Abstract
The International Olympic Committee's (IOC) attempts to modernise the Olympic programme thought the Agenda 2020 framework, including through the inclusion of newer youth-focused action sports, is well documented. However, research on action sport inclusion has focused on the challenges for the newly incorporated sports, and their governance. The impacts for the traditional International Federations (IFs), and their shifting power and influence in these processes has been less well evidenced. To address this gap we focus on attempts to modernise Olympic Sailing via the integration of two youth-focused action sports windsurfing and kiteboarding. Our research used a multi-method, historical (1980s–2024) and ANT-informed methodology. This directed us to identify the different organisational actors involved in the modernisation of sailing; World Sailing (WS), the IOC, and the action sports organisations, their roles and experiences. Examining significant events and policy shifts from the inclusion of windsurfing in the 1980s, to the substantial changes implemented for Paris 2024, we show the different actants/stakeholders involved in each event, their challenges, and shifting influence. Our findings show that Agenda 2020 has played a critical role in the modernisation of Olympic Sailing. However, while both new sailing sports windsurfing and kiteboarding appeared to have had the IOC's support, Olympic inclusion was a contested process, particularly amongst sailing's traditional stakeholders. Our analysis highlights the economic, cultural, political and technological forces impacting the modernisation process, and contestation within and between these stakeholders. Our research reveals key shifts in the relationship between the IOC and this IF, showing that over the past decade, the IOC had increased its influence on WS's decision-making, and has exerted its authority more evidently. As WS is one of 39 IOC-recognised IFs under pressure from the IOC to modernise, our article raises wider issues about the power, politics and challenges of IF modernisation.
Introduction
When President Thomas Bach took over the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) leadership in 2013, ‘Olympism was facing a crisis of legitimacy’, and the IOC faced multiple contentious issues that threatened to weaken the position and power of the organisation and Olympic movement (Bayle, 2024: 1757). Bach's ‘strategic roadmap for the future of the Olympic Movement’ Agenda 2020 was launched a year later (IOC, 2014), widely seen as the IOC's attempt to demonstrate its ongoing relevance in an evolving world, and to respond to growing critiques of its operations, particularly across ‘governance, legitimacy and purpose’ (Goldblatt, 2016: 260). The 40 Agenda 2020 recommendations were directed at addressing longstanding foci such as the costly bidding processes, governance and ethics, along with proposals focused on environmental sustainability, gender equity, and reaching new audiences (IOC, 2014). The IOC had long-recognised it faced increasing competition from new sports forms and events outside of the Olympic movement, including the X Games, action and adventure sports (see Thorpe and Wheaton, 2017), and most recently, the emergence of e-sports. To address this trend, and engage new audiences focused on urban youth sports, Agenda 2020 enabled the introduction of skateboarding, surfing and sport climbing, along with bicycle motocross (BMX) freestyle and Basketball 3 × 3 at Tokyo 2020/21. This initiative was heralded by the IOC as a significant success, delivering its objectives around credibility, sustainability, and gender equity (IOC, 2017).
However, to accommodate these new sports while retaining the 10,500 athlete limit (Bayle, 2024), the IOC needed to reduce athlete quotas in other events. The IOC asked all existing sport federations to ensure their programmes had continued relevance across Agenda 2020 (and later Agenda 2020+) foci, including innovations that appeal to media and youth; showing diversity and universality; and ensuring gender balance across their athlete quota and events (IOC, 2017). The IOC Programme Commission's initial evaluation led to a reduction of 285 athlete quotas for Tokyo 2020/1, including across Canoe, Judo, Rowing, Sailing, Shooting and Weightlifting programmes. To address gender inequity, several of these sports had a transfer of their quotas from men's events to women's events. Further athlete reductions occurred between Tokyo and Paris 2024, with boxing and weightlifting having the largest reduction, provoking alarm in these sports (Beacham, 2024; Pavitt, 2020).
Our focus in this paper is the Olympic sport of ‘Sailing’, a long-standing feature of the Summer Olympics (IOC, 2024), which experienced a loss of 129 of their 461-athlete quota (28%) between Atlanta 1996 and Paris 2024 (World Sailing, 2018a). These losses, along with sailing's removal from the Paralympic Games (post-2016), caused widespread concern amongst sailing's core stakeholders about their sport's future in the Olympics (World Sailing, 2018a). In response, the International Federation (IF) World Sailing (WS) set in motion a range of changes intended to modernise Olympic Sailing in line with the IOC's Agenda 2020 directives. As WS stated in 2018: The Olympic Agenda 2020 strategic road map has made it clear that change is required and World Sailing should ensure that it meets the IOC expectations for future Olympic Games. (World Sailing, 2018a: 4)
The most significant change was a proposal for the 2024 Paris Olympic programme, which saw several longstanding sailing events 1 (i.e. boat type/class) dropped and replaced with new craft/events that were very different to traditional sailing boats. Specifically, their proposal included the introduction of kiteboarding, a youth focused board-sport, and craft using hydrofoil technology. Hydrofoils that lift the craft above the water at high speed had been popularised in Sailing's prestigious and televisual America's Cup. As we highlight, few participants who practiced the two board sports (i.e. windsurfing or kiteboarding) appropriated under Olympic sailing, considered themselves to be sailors, or their sport to be a form of sailing. Furthermore, these modernisation initiatives were met with alarm and contestation amongst sailing's traditional stakeholders including National Federations, Sailing Class Associations, Sailing Clubs and the sailing media.
These events frame our paper which focuses on Sailing's IF (WS) and its contested attempt to modernise Olympic Sailing in line with the IOC's Agenda 2020 directives via the integration of two youth-focused action sports; windsurfing (initially the 1984 Summer Games, Los Angeles) and kiteboarding (the 2018 Youth Olympic Games and 2024 Summer Games, Paris). The paper is underpinned by the following research questions: (a) What were the key forces impacting the inclusion of windsurfing and kiting/kiteboarding into the Olympic Games? (b) How has the inclusion of windsurfing and kiting impacted Olympic sailing? (c) Who are the key actants involved in the process of incorporating these new sports to modernise sailing at the Olympics, and how has their influence shifted over time (1980s–2020s)? The analysis of our findings is presented chronologically from windsurfing's inclusion in the 1980s to the substantial event changes implemented for Paris (2024).
Literature review
Our literature review first highlights the paucity of research on sailing in the Olympics and the sport's governance. We then discuss literature on the ‘Olympic network’, which illuminates that the IOC and IFs increasingly operate in a complex and expanding network of stakeholders. Last, we situate our research within the body of sociological literature on action sports inclusion in the Olympics.
Sailing in the Olympics: history and governance
Sailing has been part of the Olympics since the first Modern Games in 1896 (IOC, 2024), yet, to date has not garnered academic attention. Sociocultural research on competitive sailing (i.e. racing) has focused on prestigious yachting events like the America's Cup and Offshore yacht racing rather than Olympic sailing, with much of this research focused on highlighting their elitist and male-dominated culture (Bricknell, 1999; Bruce and Wheaton, 2009; Crawley, 1998). Sociological inquiry has also examined sailing as a recreational activity, charting its history and development, emphasising sailing's elitism and association with white male privilege, wealth, and social prestige (Aversa, 1986; Bourdieu, 1984; Oakley, 2025; O’Connor, 2024; Wheaton and Liu, 2024). Reflecting these trends, Olympic Sailing medals have been dominated by wealthy nations in the Global North and did not include a women's sailing event until 1988.
