with an extremely negative reception outside Poland’, as Surdykowska (2020: 44) points out, including from the European Trade Union Confederation. Despite the Social Dialogue Council’s limits, however, trade unions rely significantly on this access channel to the government. This is reflected in the fairly detailed reporting of Council meetings and outcomes by all three major trade union confederations.

The PiS government has more arms-length and formal relations with individual businesses than Fidesz. NSZZ Solidarność is politically close to the ruling party. In 2015, this confederation endorsed PiS presidential candidate Andrzej Duda, although not the PiS itself in the parliamentary elections, possibly fearing members’ backlash (Bernaciak, 2017: 167). After the 2015 elections, NSZZ Solidarność members were accorded important roles in key ministries (Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018: 108). NSZZ Solidarność publications have presented the government in a fairly positive light and have often sided with the ruling party against the opposition (Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018: 113). They have also defended the government against EU criticisms. In November 2021, Tygodnik Solidarność, which is close to the confederation, published an interview with Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right French National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) and highlighted her statement that ‘this frontal attack on Poland, a sovereign country, should be a warning for all European nations that care about their freedom’ (Tygodnik Solidarność, 2021). This interview met with strong international criticism, particularly from European trade unions. NSSZ Solidarność also underlines its ideological closeness to the PiS by highlighting its national-Catholic identity (see, for example, NSZZ Solidarność, 2022a). Nevertheless, this confederation clearly formulates its labour-related demands and does not hide any disagreements that might arise with the PiS government, for example, regarding strike legislation (for example, NSZZ Solidarność, 2022b). After several months of negotiations, NSZZ Solidarność signed an exclusive multi-faceted agreement with the PiS government in June 2023 (Duda, 2023). After a period of trying to preserve its autonomy while signalling that it belongs to the national-conservative current of civil society, NSZZ Solidarność now seems to be leaning more explicitly towards the PiS. The other confederations are keeping their distance. They welcome the re-established consultation and specific social policies, but criticise other policies in no uncertain terms. The OPZZ clearly voiced its concerns about key government reforms, for example, concerning the Constitutional Court (Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018: 114). The trade unions have usually presented their political demands individually, although they occasionally cooperate on issues of joint interest.

The PiS government has taken up key trade union social policy demands, but it has been more hesitant in relation to labour legislation. In 2018, it took the ambitious initiative of drafting a new Labour Code. Key issues such as employers’ control over working time and enforced employment protections proved to be highly controversial. Finally, the government desisted from tabling the draft Labour Code and instead opted to amend the existing Labour Code on less controversial matters (Czarzasty, 2019: 478 ff). The PiS government also proposed more restrictive strike legislation, such as banning solidarity strikes. NSZZ Solidarność (2022b) criticised this. Regarding labour legislation, the government generally seems to be torn between its pro-business orientation and its links to the trade union movement. Maintaining tripartite structures, (selectively) consulting unions and business organisations and building privileged links to NSZZ Solidarność the PiS has followed a rather national-conservative industrial relations approach.

Trade unions in Hungary and Poland have thus faced different industrial relations strategies. Hungarian trade unions have reacted to being systematically sidelined by devising new forms of broad-based protest. One example was the protests against the dramatic flexibilisation (deregulation) of labour time in 2018, what came to be known as the ‘slave law’. Trade unions organised demonstrations, which later developed into broader protests. All the opposition parties joined hands to obstruct the legislation in parliament (Gagyi and Gerőcs, 2019: 29). This effort of the opposition was ultimately not successful, however. A second example is the long-lasting industrial action by teachers’ unions in 2022–2023. This involved ‘two previously rival formations, the Democratic Union of Teachers and the Union of Teachers’ (Shybunko, 2022). The unions combined their strikes, which are severely restricted by government regulations, with a wide variety of protests. Students organised themselves to support teachers’ demands and to achieve a more pluralist curriculum. There were also actions in small towns (for example, Dobszay, 2022; Dobszay and Tarnay, 2022). The very right to strike was also at issue. All major trade union confederations reaffirmed the right to strike in a joint declaration (MASZSZ, 2022). There are indications that the trade unions have worked out ways of taking a more ‘cooperative approach’ (Shybunko, 2022) in the face of Fidesz’s uncompromising neoliberal industrial relations policies. The broader protest actions have given the trade unions heightened visibility and expanded their alliances. It is too early to tell how successful this new approach will be, however.

