A comparative analysis of the environmental sustainability of London 2012 and Rio 2016: A Capability Approach to inter-national inequality at the Olympic Games

Abstract

Major sporting events can act either as drivers of environmental degradation or catalysts for environmental sustainability, often dictated by the developmental level of the host nation. This article applies a Capability Approach, alongside World-Systems Theory, in its analysis of the environmental sustainability of the London 2012 and Rio 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The article suggests that it is the possessed capabilities of the event host, rather than resources or utilities, which defines sustainable Olympic delivery. It asserts that the ‘non-core’ Rio possessed national capabilities less valuable in hosting an environmentally sustainable MSE than the ‘core’ London. In doing so, the article establishes four key inequalities between the environmental sustainability of the two cases: environmental starting positions; prevalence of expert local organisations; structural and regulatory conditions; and economic stability. It argues that these inter-national inequalities were unaccounted for in event planning and delivery – and were exacerbated by the ‘core’ hegemony of the Olympic Games. The paper suggests that the identification, acknowledgement, and attempted remediation of this inter-national inequality of capability may encourage a more equitable Olympic Games.

Introduction

Major Sporting Events (MSEs) have been employed by various nations, in various stages of development, for various reasons. Historically, such events have been disproportionately allocated to ‘core’ countries, however, recent times have seen an increase in ‘non-core’ hosting as aspiring nations emerge onto the global MSE stage (Grix and Lee, 2013). However, as will be identified shortly, MSEs hosted by ‘non-core’ nations appear to be less beneficial, and more harmful, than MSEs hosted by ‘core’ nations. This is particularly salient regarding the environmental sustainability of these events – which has become of increasing importance both inside and outside of the MSE sphere, being prioritised by the UN and IOC alike (UN, 2021; Flyvbjerg et al., 2021).

Despite the burgeoning importance of environmental sustainability within the Olympic Games (Ross and Leopkey, 2017) the environmental performance of Olympic hosts has been underwhelming (Hayes and Horne, 2011; Müller et al., 2021). Additionally, Olympic events hosted by ‘non-core’ countries have been asserted as the least sustainable (Müller et al., 2021). Following this, it has been questioned as to why ‘non-core’ nations suffer from these greater negative environmental impacts (Rowberg and Rincker, 2019). This paper will suggest that this is influenced by the existence of inter-national inequality of capability – the differences in possessed capabilities between nations. In this sense, MSE environmental sustainability is a lens through which we can observe this inequality. In situating the concept of inter-national inequality of capability, the article will draw on the Capability Approach and World-Systems Theory.

Therefore, this article considers two research questions. Firstly: What can a Capability Approach to inter-national inequality inform us about MSE environmental sustainability? Secondly: What can a comparative analysis of London 2012 and Rio 2016 inform us about the relationship between inter-national inequality, MSE environmental policy, and capability?

Towards these questions, this article will first briefly discuss the relationship between sport and the environment. It will then introduce the theoretical frameworks of the study, the Capability Approach and World-Systems Theory, within the research context, before elucidating on inter-national inequality of capability in MSE environmental policy. It will then trace the methods employed. The case studies will be presented separately, followed by a comparison and discussion. It concludes with some suggestions going forward.

Sport and the environment

Human behaviour has unequivocally caused irrevocable, irreversible, and unprecedented damage to the planet we inhabit (IPCC, 2021). Increased intensity of hazardous weather conditions, air and water pollution, degraded ecosystems and biospheres, rising sea levels, and climate change (IPCC, 2021; Rosenberg, 2018) has put us in – as labelled by the UN Secretary-General – a ‘code red for humanity’ (UN, 2021). Therefore, questions around the relationship between our actions and the environment have become more apt than ever.

A significant factor within the environmental discussion is sport (Thibault, 2009). Sport often engenders various negative environmental impacts. It contributes considerably to GHG emissions (Chard and Mallen, 2012; Dolf and Teehan, 2015) and degrades the environment through land clearance for sport-related constructions (Inoue and Kent, 2012; Trendafilova et al., 2014). Additionally, sport often consumes resources at an incommensurate rate (Neo, 2010; Millington and Wilson, 2014), leading to an inherent issue of waste within sport (Thibault, 2009).

MSEs remain one of the most visible manifestations of the environmental impact of sport, primarily through their international nature (DeChano-Cook and Shelley, 2018). Air pollution through increased international travel (Pereira et al., 2017), insufficient waste disposal (Lenskyj, 1998; Dolles and Sӧderman, 2010), and biodiversity loss through infrastructural developments (Lee, 2019) remain common MSE legacies. Additionally, these infrastructures are often underutilised post-event (Essex and Chalkley, 2004; Deng and Poon, 2013; Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016; Bama, 2017). MSE environmental policy is often unsuccessful (Preuss, 2013; Karamichas, 2013); rarely materialises into national legislation (Fermeglia, 2017); functions primarily as rhetoric (Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 2012); is often overruled in favour of commercial opportunities (Azzali, 2017b); and serves to implement ‘Western’ policy into ‘non-core’ nations (Karamichas, 2020). Therefore, the extent to which the environment is prioritised within environmental policy could be questioned.

Sport, environmental sustainability, and inequality of capability

Capability approach

This section will first introduce the theoretical frameworks of the study, before using them to establish the concept of ‘inequality of capability’ between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ states, situating it within the MSE arena.