The first IF for sailing, the International Yacht Racing Union (IYRU), was created in Paris in 1907. The name was subsequently changed to the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) in 1996, and then WS in 2015 (World Sailing, 2024a). Along with the name change, the Olympic programme title was changed from ‘Yachting’ to ‘Sailing’ (in 2000). WS is a large organisation with a complex committee structure (see World Sailing, 2024b). The WS Council heads their decision-making structure and appoints Committees. In 2024, Council had 42 members consisting of 9 Board of Directors and 28 appointed members representing the regional groups of sailing nations across 140 countries, Committees representatives, Athletes’ Commission and a Women's Representative (World sailing, 2024b). The IF is responsible for the promotion of the sport internationally including managing sailing at the Olympic and formerly the Paralympic Games. This involves developing the rules for sailing competitions, the training of judges, and other administrators, and the global development of the sport, including representing sailors in all matters concerning the sport. Around 120 International Class Associations (boat types) are recognised by WS which means they are entitled to hold a World Championship. Since 1896, over 48 different boat types have been used at the Olympics (IOC, 2024) varieties spanning from offshore boats to small dinghies.
While research exploring Sailing's IF is limited, it was one of the 35 Olympic sport IFs examined in Geeraert et al.’s (2014) research on international sport organisation governance. They highlighted a range of structural issues impacting the quality of the IF's self-governance including ‘lack of accountability arrangements’ including an ‘independent ethics committees’; absence of ‘objective criteria and transparency in the distribution of funding to members’; athlete representatives lacking formal ‘decision-making power’ and executive bodies that are dominated by male members from ‘the European continent’ (281). However, as Bayle (2024: 1759) outlines, through Agenda 2020, the IOC has made ‘moves to apply “good” governance principles centred around greater transparency, greater gender equality, and better control mechanisms’. While organisations within the Olympic Movement are expected to implement these new measures, few IFs and NOCs have done so and the ‘quality of governance within IFs remains very variable and, for some highly problematic’ (Bayle, 2024: 1760).
It is under such a climate that two youth focus action sports windsurfing, and later kiteboarding (also known as kiting), were incorporated into the Olympic Games with a range of political struggles and tensions shaping the process (Jallat, 2018; Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a). Although like other small sailing boats, the propulsion for windsurfing and kiteboarding is provided by the power of the wind, both are board-sports not boats; the rider stands on the board and changes direction using their body movements alone. Both windsurfing and kiteboarding have been characterised as action or lifestyle sports in academic literatures (Dant and Wheaton, 2007; Smits, 2019; Wheaton, 2004), with both sports emphasising the expressive and creative aspects of their skill, style of manoeuvres. Windsurfing participants were involved in the development of kiting, hence these action sport share aspects of their cultural values, technologies, brand/industries, participation localities, and their relationships with institutions associated with their sports (Jallat, 2018; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). Both sports tend to be informal and self-directed while embodying diverse ways of participating, including ever-evolving equipment and styles (Smits, 2019; Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a). However, both have different modes of participation to boat sailing; neither are considered as ‘sailing’ by their participants and are rarely practiced in sailing clubs.
Next, we briefly situate our study in research on Agenda 2020 and its impacts on, and for understanding the IOC's relationships with international sport's governing bodies (i.e. WS), and other sport stakeholders.
Understanding the Olympic ‘network’ and Agenda 2020
Despite decades of holding a hegemonic position in global sports, the IOC and IFs are having to respond to a rapidly changing sport-media-economic landscape, involving new and increasing stakeholders. As Bayle (2024: 1767) outlines, ‘the IOC has changed profoundly over the last 10 years’, particularly with respect to its promotion discourse, the Olympic programme, professionalisation, gender equality, and transparency. Nonetheless, many critics ‘doubt the credibility’ of the changes implemented (Bayle, 2024: 1767; see also Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Goldblatt, 2016; MacAloon, 2016).
This changing, economic, political and social climate connected with the neo-liberalisation of the Olympics has led to increasingly complex and shifting webs of economic and political influences that underpin the IOC's decision-making (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017). Therefore to understand how the IOC operates institutionally and organisationally, requires recognition of this shift and its impacts on the traditional Olympic Movement which was based on a hierarchical structure dominated by the IOC, and comprising of five key and closely related organisations (i.e. IOC, Organising Committees for the Olympic Games, NOCs, IFs, National Governing Bodies) (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008). This has transitioned to a significantly more complex governance model or network involving numerous new stakeholders including the media, governments and inter-governmental organisations, corporate sponsors, and professional teams or athletes (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Chappelet, 2023). While the IOC still retains power – predominantly because it largely ‘finances the classic Olympic system’, and decides which cities will host the Games (Chappelet, 2023: 795), the Olympic movement now needs to be understood as ‘networks of elites and powerbrokers’ (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017: 119). As we outline below, recognition that the IOC and the IFs increasingly operate as part of a complex network, with new stakeholders including action sports organisations and industries, underpins our research.
New action sports included in the Olympics: governance challenges
A body of research has explored the inclusion of various youth-focused action sports into the Olympics, dating from windsurfing in the 1980s, then snowboarding (1998) and BMX racing (2008), through to skateboarding, surfing, sport climbing and BMX freestyle in Tokyo 2020/1. Much of the existing research has focused on micro-level cultural politics in their contestation with, and incorporation into, the IOC at one moment (or period) of time, and the subsequent impacts within these action sport cultures including sportisation and institutionalisation (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021: 28).
Studies also highlight the national/ international governance challenges of Olympic incorporation for the action sports (e.g. Barjolin-Smith, 2020; Batuev and Robinson, 2017, 2019; Jallat, 2018; MacFarlane, 2023; Strittmatter et al., 2019; Thorpe and Wheaton, 2019; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). Notably, until the introduction of Agenda 2020, all new action sports were appropriated into the Olympics via existing traditional IFs. Windsurfing was brought in under sailing governed by the International Yacht Racing Union (IYRU); snowboarding under skiing's International Skiing Federation (FIS), and BMX racing, under Union Cycliste Internationale (see Thorpe and Wheaton's, 2011a, 2011b). As has been well documented, the action sport athletes and communities experienced challenges fitting into traditional sports structures and organisations, creating cultural tensions and sometimes resistance (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a, 2011b).
Often the impetus for these IFs to appropriate these action sports came directly from the IOC (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021), who saw inclusion under IFs that were already part of the Olympic family advantageous operationally (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2019). However, the IFs tasked with including the new sport were not always enthusiastic. Despite potential new revenue, they might receive (i.e. sponsorship or broadcasting distributed by the IOC), most continued to favour their older and most established sports/events (Kilberth and Schwier, 2020; Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a, 2011b). As Puddle and Wheaton (2023: 571) outline, while the relationship between the longstanding IFs and the IOC has been ‘symbiotic’ providing ‘mutual benefits’, often the IF is ‘also subservient to the IOC’ (see also Cervin, 2020).
Recognising the reticence of sports like skateboarding to be part of the Olympics (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021), and therefore the need to get buy-in from the action sporting cultures and industries, the IOC introduced a new self-governance model for two of the new action sports in Tokyo (i.e. surfing, sport climbing) and then the Olympic breaking programme in Paris. Agenda 2020 enabled new sports to be governed either by a new action sport-specific arm of an existing IF (e.g. World Skate), or existing action sport organisations that were new to the Olympic movement (e.g. International Surfing Association, International Federation of Sport Climbing). As detailed by Thorpe and Wheaton (2019), developing these self-governing models involved IOC representatives building relationships with the action sport communities, and involving them in the incorporation process. Through this, the IOC could demonstrate a less top-down and more collaborative approach. The new sports had more autonomy and control including over rules and regulations (e.g. qualification criteria, competition formats, types of equipment, which styles of participation to support), and the ability to advocate directly with sport bodies and potential sponsors (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). Despite this, these action sports organisations have experienced challenges working within the Olympic structures and models of sport (Batuev and Robinson, 2017, 2019; MacFarlane, 2023; Thorpe et al., 2024; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021), and as temporary additions to the Olympic programme. They also received less Olympic revenue redistribution than the core sports 2 (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021), which Bayle suggests, was a compromise the IOC took ‘to satisfy the oldest Olympic sports, which did not want to see their allocations reduced’ (2024: 1753).
