The EMU after the Gauweiler Judgment and the Juncker Report

Abstract

In drawing heavily on its case law related to the distinction between the economic and monetary policy (EMU), the extent of control of discretionary power, motivation and proportionality, and the prohibition of monetary financing, the Court of Justice of the European Union has made legitimate unconventional measures of the European Central Bank. The judgment on the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) offers guidelines for future action. The Juncker Report builds on the reflection process started by the Van Rompuy Reports and the Commission blue-print of 2012. Among the questions raised are: how much centralization is necessary? How many competences should remain in the national domain? To what extent should EMU rely on strict rules'? To what extent are strong institutions necessary? How can political accountability be increased and what role should the European Parliament and national parliaments play, especially in the framework of the renewed ‘European semester’? What place could a European treasury, meaning a Ministry of Finance of the EU or the Eurozone, play in a reformed EMU? The Juncker Report proposes a calendar for the ten years to come. Do the answers given in the Juncker Report appropriately address the necessity of reform?