The Capability Approach (CA) is centred around equality, focusing on what individuals are free and able to do (Sen, 1979). The framework distinguishes between two key concepts, functionings and capabilities. Functionings are our real actions dictated by the external and internal environment, such as age, gender, or educational background (Nussbaum 2011). To illustrate, Saith (2001) describes a scenario wherein two individuals are given adequate food: one may achieve a state of ‘moderate nourishment’ whereas the other, who has a parasitic infection, may achieve the different functioning of ‘poor nourishment’. Capabilities, however, are the requirements we must fulfil to enable the potential choosing of functionings (Sen, 1993). For example, the difference between starving and fasting (Sen, 2001; Clark, 2006). In both states the functioning is starving whilst the capability is the ability to be well nourished. Someone starving lacks this capability and, therefore, cannot achieve the functioning of ‘moderate nourishment’. However, someone fasting possesses this capability but has the agency to instead choose to pursue the functioning of ‘starving’, as they perceive that as the more valuable functioning. Whilst functionings represent actual achievements, the formation of a capability set is representative of the opportunity freedom, dictated by possessed capabilities, to alternate between combinations of functionings (Sen 2001) – they are the different potential pathways towards a valuable life (Sen 1992). Summarised by Alkire (2008: 28), the normative proposition asserted by CA is that ‘social arrangements should be primarily evaluated according to the extent of freedom people have to promote or achieve functionings they value’.

CA rejects a resource-based view of development (Alkire and Deneulin, 2009), considering resources as absent of intrinsic value but valuable because of the opportunities they provide (Anand et al., 2005). People do not only value economic income (Anand et al., 2009) and many who possess sufficient resources lack the capabilities to employ them valuably (Sen, 2001). CA asserts that, towards the goal of equality, the expansion of capabilities should be prioritised over resources or utilities (Kimhur, 2020). In this way, CA serves to relocate discussions of resource and utility within the MSE sphere to a discussion of capabilities.

Essential in transforming resources into capabilities are conversion factors. These are elements possessed by an individual or group which enable resources to be converted into capabilities. Using an example from Pelenc et al. (2015) within the development of sustainable development capabilities, factors such as organisational capacity; effectiveness of partnerships; relationships of power; and vulnerability to climate change influenced the possession of the capability ‘being able to implement sustainable development projects at a local/regional scale’. Therefore, these conversion factors influence which capabilities are possessed (Griewald and Rauschmayer, 2014). Within this study, conversion factors approximate the ‘local context’ of the nation – that being the combination of factors possessed by London or Rio in the conversion of resources to capabilities – consisting of organisational, social, and environmental components (Griewald and Rauschmayer, 2014).

The concept of collective capabilities is also drawn upon – these are capabilities possessed by a group (Lessman, 2022). Group capabilities are particularly influenced by organisations, structures, and institutions (Ibrahim, 2006; Andreoni et al., 2021). Regarding the environment, collective capabilities are essential to discussions of sustainability, relocating responsibility from the individual to the collective (Lessman and Rauschmayer, 2012; Pelenc et al., 2013; 2015; Lessman, 2022). However, measuring the impact of collective capabilities on the individual can be difficult (Pelenc et al., 2015). In addressing this, for this study being environmentally sustainable is assumed to be ‘valuable’ to the individual and group.

These collective capabilities further influence the possessed capabilities of the wider group – having a ‘knock-on’ effect (Andreoni et al., 2021). In this article, smaller-scale capabilities possessed by organisations and institutions within a nation then contribute to the wider possessed capabilities of that nation in hosting MSEs. Interestingly, the possession of these ‘collective productive capabilities’ are essential in overcoming structural inequality (Andreoni et al., 2021). In this way, various organisations and institutions can be analysed through CA (Rauschmayer et al., 2018).

Sen (1985) alludes to the possession of capabilities by national groups in his comparison of India and China. This article conceptualises the unit of analysis from individuals to collective actors (Griewald and Raschmayer, 2014). In this paper, the host nation itself could be considered as the ‘entity’ to which these capabilities connect, rather than an individual. Therefore, the notion of national capabilities is adopted, operationalised to the inequalities which exist between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ nations.

Various criticisms of CA exist, summarised succinctly by Clark (2006) as: questions regarding the valued weighting of capabilities, as to which capabilities could be considered more important than others; the high informational requirement of its application; and the vague nature of what a capability is through its lack of a definitive ‘list’. In addition, Evans (2002) accuses the approach of containing intrinsic neoliberal tendencies through its focus on individualism. Regarding its application in this research: capability weighting was determined qualitatively through the impact on the environmental sustainability of the events; the high informational requirement was mitigated by the wide availability of data; the ‘vagueness’, or rather flexibility, of the framework allowed it to be employed across disciplines (Kimhur, 2020); and focus was relocated from the traditional individualistic perspective towards a more collective application.

World-Systems theory

Having established the nation as the unit of analysis, this research incorporates Wallerstein's (2004a) world-systems theory (WST) in acknowledging the differing positions that nations inhabit within global structures. WST asserts that the world-economy is predicated on cycles of strengthening state-structures in the global ‘core’ alongside the simultaneous interrelated weakening of those in the ‘periphery’, reproducing the hegemony of the ‘core’ (Wallerstein, 2004a). ‘Core’ nations, such as the UK, exist at the centre of the economic order and enjoy a favourable power dynamic over the ‘non-core’ (Klimczuk and Klimczuk-Kochanska, 2019) primarily due to their developed knowledge economy (Shannon, 1996).