However, as Wheaton and Thorpe (2021) outline, the challenges and impacts of incorporation for each action sport has been different, shifted over time, and had diverse impacts across the stakeholders/communities within the sports. To make meaning of the complexities both within and across sports, and understand ‘the multiple actants involved in the ongoing and dynamic relationship between action sports and the Olympic Games’, Wheaton and Thorpe's (2021) developed the concept of the ‘action sport-Olympic assemblage’. Through an Actor-Network Theory (ANT) inspired approach, their research revealed the shifting power relations within the Olympic network (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021: 29), and that the operations of power (from economic/organisational to the more micro-cultural levels) between these actors including the IOC, IFs and various action sports stakeholders, was complex, fluid, non-linear, and not always predictable.
Moreover, despite the IOC's claims to understand action sports needs for autonomy, as we explore in this paper in the case of kiteboarding, the appropriation of action sports into existing long-standing Federations has continued post-Agenda 2020 (see Puddle and Wheaton, 2023; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). The governance of Olympic skateboarding was controversial, with three organisations vying for the role, and then the IOC ultimately giving control to World Skate (rebranded from the International Federation of Roller Sports) with some key US-based skate industry involvement (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2019). As shown in the case of the Gymnastics’ IF (the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique, FIG) attempts to appropriate parkour as a new gymnastic discipline against the will of most parkour stakeholders, was driven by an alliance between FIG and the IOC, underpinned by economic motives and FIG's desires to support the IOC and its Agenda 2020 priorities (Puddle and Wheaton, 2023). The authors suggest that while mutually beneficial for the IOC and IF, this set of events show that FIG is ‘also subservient to the IOC’ who are increasingly asserting their influence (Puddle and Wheaton, 2023: 571).
In summary, research on modernising the Olympics through more youthful sports has focused on the impacts and challenges for the new sports being incorporated. However, little is known about the challenges for the traditional IFs tasked with incorporating the new action sports, nor the impacts on the sports core traditional stakeholders in these modernisation initiatives. Furthermore, most studies have focused on the workings of individual organisations, rather than the networks across and between organisations ‘within the overarching IOC structures’ (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2019: 467). To address these gaps, our research focused on one IF, WS, and its role over time in the action sport-Olympic network. As detailed in our methodology, we used a longitudinal, ANT-inspired approach to identify the multiple actants, and their shifting influences in the Sailing-Olympic-Action Sport network (see Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). Our research reveals key shifts in the relationship between the IOC and IF over this time, and also exposes the contestation between key stakeholders within the IF and WS. In so doing, our research also contributes to the paucity of literature on Olympic Sailing and governance, and to wider understandings of the shifting power of longstanding IFs within the Olympic network.
Methodology
This paper draws from and extends multi-method longitudinal research conducted by Wheaton and Thorpe (2021) between 2010 and 2021 exploring different action sports incorporation into the Olympic Games/Youth Olympic Games (YOG), including windsurfing and kiteboarding. We used an ANT-inspired approach to investigate the different actants involved in, supporting and resisting, the modernisation of sailing including; the IOC, Sailing's IF, new windsurfing and kiting organisations, and agents within both actions sports and sailing communities and related industries (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). ANT provided a set of methodological and analytical tools that did not assume particular connections and power relationships in this network. Rather, ANT prompted us to consider what constituted the actor network, and directed us to trace the different, overlapping and shifting actors, and their ‘abilities to produce and stabilize’ the network (c.f. Darnell, 2020: 235).
This approach, within an interpretivist epistemology, allowed us to trace actors and actions through the processes of these two action sports’ incorporations into the Olympic Games network over time, and to explore the roles and perspectives of the different actants. We sought to comprehend the different flows of power (from economic/organisational to the more micro-cultural levels) operating in the networks across and within the IOC, WS and its stakeholders, and the action sports (i.e. windsurfing and kiteboarding) cultures, media and industries.
A range of qualitative methods including interviews, participant observation at events, media analysis, and archival and policy document research contributed to our data. The empirical research on kiteboarding began in 2015. Interviews were important for understanding the policy issues from the subjective perceptions and experiences of key actors involved. As Green and Houlihan (2006: 51) suggest, such interviews help draw out the differences between the ‘rhetoric’ in policy documents and the actors’ own perspectives on a particular policy development. We conducted four in-depth interviews (2015–2016) with key actors whose roles and experiences included; leadership in national and international kite organisations including one past-president of the International Kitesurfing Association (IKA); international kiteboarding competitors including two national champions; involvement with national or international coaching; and working in the kite industry. Then between 2017 and 2020 two further in-depth interviews were conducted with national kite organisation representatives who were involved with kite's 2018 YOG inclusion. We used snowball sampling to ensure multiple perspectives were included. Our existing cultural knowledge and contacts helped in accessing key cultural intermediaries and decision-makers. Interviews were conducted via on-line video and lasted between 1 and 2 hours, and were transcribed verbatim.
We also collated and analysed policy and media documents related to both windsurfing and kiteboarding in the YOG and Olympics (initially between 2012 and 2020). Then, in 2024, we explored media and policy documents related to WS, and windsurfing and kiteboarding stakeholders between 2018 and 2024. This included 37 articles that were published between January and May 2018 in the sailing media.
Our research is also informed by the research team's lived experiences as sporting participants, coaches, and administrators. Wheaton grew up sailing, became a competitive windsurfer, has kited and is a wing-foil participant. They were involved in the niche media, event organisation and national policy forums. Oakley brings over 45 years lived experiences in sailing, including as a competitor, as a national Olympic windsurfing coach in Korea (1988) and Barcelona (1992), and a range of national policy-related roles. Thorpe grew up in a windsurfing family, and later in life also learned to kiteboard.
Our analysis of these interviews and documents is presented chronologically from the fast-tracking of windsurfing in the 1980s to the substantial changes implemented for Paris (2024).
We identify significant events/moments across this period, and examine the roles, influence and challenges of the different organisational and community stakeholders involved. However, our paper focuses on events from 2018 onwards, as the earlier periods have been considered in more depth elsewhere (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021).
Our research does not present these events as historical facts. Our selections of key moments and voices were driven by our objective to explore what the different agents said about events they had experienced, and the various policies and choices pursued by institutions. We recognise that the contexts of these sources differ. We were mindful that formal institutional communications, for example, as expressed in press releases and policy documents, play a particular function, and can be at odds with the positions these actors took on other matters. Likewise, the views expressed in the sport media needed careful contextualisation, recognising that such sources represent the perspectives of those with a voice, and who often have particular agenda. However, exploring these different and conflicting ‘truths’ enabled us to understand the debates and conflicts from the perspectives of different stakeholders, as they developed over time.
Analysis: the modernisation of Olympic Sailing
Windsurfing fast-tracked into Olympic Sailing (1980s)
When windsurfing was incorporated into the Olympics in 1980 (for the 1984 Games) it was perceived as sailing's more accessible and ‘radical cousin’ (Oakley, 2023: 1263) and a challenge to sailing's elitist image (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a). Despite being only a decade old, this fast-evolving, youthful and athletic sport was fast-tracked to Olympic status (see Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a, 2011b). A women's event was introduced at the 1992 Barcelona Games. However, as Thorpe and Wheaton (2011a) outline, many across the sailing community were not enthusiastic about this new addition to its programme 3 ; they resented losing two of sailing's 10 Olympic medals to these new events.