Polish trade unions have not been so much on the defensive as their Hungarian counterparts. Significant industrial action has taken place, especially in the public sector, above all in education and health care. In 2016 and 2017, the Teachers’ Union of Poland (Związek Nauczielstwa Polskiego, ZNP), OPZZ’s biggest member union, organised a campaign against controversial school reforms. NSSZ Solidarność distanced itself from the protests, but in a separate statement criticised the lack of consultation (Kajta and Mrozowicki, 2018: 115). In 2019, ZNP and FZZ, on the one hand, and NSZZ Solidarność on the other clashed on collective agreement talks and the ZNP/FZZ strike action. The vice-president of NSSZ Solidarność denounced the ZNP action as ‘political’ (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019). In the health sector, where the unions’ politico-ideological positions are less pronounced, the different trade unions found more common ground (NSZZ Solidarność, 2021; OPZZ, 2021).

Conclusions

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Fidesz and the PiS were able to take electoral advantage of popular disaffection with the imposition of neoliberal economic policies concomitant with EU integration and disillusionment with domestic businesses’ subordination. In order to placate or co-opt disaffected sectors of society they introduced new national-conservative elements into their policies, in combination with neoliberal measures, integrated within a framework of selective nationalism. Fidesz and the PiS combined new and old socio-economic policies in different ways. The framework proposed here makes possible a comparative analysis of how they combined national-conservative and (nationalist) neoliberal elements in their strategies and the social interests these strategies served. Bluhm and Varga (2020), by contrast, focus only on the conservative elements. Bluhm and Varga elaborate key elements of ‘conservative statism’, but characterise the models as conservative in too homogeneous a way. In further contrast with Bohle et al. (2022), our proposed framework does not seek to analyse different forms of capitalism, but the strategic combination of socio-economic concepts from different ideational strands.

It highlights more strongly than Bohle et al. the qualitatively different character of authoritarian tendencies of national-conservative and nationalist-neoliberal state projects and their related policies: the neoliberal sidelining of parliaments and neo-corporatist bodies, and the national-conservative restricting of legitimacy to political forces in the nationalist camp, as well as the weakening checks and balances.

Both parties have established a re-politicised party state with curtailed checks and balances. This has led to conflicts with the EU. In accordance with their national-conservative stance, they have used the levers of state power to promote domestic capital, which is also at odds with EU policies. This is particularly blatant in Hungary’s more clientelistic form of economic nationalism. Given Hungary’s export dependence, however, Fidesz has provided foreign firms in export manufacturing with ample incentives.

In response to business demands, the Fidesz government has introduced neoliberal workfare policies. At the same time, it has offered the middle class generous family policies designed in a national-conservative way. The PiS has pursued broader national-conservative social policies, again with family policy at their heart. In contrast to Fidesz, PiS social policies have also been aimed at workers and certain trade union demands have been taken up explicitly.

Similar strategic differences can be observed in industrial relations policies. Fidesz has systematically diluted tripartism and marginalised trade unions. It has taken a very hard line in public sector labour conflicts. Neoliberal elements predominate in Fidesz’s industrial policy. The PiS has followed rather national-conservative industrial policies. It has worked selectively with tripartite structures and has established a privileged relationship with NSZZ Solidarność.

Thus, our analytical framework enables us to identify some key differences between the political economic projects of Fidesz and the PiS. In Poland, for example, there is stronger emphasis on national-conservative elements. Trade unions face different challenges in coping with the two neo-nationalist approaches to industrial relations. Under the neoliberal industrial relations approach, they have to resist being sidelined and cope with a deteriorating legal environment and a harsh government line in crucial labour conflicts. Under the national-conservative approach, trade unions’ main challenge is to retain autonomy.