Three theories or rationales can be invoked to explain the formation of the monetary union as well as its policy architecture. One sees its rationale as forming an optimal currency area, another as making macroeconomic policies credibly stability-oriented and a last one as overcoming collective action problems of mutually beneficial policy coordination. Each theory also implies an explanation for why the euro area is in crisis now. The article contains a critical assessment of these theories, with a view to how they have informed crisis management of the euro area but have also failed so far to stabilize the monetary union effectively.
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