Rapid technological change in windsurfing from the late 1970s led to a quickly changing sporting practice. The initial board used in the Olympics was soon outdated (Oakley, 2023). Although the craft selected for Olympic events was updated several times, the long notice period (typically 4–6 years) and strict one-design rules regarding the equipment specified for Olympic competition made the Olympic windsurfing events seem archaic in comparison to both professional and recreational windsurfing. As one industry insider explained (2015) when interviewed, ‘almost nobody’ is ‘using the kind of equipment they are using in the Olympics’. Moreover, in contrast to the more popular and media-friendly forms of windsurfing competition organised by the Professional Windsurfing Association (PWA) such as slalom-racing, waves and freestyle, Olympic windsurfing had to fit the rules and fleet racing format of the Sailing programme.
Olympic windsurfing occupied an ambiguous position; an imposter in the sailing world, while also marginalised by the windsurfing culture and industry. Attempts were made to modernise the Olympic equipment; for example, the RS:X Class implemented in 2008 and used until Tokyo 2020/1 was seen as a compromise between the previously used race boards, and the more popular formula boards used in industry-led competitions. Yet few endeavours were made to accommodate the unique cultural values or physical requirements of windsurfers; Olympic windsurfing increasingly became subsumed within the sport and culture of sailing (Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a, 2011b).
The IOC eyes the new sport of kiteboarding (2000s)
Kiteboarding, an action sport with connections to the technologies and physical literacies of not just windsurfing, but surfing, paragliding, wakeboarding and snowboarding, grew quickly in the late 1990s (Jallat, 2018). The practice soon diversified with formats such as freestyle and big air that were spectacular for live and media audiences alike. Reflecting this, different names have been used over time and by different groups to describe kite sports such as kitesurfing, kiteboarding and kiting. Competitive events emerged across different formats overseen internationally by various athlete-led organisations (e.g. Global Kitesports Association [GKA] and International Kiteboarding Association [IKA]). Kiting clearly had potential to provide many of the requirements for the IOC. It was spectacular, had youth appeal, practiced in diverse global settings, and was relatively accessible particularly as the equipment was much easier to transport than boats or windsurfers. The kiters we interviewed (2015/6) recounted that the IOC had expressed an early interest in the sport and initiated conversations with the IKA, corroborated by our own discussions with the IOC Sports Department: So the IOC put eyes on the new sports … kiteboarding was one of them. We really jumped into it and start to keep the IOC informed as much as possible, to try to claim a place in the Olympics. (Interview, 2015)
Although the kite community at that time were largely ambivalent about Olympic inclusion, the IKA became a key and effective agent driving the Olympic inclusion of kiteboarding, actively lobbying for kiteboarding in the Rio 2016 Games (see IKA, 2009; Schwendtner, 2011). Kiters had advocated for the more spectacular and popular versions of their sport like freestyle (interviews 2015). However, in their discussions with IOC representatives, they learned that ‘racing, where we can say first one over the line wins’ (Interview, 2015) was preferred. The IOC explained they needed an event that could be held in all wind strengths/venues and wanted to avoid judging disciplines like freestyle (Interview, 2015). Kiters invested time to allay concerns about the new sports safety, and the practicalities of the inclusion of their sport (Kendall, 2012).
Kiteboarding is incorporated as a new sailing class (2008)
Mirroring the governance model in windsurfing, the IKA became an ISAF sailing class in 2008. However, this decision followed widespread consultation by kiters to understand previous models of Olympic incorporation and governance structures for action sports (e.g. snowboarding and windsurfing), to ensure the kiters maintained some control over their sport (Interview, 2015). Recognising the challenges windsurfing had experienced, there was discussion about becoming affiliated with other kite-sport federations such as snow-kiting and paragliding (Jallat, 2018). A group of kiters also discussed forming their own IF (Interview, 2015). However, they concluded that is ‘just such a huge project for such a small sport’ particularly the requirements for an ethics commission, athletes commission and anti-doping (Interview, 2015). Ultimately, it was decided that sailing (the ISAF) was the closest existing IOC-recognised IF to their sport.
The process of becoming an affiliated sailing class was time-consuming and required negotiation and adjustment; ‘It took us two years to adjust the structures … we were facing the same problems as windsurfing’ (Interview, 2015). They found processes to be frustratingly slow, and the committee structures hard to navigate. Kiting representatives felt marginalised, and had to continually lobby for their position and voice within the ‘traditional’ Sailing IF: Everyone's very traditional and it's all structured, and the people that are sitting in Council and the Federations, they’re 70 years old now and they had their sailing career … in the 1950s. (Interview, 2015)
In summary, although the IKA had received strong messages from the IOC that they were interested in kiting in the Olympics, kiters felt marginalised and constrained within Sailing's IF (ISAF/WS). Kiter's lack of status and influence is confirmed in an IF working party report, which articulated the low opinion of some in the sailing fraternity towards kiteboarding, stated they were: aware of the view being expressed that kiteboarding is not sailing and should not be part of … World Sailing. The Working Party does not agree with this view and recalls very similar views being expressed in the early years of windsurfing. (World Sailing, 2018b: 3)
Kiters advocating for Olympic inclusion also found the kite community was largely disinterested, and the kite industry mostly ‘in the dark’ (Interview, 2015). They contended that even kite racers (i.e. those who might pursue an Olympic path) were not proactive in helping to create change in WS. ‘A lot of the racers, they don’t care’, and did not contribute to decision-making via their representative kite organisations (Interview, 2015). Additionally, tensions and power struggles between industry groups invested in the economic growth of the sport that had existed throughout the development of competitive kite events, intensified (see Jallat, 2018; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). These resulted in a range of disputes including in the court of law (Surfer Today, 2015). In 2016, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between ISAF, IKA and The Global Kitesports Association (GKA) which gave GKA the right to run expression events, while the IKA would continue with the racing disciplines (Pavitt, 2016). Later, a trilateral collaboration between ISAF/WS, IKA and GKA was reached to ‘promote and expand’ the sport of competitive kiteboarding worldwide ‘to regulate the management and responsibilities for kiteboarding’ (2018). 4
Contestation between action sports: kiteboarding to replace windsurfing? (2010–2018)
Despite the Sailing's IF initial reticence to embrace windsurfing, it remained on the Sailing Olympic programme. However, when the IF voted on the 10 sailing events for the Rio 2016 Games in May 2012, windsurfing was left out, seemingly replaced by kiteboarding. The sailing and windsurfing community were shocked, with widespread speculation about the IF's decision-making. Commentators in the sailing media claimed the WS President and CEO were pushing hard for the replacement of windsurfing with ‘telegenic’ kites to ‘modernise’ the Olympic class line-up (Sailing Illustrated, 2018a). Another claim was that when kites were accepted into sailing it was sold to the other classes with an assurance that kites would only become Olympic events if the IOC granted Sailing two more events, along with an increase in the IOC quota (Sailing Illustrated, 2018c). Jallat's (2018) research suggests Sailing's IF only nominated kiteboarding because of a request from the IOC to ‘dust the cobwebs off sailing’ (161). He cites a French Sailing Federation member, who claimed the IF were prepared to ‘lose windsurfing’ and support kiting to protect sailing's core community, ‘the interests of the dinghy lobby’ (162).
Windsurfers launched an international petition to ‘Keep Windsurfing as a Olympic Discipline’ (Petition, 2012). They argued that windsurfing was the least expensive and universal route into the Olympic programme for small and emerging sailing nations. Windsurfing had been the most diverse of all the sailing events over the past 7 Olympiads, with medals won by athletes from five continents.
Then, some months later, this controversial decision was overturned. News reports stated the IF delegates admitted to voting incorrectly due to confusion and language difficulties (Mackay, 2012b). However, Jallat (2018) suggests this U-turn followed active lobbying by national Sailing Federations to save windsurfing. He argues that ‘it is hard to explain’ this turn of events ‘in any other way’ (Jallat, 2018: 162). His view is corroborated by British sailing sources suggesting the reversal followed ‘an intense lobbying effort’ (Gladwell, 2018a). Kiters were frustrated; for a period of months their sport had started to gain momentum and, in some nations, also funding as a new Olympic sport (Interview, 2016). Some windsurfing athletes had even started to learn kiteboarding. This set of events vividly highlights the power of this IF in determining the fate of new sports subsumed into their governance. Furthermore, the decision-making process illustrates the power struggles between different stakeholders within the Sailing IF, and between the IOC and the IF.