The ‘non-core’ consists of peripheral and semi-peripheral countries dependent on the ‘core’, who often strive to transition into the ‘core’ (Wallerstein, 2004a). ‘Peripheral’ countries are often less industrialised, agricultural countries wherein growth is dependent on the export of raw materials (Shannon, 1996). Between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ exists the ‘semi-periphery’ – rapidly industrialising nations, such as Brazil, which are exploited by the ‘core’ whilst simultaneously exploiting the ‘periphery’ (Wallerstein, 2004a). These three categories exist on a scale – with ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ as the two extremes and ‘semi-periphery’ as the middle ground (Lee, 2016) – therefore their definitional borders are not exact.

Various criticisms of WST exist, such as its lack of quantitative value (Christofis, 2019); the perceived abandonment of class within analysis (Christofis, 2019); the accusation that it fails to consider social relations and culture (Petras, 1981); claims that it is based on vague rhetoric rather than measurable factors (Pieterse, 1988); and uncertainty by state autonomists of WSTs deconstruction of the separation between the state and capitalist entrepreneurs (Wallerstein, 2004b). Despite these objections, WST is suitable for this research due to its conceptualisation of the power imbalance between the ‘core’ and the ‘non-core’; the acknowledgement of the motivations of the ‘semi-periphery’ to transition into the ‘core’; and its realisation that the ‘core’ will resist the deconstruction of its hegemony. Interestingly, Similar power imbalances have been noted in CA literature to constrain the achievement of environmental sustainability (Scholtes, 2010; Bockstael and Berkes, 2017).

Inter-national inequality of capability

Whilst CA is valuable in providing an adaptable framework from which to explore inequality it requires additional frameworks to establish causality (Robeyns, 2006; Greiwald and Rauschmeyer, 2014). In this vein, WST is employed to fill this gap through its exploration of geopolitical power relations and dependency. Through WST the consideration of how institutions and other structures influence capabilities can be achieved. Used in tandem, the two frameworks can conceptualise ‘inequality of capability’ at a global scale.

Historically, uneven power dynamics within the World-System have led to discrepancies in capabilities developed by ‘non-core’ nations compared to those in the ‘core’. This is influenced by the possession of less effective conversion factors within the ‘non-core’ local context – noted here. Ibrahim (2006) asserts the various disadvantages marginalised groups possess in developing collective capabilities, such as: their limited access to political and social institutions; lower financial resources; lack of information; a psychology of dependence; and internal conflicts. Relating this to nations, Zipp (2017) traces three overarching macro-level ‘inequalities’ which contribute to Barbados and St Lucia being ‘non-average’ within the world-system: economic instability and vulnerability; the structure of the education system; and inefficiencies in government, policy, and infrastructure. Extensive economic and social pressures within ‘non-core’ urban centres frequently leads to insufficient service provision (Gruneau, 2016). Additionally, urban development programmes within ‘non-core’ states are often outsourced to large ‘core’ based multi-national organisations that propose strategies less appropriate for the ‘non-core’ context (Watson, 2014; Scorcia and Munoz-Raskin, 2019). Karamichas (2007), within the context of Greece, illustrates inhibitory differences between countries in the adoption of environmental policy: a lack of civic culture; ineffective administrative structures underpinned by lesser technical knowledge; and the prevalence of reactive legislative processes. ‘Non-core’ nations also appear to be less likely to embrace environmental policies (Martínez-Zarzoso and Phillips, 2020) due to the perception that environmental considerations may limit economic growth (Talbot, 2008).

With the recent increase in Olympic editions outside of the ‘core’ (Horne and Takahashi, 2022) these limited conversion factors become revealed within ‘non-core’ contexts. In MSE hosting, ‘non-core’ nations face additional barriers through the limited capacity and stability of economic, social, and political structures (Black, 2007; Karamichas, 2012; Dowse and Fletcher, 2018). These ‘non-core’ realities diverge from those of the ‘core’ (Bravo et al., 2018) resulting in less suitability for hosting (Dowse and Fletcher, 2018). This is exacerbated by less extensive sport-related infrastructure (Matheson and Baade, 2004; Bama, 2017) and a workforce less skilled in the MSE sector (Sroka, 2021) leading to greater investment requirements (Matheson and Baade, 2004) and greater opportunity costs (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006; De Oliveira, 2011). From a policy context, MSE institutions are primarily based within a ‘core’ environment (Poast, 2007), with requirements unsuited for countries outside of this ‘core’ (Sroka, 2021), resulting in dissonance between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ perspectives (Cornelissen, 2014; Azzali, 2017a). These inequalities often contribute to host agency, with ‘non-core’ nations experiencing greater interference from their respective governing bodies (Swart and Bob, 2009; Cornellissen, 2011; Van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2011). Additionally, through MSE hosting the dominant practices of ‘core’ nations within a ‘zone of prestige’ may be imitated by transitive ‘semi-peripheral’ nations existing within a ‘zone of emulation’ (Lee, 2016). Similarly, various mechanisms serve to reaffirm MSE ‘core’ hegemony through the standardisation of ‘non-core’ host cultures to align with ‘core’ values (Brownell, 2005; Hayes and Karamichas, 2012; Lee, 2016; Dowse and Fletcher, 2018; Karamichas, 2020).

