Revisiting the social deficit: Social rights and the liberal conception of the person in EU law

Abstract

The article aims to add to the common narrative of the social deficit, outlining another hurdle to realizing social rights: the conception of the person underlying EU law and policy. The conception of the person is a socio-legal imaginary, an amalgam of held beliefs about human nature. It is manifest in the imagined legal subject which we legislate for, and it influences legislation and legal institutions. To do so, the article proceeds in three steps. A first part expands on the relevance of analysing the conception of the person or ‘the imagined EU legal subject’. A second part draws inspiration from Martha Nussbaum's political philosophy, and in particular her understanding of vulnerability and care-dependence relationships, to present an alternative conception of the person. A third part submits that it is precisely the failure to consider the centrality of care and dependency in human life, highlighted by Nussbaum and many other feminist scholars, which frustrates the realization of social rights in the EU.