It is also notable that the decision-making process was largely misunderstood. Across action sport media, the IOC was articulated as the decision-maker, thus not recognising the role of the Sailing IF in this debacle. Furthermore, kiting was framed as a direct replacement for windsurfing suggesting that the IOC had to choose one board sport (i.e. Kiteboarding or windsurfing). This misinterpretation was articulated across mass and action sport niche media (i.e. magazines, websites, social media), often pitting the two sports against each other, and making binary arguments for which was better for the Olympics (e.g. BBC, 2012; Mackay, 2012a). Despite this, in online forums, kiters were sympathetic to windsurfing's predicament: I never say, and neither does most kiters, that they want windsurfing out of the Olympics. Personally, I think making the vote between windsurfing and kiteboarding is bollocks. (Kiteforum.com)
Across our interviews (conducted in 2015–2016) kiters argued that ‘windsurfing is certainly better in many ways as a current Olympic sport than many of the other sailing classes’ (Interview, 2016), and its lack of success as an Olympic sport was large because of the ISAF's [Sailing IF] failure to modernise the equipment (Interview, 2015). They recognised that Sailing's IF's focus was ‘its bread and butter’ [i.e. sailing events] and that ‘expecting ISAF to genuinely represent the interests of windsurfing and kitesurfing [is] just mad’ (social media post, 2012). There were calls for the two action sports to form ‘a coalition to lobby together against the Sailing IF ‘and say we are two modern sports that can represent the modern face of sailing’ (Interview, 2015). This coalition did not eventuate.
Disappointed kite representatives continued to have discussions with the IOC via the Sport and YOG Departments but were frustrated that these groups seemed unable to directly influence the ISAF: It's not that the IOC doesn’t want it [kiteboarding]. The problem is that the IOC sometimes should give a little bit clearer indication to the federations on what they want. (Interview, 2015)
The IOC at this time, seemed to have less influence than kiters had anticipated; an observation corroborated by the authors’ ongoing interactions with the IOC. However, kiteboarding was subsequently selected for the 2018 YOG, which as we discuss below, has been an important testing ground for the IOC, particularly in assessing new sport and youth trends (Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021).
Kiteboarding incorporated into the youth Olympic games (2014 and beyond)
Despite windsurfing's scare in 2012, it was selected for two of only four Sailing events for the Nanjing 2014 YOG, but using a different, and more accessible craft (Bic techno) than was used in the Summer Olympics. As one sailing coach at the Nanjing YOG commented, in contrast to the elitism of ‘senior Olympic windsurfing classes’ the windsurfing event was the highlight of the Nanjing YOG with competitors ‘coming from countries that we’ve never heard of before’ (Interview, 2015).
Then, in the 2018 YOG, four of the five sailing events were on boards (i.e. windsurfing and kiteboarding for boys and girls) rather than in boats. According to informants in the kiteboarding industry, kiteboarding's inclusion was the direct impact of highly strategic IOC lobbying by the IKA. This included informal face-to-face interactions through an IKA member based in Geneva; with the IOC ‘right on his doorstep… They’re all schmoozing together’ (Interview, 2016).
However, as shown in the Sailing IF's meeting minutes, they were aware that the inclusion of kiteboarding at the 2018 YOG demonstrated the IF's attempts to broaden and diversify the sailing regatta to the IOC: Kiteboarding has great potential to become significantly universal and see new countries competing in the Olympics in sailing because of the lower cost and transportability of the equipment and appeal to youth. (World Sailing, 2018a: 25)
The minutes noted the new countries involved in the YOG Kiteboard ‘Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Antigua and the Philippines’ and that ‘four African countries contested the 2018 YOG African Kiteboard qualification event’ (World Sailing, 2018b: 25). Such comments highlight the value the IF was starting to see in kiteboarding for meeting key criteria set by the IOC for diversification. Nonetheless, as Frizzel (2014) notes, although many kiting venues are in the Global South, this does not necessarily suggest greater diversity as training locales and nationality do not always align, highlighting the broader issues of opportunity and privilege (Thorpe et al., 2024).
The IOC exerts pressure on world sailing to modernise (2015–2020)
As explained in the introduction, from 2018, the IOC began to deliver a clearer message to all IFs to ensure their programmes had continued relevance across Agenda 2020 (and later Agenda 2020+) foci, including an expectation that their events must be more media and youth friendly to attract new audiences; address gender imbalances across their quota and events; and show more diversity of nations.
In 2015, the ISAF was renamed WS. Some commentators argued this was merely a rebranding exercise (Interview, 2017; Fisher, 2018). However, changes were implemented including the introduction of the Nacra 17 equipment in 2016 which saw sailing became one of the first Olympic sports to use mixed-gender events in their programme. WS also recognised the need to improve the experiences of Olympic audiences. Uninspiring broadcasting was a source of concern for WS; as their CEO acknowledged, ‘filming sailing is unique … [and] can be difficult to capture and convey to the audience’ (World Sailing, 2021b). WS implemented the Sailing Analytics Platform [SAP] for Tokyo 2020/1 which allowed audiences to follow the races in real-time with a broader range of insights. The SAP platform was featured by more than 30 rights-holding broadcasters around the world, and gave commentators added depth to live broadcasts (World Sailing, 2021b).
However, the watershed moment for change within WS was the period from 2018 instigated by the IOC's review of events for the Paris 2024 Games. WS recognised it did not comply with the key IOC goals, particularly around gender equity at an event level (World Sailing, 2018b: 4), and initiated a review: The Olympic Agenda 2020 strategic road map has made it clear that change is required and World Sailing should ensure that it meets the IOC expectations for future Olympic Games. (World Sailing, 2018a: 4)
WS initially tasked the Event Committee with ‘reviewing, debating and making a recommendation to World Sailing's Council’ (World Sailing, 2018c). A working group focused on the five events that had been placed under review by the Council in February that year (World Sailing, 2018c), then reviewing, and voting on 20 submissions/proposals. The Working Party and the Events Committee report and recommendation then went to the May 2018 Council Meeting.
This proposal saw several longstanding events dropped for the 2024 Olympic programme, and the introduction of three new events/crafts including the introduction of kiteboarding and hydrofoil technology, alarming many in the sailing community. This provoked widespread media commentary focused on the review and its implications including 37 articles published between January and May 2018 (News and Views, 2018). One described Sailing's 2018 mid-year meeting as ‘the most important in 50 years’ (Gladwell, 2018a), another stated ‘fans and sailors were bewildered by decisions’ made by WS, which was ‘facing a crisis’ (Fisher, 2018).
Two online petitions wanting the review stopped were launched, attracting 35,000 signatures. One titled ‘World Sailing Executive – Please save our sport’ (Petition, 2018) was supported by an Open Letter (also published in Seahorse Magazine in May). This letter, titled ‘Sailing Clubs, time is short’ signed by a group of Olympic sailors The thrust is to use Olympic Sailing as a vehicle to introduce kitesurfing, a subjectively scored, wave-jumping, foiling, off-the-beach event held not at the Olympic Sailing venue but at a [wrongly attributed] new Olympic Surfing venue … [kitesurfing] should fly on its own merits and not use sailing to promote its desire to be included in the Olympic Games – and its commercial interests. (Petition 2018)
This call to arms urged sailors to lobby hard via their National Federations, Sailing Clubs and Class Associations (see also Sailing Illustrated, 2018b).