Following this, ‘non-core’ nations are considered the least environmentally sustainable Olympic hosts (Müller et al., 2021). They inhabit a weaker environmental position than those in the ‘core’ (Cornelissen, 2010) – they are at greater risk of environmental impacts (Allen et al., 2015) and require greater considerations to combat this (Peiser and Reilly, 2004; Serauta, 2018). These ‘non-core’ hosts also appear to engender less effective environmental NGO collaboration (Karamichas, 2012) and receive guidance from the IOC regarding environmental organisational collaboration (Ross and Leopkey, 2017; Millington et al., 2018). In addition, they face greater difficulties in surpassing the environmental standards set by MSEs in ‘core’ nations (Caratti and Ferragutto, 2012; Talavera et al., 2019). Interestingly, these inequalities appear reflected in CA sustainability literature, where they are noted to influence the possession of capabilities relevant to environmental sustainability. Key factors here are: organisational structure and capacity; possession of relevant knowledge; partnership effectiveness; regulatory frameworks; the political environment; public support; biodiversity hotspots; vulnerability to land use change and climate change; and environmental sensitivity (Greiwald and Rauschmayer, 2014; Pelenc et al., 2015).

Through the adaptation of Sen's (1980) and Nussbaum's (2003) discussions around capabilities, combining them with WST – replacing a wheelchair-bound individual with ‘non-core’ countries – conceptualisations around the inter-national inequalities of MSEs emerge: ‘a ‘non-core’ country will require more resources connected with Olympic hosting than will the ‘core’ country, if the two are to attain a similar level of ability to host’ (Sen, 1980, cited in Nussbaum, 2003: 4). In this way, the ability – or capability – for ‘non-core’ nations to host MSEs is constricted by their available resources and possessed conversion factors.

Following this, this article employs CA to conceptualise exactly what the inequality between the two event hosts is – that is, inequality of capability – before utilising WST to contextualise and understand the mechanisms which engender and exacerbate this inequality. Whilst this capability inequality is often alluded to within MSE literature, CA is used to theoretically embed such discussions beyond those of resources and utilities. In considering this, the application of CA here contributes to addressing inequality between countries.

Methods

In utilising CA in this way, certain methodological considerations should be clarified. There are, broadly speaking, three primary functions of CA: as an evaluative framework; a prospective framework; and a descriptive framework (Alkire, 2008). Descriptive simply refers to the use of capabilities to describe the reality of a state or event (Sen, 2004) whilst prospective refers to the consideration of pathways which would generate notable capability expansion (Alkire, 2008). These two forms of CA are less relevant to this study. Rather, CA as an evaluative framework will be primarily drawn upon. This refers to the assessment of multiple states of affairs through the comparison of capabilities (Alkire, 2008). In this sense, capabilities are the focus of comparison, not environmental performance.

This study employed a comparative analysis of two case studies: the London 2012 and Rio 2016 Olympic Games, towards the goal of exploring the mechanisms that create differences between these cases. Rio and London presented a unique opportunity wherein a ‘core’ host directly preceded a ‘semi-peripheral’ nation – allowing for theoretical replication logic due to expected differences between cases (Yin, 2013).

A comparative case study approach was chosen (Yin, 2013). A research design inspired by the first phase of both Brannagan and Rookwood's (2016) Qatar 2022 study and Azzali's (2019) mega-event paper was adopted. This relates to the analysis of key documents, primarily official publications from key Games organisations, combined with media reports relating to the events – alongside relevant research within the extant literature.

Documents published by Olympic organisers, particularly Rio 2016, appeared to omit environmental failures, instead focusing on positive Games aspects. Therefore, news reports were used more than expected in crafting narrative vignettes. This raised the issue of data source, most specifically within news reports and official documents. The author considered the data sources within the analysis and only included those deemed reliable. Controversial or overly positive claims were sought to be justified through multiple occurrences within the data and triangulated through comparison with sources from a different data medium. News sources analysed were solely English language based, arguably existing within a Western worldview – therefore, local Brazilian news sources could not be included. Data was gathered and analysed in summer 2021, during COVID-19.

Following data collection, an analytical framework consisting primarily of thematic analysis was created (Edwards and Skinner, 2009). During analysis of policy documents data was organised into broad codes which reflected identified themes, before analysis of news articles and peer-reviewed journal articles further informed code organisation. Codes were then narrowed following the establishment of further nuances, allowing theoretical considerations to emerge from the data. Throughout the creation of these codes initial comparative ideas were identified, followed by a later, more formal, comparison of codes and case studies. The researcher employed recursive analytical strategies, including several checks, to ensure the appropriateness of developed codes. These codes and themes were developed with Zipp's (2017) assertion – that they should relate to the capabilities exposed – in mind.

However, CA is still a ‘work in progress’ and thus a distinct methodology for CA analysis does not yet exist (Alkire, 2008: 27). Therefore, the author recognises that this adoptive methodology applied here is not beyond reproach, and might have been supplemented with additional methods to triangulate findings. However, the analysis was guided by Alkire's (2008: 43) sketch of common CA analyses in the evaluation of ‘institutions, social structures, and groups inter alia’ – ensuring the appropriateness of the chosen analytical method. This article, then, suggests a useful method for engaging in CA analysis within MSE research.

Regarding positionality, the author is a UK citizen of English descent, born in North-West England and living in Scotland since 2016. Circumstantial knowledge of these events had been acquired through previous study, however, all information included in this article was acquired during the research. Particularly since London was investigated, these personal factors influenced the research perspective.

The article will next present both case studies separately – highlighting possessed capabilities which impacted event hosting – before comparing the two events.

A tale of two cities

London 2012

London is situated at the ‘core’ of global operational processes and is key to international trade and financial systems (Sassen, 2007) – serving as a nodal point of various environmental flows (Karamichas, 2020) whilst possessing a strong environmental ethos and voluntary sector (London 2012, 2004).

