Abstract
The question of a possible validity of competitive action is discussed in form of a pro-contra dialogue. With reference to the basic differentiation between value and norm ethical questions, F. Bockrath disputes an original value-relation of sport activities in a deontological sense. Amongst other points of reference, he justifies his argumentation by pointing out to the axiological differentiation of "object of values" and "values of objects". In this context he also denies the assumption that the moral significance of sport activities may be deduced from the rules of competition alone as regulative conditions of their existence.
In his replication, E. Franke develops the idea of a contractual validity of competitive actions. One of its ethical significant features of construction is the "agonal principle". The conditions of competition correspondingly are not merely an external, formal limitation of action but have a specific constitutive meaning - they make it possible to compare competitive actions to non-verbal performative acts.
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