The Open letter acknowledged that the IOC were requiring changes within Agenda 2020, but suggested the WS executive were the ‘real’ change protagonists, willingly over-complying with the IOC's perceived requirements. They referred to a letter (October 2016) from the IOC's Sport Director, Kit McConnell, to the WS CEO, in which McConnell explained that: The IOC has not and will not dictate changes to the programme nor specific events for inclusion or exclusion … we fully respect the autonomy and independence of World Sailing in these considerations […] each IF retains its independence in considerations and making proposals on the Olympic event programme and athlete quota. (Published in Gladwell, 2018a)
The view that WS Executive were the change protagonists was also voiced in other sailing media (e.g. Fisher, 2018; Gladwell, 2018a). Gladwell (2018a) provocatively termed this agenda ‘Sailing's Agenda 2024’, arguing that ‘Agenda 2020 and the whispered dire penalties for a sport that does not meet the recommendations’ were a ‘gift for World Sailing's scaremongers and their agendas who have used the opportunity [to] set the scene for massive and unnecessary change’ (2018a).
Such critique of the organisation's governance, organisational structure, practices and culture were widespread across the sailing media at this time. WS's leadership was depicted as in crisis, and out of line with the sports key stakeholders, the sailing participants, who are a ‘huge silent mass’ (Gladwell, 2018a). Commentary also highlighted long-standing inequitable practices including the ever-changing and complex selection systems and regulations; the use of trials for new classes which drained resources and were mostly held in Europe disadvantaging the rest of the world; the fairness of voting processes, particularly email voting (Sailing Illustrated 2018c); and role of lobbying (Fisher, 2018; Gladwell, 2018b, 2018c). Gladwell described WS's 2018 Conference, as ‘the bunfight of the quadrennium’ with classes ‘lobbying for inclusion’ while others ‘fought equally hard for retention’ (Gladwell, 2018a). These critiques were also evident across our kite interviews, who described WS's democratic process as ‘flawed’, perpetuating self-interest, and mostly reproducing the views of the traditionalists within the organisation.
Implementing ‘Sailing’s Agenda 2024’
The WS persisted to implement what sailing reporter Gladwell had termed its ‘Agenda 2024’ making significant changes for the Paris 2024 sailing regatta. Two long-standing sailing classes were scrapped including the iconic Finn dinghy. As sailing commentators acknowledged, this men-only craft had ‘to go’ to create the required gender balance, but with such a long history, and ‘support from with so many iconic sailors’ (Leweck, 2021) this was challenging for traditionalists. The 470 dinghy was scaled back from two medals (men's and women's) to one mixed-gender event, and hydrofoil technology became more widespread including in kiteboarding (Formula Kite), and windsurfing (iQFoil). 5
We focus our remaining discussion on the proposals to introduce Formula Kite and the Mixed Offshore event (using a large yacht). These best highlight both the ongoing push and pull between modernists and traditionalists factions in WS, and the increasing direct influence exerted by the IOC in Sailing's Olympic operations.
Sailing traditionalists resist through a mixed offshore proposal
A Mixed Offshore event proposal was a late submission at the 2018 WS Annual Meeting. It was seen as a creative way to ensure traditional boat sailing events were not diminished, while ‘showcasing a growing segment of sailing’. By using a new offshore marathon format, it fulfilled the IOC requirements for different formats and new audiences (Leweck, 2021). However, the event would use a keelboat sailed by two people (i.e. a large, expensive sailing boat). The proposal was championed by France, the world leader in such offshore marathon sailing (Gladwell, 2018b), and with considerable lobbying of WS members, it gained support across WS (Gladwell, 2018c).
However, The IOC advised WS on several occasions that they were unhappy with Mixed Offshore, raising concerns including equipment costs, and broadcasting costs and ‘field-of-play security’ (Morgan, 2021a). The IOC directed WS to propose a different event, giving them only five months to come up with an alternative (Morgan, 2021a); this was only three years before the 2024 Games.
Despite the urgency of coming to a decision about an alternative event that met the IOC's requirements, WS received 26 submissions from its member nations most of which did not meet the IOC's gender equality criteria so were rejected by WS (Morgan, 2021a, 2021b). WS officials cautioned its members, reminding them that if it failed to propose a suitable alternative, the sport could lose its 10th medal at Paris (Morgan, 2021a). Three proposals became front-runners (including Formula Kite) and were approved by the relevant committees as the shortlist. In yet another protracted process, WS's Council members then voted to reject its Events Committee's work and recommendations and keep Mixed Offshore (Morgan, 2021b). Supporting Council's decision, WS's CEO commented, ‘The World Sailing community selected the Mixed Offshore Event and our slate of events gave a true representation of the depth and breadth of our sport’ (World Sailing, 2021a). A journalist (Morgan, 2021b) suggests the decision was supported by ‘the majority of the sailing community’. This decision seems a clear message from WS Council/CEO to the IOC; that it would determine its own affairs, even when they didn’t suit the IOC's own agenda.
The IOC intervene and veto world sailing: kiteboarding becomes an Olympic sport
However, WS continued to support the kiteboarding proposal, proposing single mixed team, racing event (IOC, 2018), with the exact format and equipment under further evaluation (Formula Kite, 2018; Kite world, 2018). Some concessions were made to the kite community seeking a more exciting format such as a short-course and ‘obstacles for athletes to navigate’ (IOC, 2018). Olympic press releases highlighting the high speed, ‘high-octane … [sport including] jumping six metres in the air, wowing the crowd with flashy grabs and tricks’, with ‘action closer to shore’ than for boat races (IOC, 2018). However, as recreational foiling was growing fast, hydrofoil equipment came within scope during the equipment evaluation, leading to The Formula Kite rules being chosen. In contrast to the one-design principle historically adopted across all sailing classes, they approved a range of production equipment (IKA, 2018). While this approach was new for sailing, it reflects the IOC's urban sports vision with participants using a variety of equipment brands like snowboarding, skateboarding and surfing (IKA, 2018). The sailors, industry and IKA endorsed the use of hydrofoil equipment, with the IKA stating it would ‘work closely’ with the WS Event Committee (Formula Kite, 2018).
However, what would eventuate in Paris was not one mixed Formula Kite event as WS proposed, but two kite events (i.e. men's and women's). At the IOC's Executive Board Meeting (8 June 2021), they decided not to follow WS's recommendation for Mixed Offshore and choose instead to approve two kiteboarding events for Paris. The IOC had vetoed WS and sent a clear message about its power to determine the Olympic programme, and its support for more youthful and globally popular events. A statement by WS explained they understood the process and rationale: Men's and Women's Kiteboarding will bring huge opportunities in terms of universality, developing women's sailing and the media appeal of these exciting events. (World Sailing, 2021a)
However, they made it clear they were unhappy about having their ‘first-choice events for Paris 2024’, overturned, a recommendation they said was ‘democratically selected by World Sailing's members’ (World Sailing, 2021a).
Predictably, the IOC and WS pronounced Formula Kite's debut at Paris as a success, highlighting the dynamic spectacle which ‘lit up the racetrack and achieved peak speeds never before seen in Olympic sailing competition’ (Rice, 2024). Yet, the narrative in the kiteboarding media suggests otherwise. The key point of concern was the lack of broadcasting coverage of the kite events; despite five days of racing only the last day's medal races were shown on Discovery Plus, while other fleets were shown in their entirety (International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024). While recognising the logistical and cost challenges of broadcasting and streaming Olympic sailing events, and that the sailing regatta was plagued by unfavourable light winds, these commentators blamed the IOC, IKA, WS and broadcasters (International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024). However, WS was seen as the key protagonist because they ‘tell broadcasters which events to watch and film’ (International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024). As Chater (2024) inquired, why was a preference for coverage ‘given to a one-design dinghy class designed in 1970’ [the laser], arguing not only was this coverage very dull, but this focus did not representation participation rates (with kiteboarding exceeding global participation of Laser sailors): It felt like kitesurfing was treated as the annoying little upstart of a sport it was back in 2012. We had this incredible opportunity, and we were robbed of the limelight by some outdated boats that offered no entertainment in the conditions found in Marseille. Kitesurfing proved itself to be far more dynamic and exciting than any other class at the games, yet it received the smallest amount of coverage. (Chater, 2024)
This lack of attention was seen as further evidence of the troubled history between kiteboarding and WS, and the IF's ongoing reticence to embrace kiteboarding or modernise.