London endeavoured to be the ‘greenest Games ever’, championing a ‘One Planet Olympics’ consisting of low-carbon emissions, zero waste, biodiversity conservation, and increased environmental attentiveness (London 2012, 2004). The bid focused on the regeneration of the deprived area of Stratford (London 2012, 2004). Regarding sustainability, the bid team collaborated with voluntary sector environmental organisations, such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and UK-based BioRegional (Gold and Gold, 2013). Additionally, the bid noted the importance of a ‘steering group’ consisting of various environmental authorities and organisations at global, national, and local levels across a wide range of specialisations (London 2012, 2004). Despite this, following the implementation of the 2010 Coalition Government, Olympic promises were revised to focus less on sustainability. The 2007 promise to ‘make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living’ was revised to ‘ensuring that the Olympic Park can be developed after the Games as one of the principal drivers of regeneration’ (CSL, 2010).

Balfour Beatty, the UK contractor responsible for the Aquatics Centre, drove sustainable concrete innovations, such as pushing coarse aggregate substitution to 76% – establishing the highest ratio of ground granulated blast-furnace slag (GGBS) cement substitution whilst still retaining quality (Henson, 2012). Overall, concrete innovations achieved a 42% reduction in emissions against standard concrete (London 2012, 2009). West Ham United, a local Premier League football club, occupied the Olympic Stadium post-event, justifying its construction despite various controversies (Gibson, 2015). Staff with professional sustainability expertise were also key to London's infrastructure projects (CSL, 2012). Additionally, the London Olympic Stadium's original capacity of 80,000 was reduced to 54,000 post-Games (Azzali, 2020) to better meet future requirements. However, post-Games adaptations did not fully account for running track removal (Zimbalist, 2015) – leading to renovations costing $323 million (Carey, 2014).

In 2011 London's Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) announced the construction of a temporary Basketball training facility on Leyton Marsh in Waltham Forest – a Site of Special Scientific Interest located on a landfill containing WWII artefacts of historical significance. The ODA promised that the site would be reverted to its previous condition by October 2012, with flooring repurposed elsewhere (ODA, 2012). The Hackney Citizen (2012) reported concerns that contaminated waste – containing asbestos excavated from the landfill – was left uncovered on site for six weeks, potentially washing into the nearby river table, causing ecological damage. Initially, ODA plans required only a 50 mm deep skim of earth, meaning this material would not be disturbed. This later increased to 15 cm in the final plan before being amended to 60 cm two weeks before construction began, without any additional environmental impact assessment. Post-Games the site was ostensibly reverted to its ‘previous condition’. Despite legal requirements, the October deadline was missed (ODA, 2013) and contractors left the site waterlogged, with public access prevention fences still erected and various wildflower species lost (Hackney Citizen, 2012).

London created the Commission for a Sustainable London (CSL) to monitor event sustainability. They were supported by strong environmental NGOs and praised for limiting over-inflated sustainability claims through their review of event projects (CAG Consultants, 2013). For example, the non-hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) cooling systems used in the London Aquatics Centre were retrofitted following CSL suggestions to address environmental issues with planned HFC systems (CAG Consultants, 2013). Reportedly, the success of CSL was predicated on two UK-based sustainability advisory bodies – the UK Sustainable Development Commission and the London Sustainable Development Commission – who provided an organisational template appropriate for the London context (CAG Consultants, 2013).

London's economic power was utilised throughout the Games, particularly in limiting failures. When Olympic Park sustainable biomass boiler installations underwhelmed, and gas boilers were instead implemented (CSL, 2012), the ODA responded by ‘contributing’ to mayoral schemes improving the energy efficiency of 12 schools and 2800 houses in local boroughs (London 2012, 2012). Following protests regarding the questionable sustainability of the Leyton Marsh temporary basketball facility the ODA pledged £65,000 to improve the area (Boykoff, 2014). Post-event, many sporting infrastructures remained subsidised by the government (Clark, 2014).

London's successful carbon reduction strategies (London 2012, 2012) drove the development of the Carbon Footprint Methodology, a sustainability tool adopted by subsequent Games committees (ESRC, 2015). For London, this methodology calculated a projected carbon footprint of 3.4 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent and determined a saving against the final footprint of 400,000 tonnes (London 2012, 2012).

Rio 2016

Rio de Janeiro is characterised by socio-economic inequality and extreme poverty (Azzali, 2020) – with a labyrinthian political system (Zimbalist, 2015) imbued with accusations of corruption and controversy (Pinheiro, 2016). It is a semi-peripheral country struggling for advantage within global market liberalisation (Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004). Pre-event, Rio entered an economic recession (Pinheiro, 2016) and possessed various inherent environmental problems relating to deforestation, air quality, waste management, and water supply (Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 2012).

The bid highlighted the catalytic potential of the Games (Rio 2016, 2008) to foster sustainable urban regeneration; promote social inclusion; and develop transport infrastructure (Rio 2016, 2009). However, Rio 2016 rather served as a global signifier of Brazil's ‘development’ and increased geopolitical power (Polo, 2012). In 2015, Rio officials conceded many environmental objectives would remain unachieved (Brooks, 2015). Despite this, Rio 2016 was awarded a sustainability award for meeting ISO 20121 – created based on London 2012 sustainability criteria (Around the Rings, 2021).