Discussion
Our ANT-inspired approach directed us to explore the roles and experiences of different actors involved in the modernisation of sailing; the IOC, including the Sports Department and YOG; Sailing's IF, its different committees, and class associations (existing and new); new organisations across the sports of windsurfing and kiteboarding (e.g. IKA); and actors within the wider windsurfing, kiteboarding and sailing communities and industries. The analysis outlined the roles and challenges of these different stakeholders and how their influence has shifted over time, and highlights the economic, cultural, political and technological forces operating, causing contestation and negotiation. Our discussion highlights key findings focused on each of these three key stakeholders and raises broader issues regarding the politics of IF modernisation.
New sailing-related sports
Our research highlights the ongoing challenges for those in/or representing new sailing-related events/sports to gain acceptance and have a voice within the governance structures of WS. Across our interviews and interactions with windsurfing and kiteboarding representatives, they expressed their frustration at their lack of voice or autonomy. Kiters felt the IKA continued to hold a marginalised position within WS, and their committees took a ‘softly, softly’ approach as they did not want to ‘upset anyone’ in the sailing world. There was clear evidence that some in the sailing community did not support the inclusion of kiteboarding, as articulated in the Petition to WS Executive (3 May 2018) cited above. They saw kiteboarding as its own sport, not part of sailing, and believed its ‘desire to be included in the Olympics was due to commercial interests’ (Petition, 2018).
These findings reflect the wider research on action sports that have been incorporated into the Olympic Games under existing traditional sport IFs showing that the sport organisations (IFs and NOCs) have continued to see the new action sports (e.g. snowboarding, BMX) as less credible or important, supporting their older and most established events (Strittmatter et al., 2019; Thorpe and Wheaton, 2011a, 2011b; Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). For the new sports, this governance model presents challenges and conflicts, including loss of participant autonomy and agency. As Strittmatter et al. (2019) show, snowboarding's shift from an ‘industry-based system’ with self-governance pre-Olympic inclusion to the ‘nation-based sport systems’ where they had to ‘conform to unfamiliar hierarchical regulations’, continues to create challenges for snowboarding (1655).
This research also points to tension and contestation within kite stakeholders. However, reflecting Jallat's (2018) observations in France, conflict was largely evident at the level of institutions, not practice. The conflicts between kite stakeholders were due to the different organisations attempting to legitimise their version of kite events, values and culture, ‘defend territory’, and ‘assert power’ (Jallat, 2018: 154). Across the broader kiteboarding community, many felt that the IKA and WS alliance was not representing or supporting the full diversity of the kiteboarding industry and community. As Frizzell argues, ‘apprehensions around the regulation of kite sports and their future growth trajectories’ are ongoing, as is the incorporation of this sport as ‘racing’ (in Thorpe et al., 2024). Although to some extent the IOC's interest in kiteboarding was due to years of lobbying by the IKA with WS (interviews, 2015–2016; International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024), as has been shown across research on other action sports, many recreational participants care little about the inclusion of this sport into the Olympic Games (see Frizzell in Thorpe et al., 2024): As kiters, we inherently didn’t want to be sailors, but it is what it is. Kite racing is a unique discipline of kitesurfing, and that's the beauty of our sport. We can do so much with so many different types of craft under our feet. (International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024)
Yet, these cultural and ideological differences fuelled disputes between diverse kite stakeholders at the institutional level in their attempts to gain control of the sport, and its economic potential.
World Sailing
Policy documents (e.g. World Sailing, 2024c) position WS as a forward-thinking IF, proactive in implementing change with modernisation initiatives that align with the IOC's Agenda 2020+directives (IOC, 2023a) include their sustainability initiatives, ‘legacy’ considerations, and implementation of eSailing (World Sailing, 2024c). Yet, our case study shows that WS has been reluctant and slow to implement changes in Olympic sailing that challenge the status quo. It was only when the IOC exerted direct influence, initially via cutting athlete quotas, then overturning its potentially expensive Mixed Offshore event recommendation, that change has been forthcoming.
Similarly, WS was relatively slow to implement the IOC's Agenda 2020 recommendation for 50% female participation: gender equity at an event level was not achieved until 2024. Our discussion shows the organisation understood this requirement but found it particularly challenging to ‘let go’ of historic male-focused events like the Finn. As sailing commentators have also noted, WS have not been proactive or creative in addressing gender equity. In 2019 The World Sailing Trust, a global charity established by WS (in June 2018), launched an international survey to better understand women's experiences in sailing. Their report highlights the lack of opportunities available to women as participants, coaches and leaders, and suggest ‘where women do have the opportunity, they are often met with prejudice and discrimination’ (World Sailing Trust, 2019: 40). Despite underscoring the need for change across Olympic and non-Olympic sailing, and outlining detailed recommendations (World Sailing Trust, 2019: 46), there is little evidence of this systemic change occurring between 2019 and 2024.
Nonetheless, WS is not a monolithic organisation; its members and their representatives have a range of conflicting interests and views. There are complex webs of power within such IFs (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Forster and Pope, 2004; Puddle and Wheaton, 2023). The disputes leading up to Paris vividly show that while a powerful group within WS were able to drive change, this process was contested, protracted and difficult. Furthermore, as non-profit organisations operating in an increasingly commercial environment, IFs like WS are ‘caught in a web of contradictions that they struggle to resolve’ (Forster and Pope, 2004: 5). Sailing stakeholders who were in favour of sailing's ‘Agenda 2024’ (Gladwell, 2018a), appeared to be driven by the IOC's agenda and financial imperatives, while some kiteboarding agents were also willing facilitators, and beneficiaries in this process. These findings reflect Puddle and Wheaton’s (2023) exploration of the gymnastic IF (FIG) attempted appropriation of parkour. Rather than a desire to develop and promote parkour, FIG's motives appear to be to ‘modernize … [and] broaden … the appeal of gymnastics’ (571). Moreover, like WS, FIG's actions were centred on commercial ambitions, ‘underpinned by maintaining their privileged’ and financially important relationship with the IOC (Puddle and Wheaton, 2023: 673).
While assessing WS governance was not our key focus, our research illustrated that the organisational structures, regulations and policies of WS reflect many of the findings in prior research on the issues impacting poor self-governance across many IFs, and how these issues impede modernisation efforts (Geeraert et al., 2014). Across the different data sources, the structure, size, and complexity of WS were viewed as contributing to a slow process of change. For example, new event selection processes adopted in 2018 were described as ‘overly complex’ with ‘six pages of confusing regulations’ (Gladwell, 2018a). A kiteboarding committee member described working with WS as ‘a nightmare’ because ‘all the committees’ and processes were ‘just so slow’ (Interview, 2017).
There were widespread criticisms about the organisation's leadership, governance practices and culture, which contributed to the contestation between different WS stakeholders. Across sailing media sources, WS's leadership was depicted as out of touch and ‘in crisis’ (Gladwell, 2018a; Leweck, 2021); its governance was described as ‘dysfunctional’ (Fisher, 2018). Commentators highlighted the lack of forums with involvement from sailors, classes and national authorities. Lobbing was a widespread practice used to gain support for particular committee agenda (Fisher, 2018; Gladwell, 2018b, 2018c), and the fairness and effectiveness of voting processes were questioned (Gladwell, 2018d; Sailing Illustrated, 2018c).
Similarly, kiting stakeholders also described WS as ‘out of touch’, seeing it as traditional, elitist, and ‘very conservative’ with the Council and Sailing Federations dominated by ‘old’ people. As a kite journalist claimed in 2024: World Sailing were never keen on kite racing being included. Think of a board of fuddy old dudes in blazers quaffing expensive wine on yachts while watching with scorn the various dinghy classes and you have an idea of what the board looks like. It would be an understatement to say they weren’t that keen on kitesurfing being included as a sailing class. (International Kitesurf Magazine, 2024)
Kiters who had participated in WS Committees described the decision-making processes as ‘flawed’ and ‘undemocratic’. They argued that although members were democratically elected, they were not always ‘fully informed representatives’, and often displayed an unwillingness to ‘compromise’. One interviewee claimed committee members ‘always vote in their own short term self-interest not the long term interests of the sport … not what's best for sailing to remain Olympic’ (Interview, 2015). This observation was also evident in the sailing media, suggesting that class associations often voted not ‘for the good of the sport or the majority of sailors and developing nations around the world who' best interests they should be protecting’ (Kendall, 2012). The larger European nations’ blocs were able to dominate event/equipment selection voting processes, and that unless small/emerging nations vote ‘en bloc they scarcely have a voice in the process’ (Gladwell 2018a).
These findings reflect previous research on Sports IFs (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Bayle, 2024; Geeraert et al., 2014) showing that a range of structural issues impact the quality of IF's governance, while also reproducing power disparities within the organisation including between nations, across sailing classes/events, and those who wanted or resisted change. As Geeraert et al. (2014) have argued, ‘member organizations’ like WS are ‘unlikely to provide an impetus to change the status quo within the sports governing bodies’ thus creating a ‘vicious circle’ that ‘prevents the impetus for change’ (2014: 283). If WS is to achieve its stated ambitions to help ‘narrow the performance gap between sailing nations’ and become more representative of the global sailing community's diversity, including across gender (World Sailing, 2024c), significant organisational and cultural change is required.
The IOC
The IOC instigated and drove the need for Olympic Sailing to change with Agenda 2020 and the updated Agenda 2020+ (IOC, 2023a) giving direction about the areas of focus. As one kiter noted: So now after Agenda 2020 came out… [WS] finally noticed; ‘oh, we have to make our events different.’ It only took them 30 years, but finally! (Interview, 2015)
Implementing reduced athlete quotas, and requirements to demonstrate 50% female participation at the event level for sports was clearly effective and provided an ongoing ‘threat’, which was widely referred to across WS's committee minutes and communications. Similarly, Wheaton and Thorpe (2021) show that this ‘top-down push from the IOC’ to include other new action sports in the Tokyo Olympics, had a significant impact in ‘putting gender equity onto the agenda’ (290) of sports that had historically marginalised women's participation and leadership. In WS's most recent ‘guide to decision-making for Olympic sailing’ (2024d), the IF makes it clear to all its stakeholders, that ‘Sailing's position in the Olympic Games is a privilege and not a right’ (2024d: 7), and that ‘all decisions’ must ‘take account of this reality’ (2024d: 7) and be proactive in aligning with the IOC's directives. As Bayle (2024) argues, while the IOC has ‘neither the capacity nor the means to impose its will on Olympic IFs’ particularly in their governance and functioning (1764), exerting such formal and informal political pressure (Bayle terms ‘coercive isomorphism’) particularly via Olympic revenue redistribution criteria, has been effective (1766).
The IOC continued to claim they had a hands-off approach, giving the IFs independence in making proposals on Olympic event programmes and athlete quotas. This point was clearly stated in the IOC's letter to WS written by Sport Director Kit McConnell (2016) and echoed by the President of WS at that time stating that the IOC was not ‘demanding change’ (reprinted in Gladwell, 2018a). Yet, a clear finding from our research is that the IOC has increased its influence on WS's decision-making over the time. This influence was clear in the event changes WS made including dropping their long-standing (and male only) dinghy classes in favour of new more youthful, physical, media-friendly events (i.e. kiting, foiling). The IOC's willingness to dictate changes to the Olympic Sailing programme was most evident in their unprecedented decision (i.e. IOC Executive Board in June 2021) to reject and overturn WS's recommendations (for Mixed Offshore), and instead approve two kiteboarding events for Paris (men and women). This action does not align with the IOC's earlier claims to respect the autonomy and independence of WS.
Lobbying by different stakeholders within the sailing communities clearly had impacts, although it is hard to assess the extent without being privy to these internal workings. The kiters informal interactions led them to believe the IOC wanted kite sports in the Olympics, but they initially felt the IOC were not proactive in supporting them and needed to push WS harder. As the researchers’ own interactions with the IOC over this time period suggest, the IOC is a complex organisation, with some factions, including the then Sports department, working strategically towards more radical change (see Wheaton and Thorpe, 2021). However, to some extent, their sphere of influence was limited by the IOC's organisational processes, particularly the ongoing (unequal) power held by the longstanding IFs in the IOC's decision-making processes.
Lastly, we note that while our discussion has focused on these three key agents, technology played a key and complex role in these modernisation processes, impacting not just craft but rules, events and media coverage. With the speed of technological change, ‘technology-first’ sports such as windsurfing (Oakley, 2023) and kiting appear to present particular challenges for their IFs and the Olympic movement. Future research needs to explore technology as a key consideration within these sporting networks. Additionally, research with more diverse stakeholder groups such as non-competitive but committed recreational boat sailors and kiters, and the perspectives of those impacted beyond the Global North, would be timely, as would more in-depth considerations of women as athletes and in leadership.
Conclusions
Much of the research to date on modernising the Olympics through the inclusion of newer more youthful sports has focused on the initiatives taken by the IOC within the Agenda 2020 framework, with a focus on the challenges for the newly incorporated sports, and their governance. What has been less well evidenced is the impacts for the traditional IFs such as WS, and their shifting power and influence in these decision-making processes. Through a historical perspective, informed by an ANT-inspired methodology, we show the different stakeholders involved in each key event or policy shift, and how each key stakeholder's influence shifts over time.
Our research shows that both new sailing-related sports – windsurfing and kiteboarding – appeared to have had the support of the IOC, yet inclusion was in both cases a protracted and contested process. We highlight that the challenges these new sports faced, including lack of institutional support and equipment choices lagging behind evolving technologies and formats, were due to WS favouring their traditional core sailing classes and marginalising the new board wind-sports. Nonetheless, the research highlights the ongoing power struggles between agents within this IF, particularly between modernists and traditionalists.
The IOC's Agenda 2020 has been the backdrop and push for Olympic Sailing's modernisation and its implementation has led to clear power shifts in the relationships between the IOC, WS, and other stakeholders. Although the IOC initially claimed to, and did respect the IF's independence, over the past decade the IOC had increased its influence on WS's decision-making, and has exerted its authority more evidently. With some IFs (such as WS) resistant to change, such efforts by the IOC were necessary to ensure progress towards achieving the goals set out in Agenda 2020 (and later Agenda 2020+). Importantly, WS is one of 39 IOC-recognised IFs under pressure from the IOC to modernise. While the relationship between these IFs and the IOC has long been one of reciprocal benefits (Cervin, 2020; Puddle and Wheaton, 2023), these power dynamics are shifting, and may play out differently in each case. The governance of the Olympic system has become increasingly complex, with the institutional work of the IOC appearing to be a ‘balancing act’ requiring collaboration and involving a complex ‘network of key partners’ (Chappelet, 2023: 1766). In this context of change, the power, politics, innovations and challenges between the IOC and other IFs, and within IFs and their sporting communities, are deserving of continued academic attention.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the University of Waikato (Strategic Research Fund).