Rio collaborated with the IOC and other Bid Organising Committees (BOCs) in their development of a sustainability strategy (Rio 2016, 2008). Michael Payne (2009), a senior strategic advisor to Rio's bid, listed Craig McLatchey, former secretary general of the Australian Olympic Committee, as an international advisor integral to Rio's bid. Payne also noted UK citizen Mike Lee, who served as communications director for both the London 2012 and Rio 2016 bids. Rio 2016 hired various firms to consult on strategy, including: LA's AECOM; UK's Wilkinson Eyre Architects; Spain's Pujol Barcelona Architects; and New York's IMG and McKinsey – presumed to aid in their efforts to emulate the Barcelona 1992 Games (Zimbalist, 2015).

Regarding infrastructure, the Future Arena – a Handball venue built by UK firm AndArchitects (AISTS, 2016) – was set to benefit 2000 schoolchildren post-Games through its deconstruction and reuse (Rio 2016, 2016a). This reuse was abandoned in 2017 due to costs (Leal and Parque, 2019). Additionally, Rio heralded the return of golf to the Olympics, stimulating the construction of a new course in Rio despite two already existing (IOC, 2015). International engineering firms were enlisted to aid US architect Gil Hanse in an environmentally sustainable course design (Rio 2016, 2014). However, many of the design choices appeared unaligned with Rio's legal and cultural structures, culminating in the proposal of unrealistic plans (Ferranti et al., 2020). Additionally, the golf course was built on environmentally protected land (Blakeley, 2012). Whilst organisers asserted the construction was environmentally sustainable (Rio 2016, 2018) multiple issues have been noted – including biodiversity loss and wildlife endangerment (Hodges, 2014); lack of environmental impact assessments or public engagement (Boykoff and Mascarenhas, 2016); and the misrepresentation of the pre-construction site as a degraded wasteland despite evidence to the contrary (Torres, 2016). Post-event the future of the course was uncertain following lack of interest (The Guardian, 2017).

Improved waterways were to be the prime environmental beneficiary of the Games (IOC, 2009) – the Sustainability Report detailed measures taken to improve Guanabara Bay and Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas water quality (Rio 2016, 2014). However, structural issues, such as slow legislative procedures across sixteen politically variant Rio municipalities, inhibited effectiveness (Nolen, 2016). Additionally, for most Rio residents, expectations of sanitation end at flushing toilets. Whether wastewater is deposited into a sustainable water sanitation line or a ditch becomes superfluous when many residents lack basic facilities (Nolen, 2016) – therefore, sustainable sanitation lines were not valued by local residents. Subsequently, the expected finish for the purification of Guanabara Bay was changed from 2016 to 2035 (Barchfield, 2015a). Poor water quality was exemplified pre-Games, when mysterious mass fish deaths occurred (Wade, 2015) and dog and human carcasses were found (Romero and Clarey, 2014). Additionally, a dam failure reportedly led to arsenic leeching in a river (Rowberg and Rincker, 2019).

In 2015 the Associated Press determined every Olympic water venue as unsafe due to high levels of bacteria and viruses – measured at levels 1.7 million times higher than what would be considered alarming in Europe (Brooks, 2015). Following this, the organising committee asserted they would initiate viral testing (Harris, 2015). However, only five labs throughout Brazil were capable of this (Harris, 2015). Looking to international organisations for advice, the World Health Organisation (WHO) stated it would recommend the implementation of viral testing in Rio (Barchfield, 2015b). However, days later they asserted that solely bacterial testing was suitable, as this was their international standard for water monitoring (Brooks, 2015) – likely derived from experiences in nations wherein viral water issues are less relevant than bacterial ones. Citing WHO, the IOC and Brazilian government then refused to implement viral testing (Brooks, 2015).

The OGI Report (OGI Research Team, 2014) studied beach water quality between 2007 and 2012, finding that whilst the Guanabara Bay beaches of Flamengo and Botafogo were considered ‘very poor’, other beaches, such as Recerio and Copacabana, were considered ‘great’. However, it notes that certain quality standards, such as enterococci concentrations and ammoniacal nitrogen quantity, can only be measured in the monitoring stations of Guanabara Bay (OGI Research Team, 2014) – casting doubt over the reliability of other beach quality ratings. Post-Games, IOC executive director Christophe Dubi asserted a lack of specialised experts and external support contributed to water failures (Farrey, 2016).

Comparison

This section will briefly compare the two events, first by environmental performance and then by their capabilities. Whilst a comparison of environmental performance between two nations cannot be equal, and therefore comes with limitations, it is important to establish that the environmental sustainability of the two events was different when discussing capability inequality.

Environmental sustainability

This research determined that the environmental policies of London were superior in execution to those of Rio. Despite both sustainability plans being environmentally considerate, sustainability rhetoric appeared to surpass outcomes. Both events struggled with water-based objectives – whilst Rio's more extensive pledge to solve endemic water issues failed, London also did not achieve their goal of water self-sufficiency in Lea Valley. London's constructions appeared to be ‘fit-for-purpose’ and the sustainable West End regeneration was largely successful. In contrast, Rio infrastructures appeared overbuilt and underutilised post-event – casting doubts as to the relevancy of their sustainable construction accolades. In London, some temporary facility sites were returned ecologically damaged, whilst many temporary venues in Rio were not deconstructed. Additionally, both events did not meaningfully collaborate with local communities, resulting in the eradication of various culturally and socially significant sites. Whilst emission targets were technically met in both events Rio required carbon offsetting – 91% of which was achieved by Dow Chemical (Rio 2016 and Dow, 2016) – otherwise it would have exceeded its target by 25% (Rio 2016, 2016b).

Capability inequality

Various capability inequalities which impacted event hosting were revealed through analysis – catalysed by Rio's limited conversion factors. Those which had the greatest impact on environmental sustainability are highlighted here. These are organised into four ‘themes’, with an example of a relevant capability included in each. These capability examples are not exhaustive or definitive, they are included to support the articulation of capability ‘themes’.

Firstly, the environmental ‘starting points’ of the event contexts were influential. In London, climate change was noted to have a limited impact on hosting, with its mild, temperate climate considered suitable (London 2012, 2004). Therefore, the extent of London's climate considerations appeared to be drought-resistant plant choices (London 2012, 2008) and the implementation of flood alleviation measures (London 2012, 2009). In contrast, Rio's harsher climate necessitated greater considerations. Hot temperatures and heavy rainfall are common in Rio. However, the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) infrastructure developed for the Games was unsuited for this climate. It implemented unreliable air-conditioning units and used asphalt instead of the more climate-appropriate concrete in construction – leading to infrastructure degradation from extreme weather events (Ferranti et al., 2020). Additionally, Rio has endemic waste and water quality issues, whilst London does not. This meant that environmental success, from the onset of the event, required greater considerations for Rio compared to London's superior initial environmental state. Therefore, the relative ability of each nation of ‘being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature’ (Nussbaum, 2003: 14) influenced MSE hosting.

Secondly, local organisations influenced success. London drew on many local environmental organisations which possessed expertise and contextual knowledge. However, in Rio, local environmental organisations appeared absent. London's CSL was buttressed by two UK-based sustainability advisory bodies – however, similar organisations in Rio did not exist in the same capacity to influence Rio's Environment Special Committee (Rio 2016, 2009). Despite this, one area where Rio's organisations benefitted event sustainability was through Brazil's strong football culture, which had driven the development of the Maracanã stadium – allowing it to be leveraged for the Olympics, rather than a new stadium being built. Therefore, the capability of ‘being able to act with expert environmental knowledge alongside knowledge of the local context’ differed between the cases.

Thirdly, structural and regulatory conditions impacted event successes. Rio's political and organisational structures inhibited event delivery, such as difficulties in collaboration across the politically distinct municipalities. Whilst London achieved its air quality goals this achievement was attributed to wider environmental frameworks – such as EU air quality standards (ESRC, 2015). In comparison, Brazilian national air quality standards are less extensive than EU or WHO standards, having fewer considerations for air pollutants (Tsuruta et al., 2018). For example, in London, event regulations were similar to local EU air quality standards, whereas in Rio event requirements resulted in the implementation of environmental frameworks with greater expectations than the ‘local’ framework – meaning greater considerations required by Rio to meet these ‘international’ standards. Therefore, a capability inequality here may be ‘being able to meet international environmental standards’.

Fourthly, the economic resources of London meant that, where environmental missteps occurred, funding could be pledged as recompense. Contrastingly, for Rio, economic issues catalysed environmental failures, particularly post-event. This impacted the capability of ‘being able to allay environmental missteps’.

Having established these four key capability themes, the next section will discuss the ways in which these inequalities impacted, and were exacerbated by, event hosting. The first section ‘dependency on the core’ will primarily address the first three capabilities, whilst the second section ‘host motivation’ will address the fourth.

Discussion

Dependency on the ‘core’

Due to a combination of their position within the world-system and the ‘core’ context of the IOC, Rio was dependent on ‘core’ based organisations. This dependency on key ‘core’ based organisations, such as the IOC and WHO, resulted in similarities in the dependent Rio organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

Through MSE hosting Rio conformed to IOC ‘core’ based guidelines, regulations, and institutions to achieve legitimacy and enhance their perceived competitiveness within the ‘core’ global market (Bravo et al., 2018). In addition, to win hosting rights, Rio's optimistic bid reflected these institutions and, upon being awarded the Games, constituted a binding contractual agreement (Sroka, 2021). This meant that, as Rio's BOC was dependent on a ‘core’ context in their bid, event delivery was then also dependent on the ‘core’ context. This dependency engendered homogenisation by Rio towards a ‘core’ perspective not aligned with their own capabilities. In this way, the dominant MSE practices of the ‘core’ were emulated by the transitive ‘non-core’ state of Rio (Lee, 2016).

Following this, the IOC appeared to serve as a gatekeeper of environmental organisational collaboration (Ross and Leopkey, 2017; Millington et al., 2018) facilitating, primarily ‘core’ based, connections. Whilst international ‘core’ based environmental organisations are valuable in progressing Olympic environmental sustainability, they are often buttressed by local organisations with environmental expertise which provide regional specificity (Ross et al. 2019). However, Rio's ‘non-core’ existence had not facilitated the development of local environmental expertise.

To explain this, Sen (1993) notes that capabilities and functionings are influenced by the developmental level of a nation. Prior to the event, Rio's local context had prioritised addressing suitable sanitation and disease control. In London, these ‘non-core’ environmental functionings had been ‘achieved’ already. Rather, London's organisations and institutions were instead aligned to ‘core’ relevant ones, such as biodiversity preservation and air quality. Therefore, London was more able to meet Olympic environmental objectives, as relevant capabilities were already possessed. In striving to achieve similar environmental objectives as London (Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 2012; Ross and Leopkey, 2017) Rio had to address sustainability in a way their ‘non-core’ capabilities were unprepared for. For example, in Rio, where endemic water quality problems are overt, the development of laboratories with specific viral measurement tools had not occurred, as the development of tools to address the more relevant bacterial diseases had been prioritised. Therefore, Rio did not possess the capability to ensure viral water quality, and so could not achieve viral water quality expectations.

Due to these different functionings influencing the possession of capabilities, a non-core, region-specific organisational perspective was absent within Rio. This contributed to their dependence on organisations originating from ‘core’ perspectives – to fill this gap. Whilst London was similarly dependent on the ‘core’ context of the IOC, the prevalence of region-specific organisations allowed for effective independent collaborations outside of IOC influence.

Additionally, for London, international ‘core’ based organisations included in the event possessed contexts which aligned with the context of London, as they shared a ‘core’ perspective. Rio's more limited selection of suitable local organisations engendered the introduction of ‘core’ based organisations – with objectives and experiences incongruent with the environmental conditions of Rio. In Rio, ‘core’ experts and professionals – who appeared to lack an understanding of Rio's context – were preferred over local ‘non-core’ ones who, whilst possessing contextual knowledge of Rio, lacked the expertise of the ‘core’ organisations. As environmental partnerships heavily influence the success of MSE environmental policy (Karamichas, 2013) the limited compatibility between Rio's ‘non-core’ context and the ‘core’ based organisations it was dependent on inhibited environmental sustainability. Whilst Rio had access to these organisational resources without support from local expertise they were inappropriate for the ‘non-core’ local context, therefore they struggled to employ these resources valuably.

This can be exemplified through WHOs involvement in the Games. Rio's viral water contamination was considered improbable in ‘core’ MSEs. Therefore, WHO water quality advice did not account for viral water contamination in Rio – so was unable to bridge this capability gap. The essence of this reiterates ‘Participant #9’ in Byun and Leopkey's (2020: 11) PyeongChang 2018 study: ‘Our greatest concern is the people… these people have great qualifications but are unfamiliar with the region’.

Rio's reflection of IOC structures and values, consultation of ‘core’ based firms, and information transfer from previous ‘core’ country bid practices led to policies being produced under a ‘core’ perspective which did not account for the capability inequality between the ‘core’ and the ‘non-core’. The event did not develop hosting capabilities ‘valued' by Rio, instead developing capabiltiies in accordance with ‘core' expectations. Therefore, whilst Rio may have possessed the resources to successfully host the event, they lacked the capabilities to employ these resources valuably (Sen, 2001). This article, then, reinforces suggestions that the alignment of host capacity and event demands contributes to event success (Agha and Taks, 2015), theoretically embedding this suggestion within the concept of capability inequality.

Host motivation

The motivations for hosting appeared to influence the environmental sustainability of the events. London primarily utilised the event to rejuvenate the derelict West End. In contrast, as MSE hosting exists as one of the few ways ‘non-core’ nations can develop international appeal (Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004), Rio appeared to host the event to be perceived as transitioning from the ‘semi-periphery’ into the ‘core’.

London and Rio both underwent an economic recession prior to hosting. London persevered regarding environmental sustainability, leveraging their economic power to allay environmental failures. In contrast, Rio's limited economic capabilities diminished their environmental sustainability, most specifically in infrastructural legacy. Rio's subscription to Olympic environmental policies served primarily to contribute to the geopolitical and economic strengthening (Wilson, 2012) of Brazil by aligning with ‘core' Olympic sustainability expectations. Therefore, when financial issues arose post-event Rio relocated funding from sustainability towards areas more directly aligned with this geopolitical objective – sacrificing environmental legacy in favour of other objectives (Deng and Poon, 2013; Azzali, 2017b). Whilst London was also concerned with geopolitical prestige, their position within the ‘core’ of the world-system was more secure than Rio's tumultuous ‘semi-peripheral’ state (Wallerstein, 2004a). Therefore, this article asserts that, despite rejecting a resource or utility-based view of inequality, economic power should be considered influential in capability development.

Inter-national inequality of capability

Rio appeared to possess insufficient capabilities to achieve an environmentally sustainable MSE, therefore was disadvantaged in hosting such an event compared with London's possession of more appropriate ‘core’ capabilities. Whilst the IOC somewhat account for local context through the relative flexibility of local organising committees regarding environmental guidelines (Ross et al., 2019) the environmental context of the event remains the domain of the ‘core’ (Poast, 2007; Sroka, 2021). Alongside this, the lack of local Rio organisations with environmental expertise inhibited the effectiveness of such a strategy. This paper suggests that there were four key inequalities between the ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ local contexts, stated throughout both the literature and this data set, such as: a weaker environmental starting position (Cornelissen, 2010); less valuable ENGO collaboration (Karamichas, 2012); limited capacity and stability of institutional infrastructures (Dowse and Fletcher, 2018); and lesser economic power (Black, 2007). This resulted in capability inequalities which were largely unaccounted for in sustainability plans, inhibiting the environmental potential of the Rio Games.

With a key tenet of CA being that entities are afforded the agency freedom to choose their preferred path, this article questions the extent to which Rio, in particular, possessed autonomy in choosing their Olympic hosting pathway. The production of Rio 2016 under a ‘core’ perspective encouraged the development of hosting capabilities valued by the ‘core’, rather than those valuable to Rio. Therefore, Rio was constricted by the ‘core’ event context which presupposed the possession of a capability set impossible for Rio to acquire. This resulted in suggested pathways for Rio which were not achievable with their possessed capabilities without their primary host motivation of geopolitical prestige suffering incommensurably. This limited the potential avenues for a ‘successful’, or valuable, event delivery. Realigning event capability requirements with Rio's ‘non-core’ capabilities may have created additional pathways to success which were concealed in the initial hosting. These additional pathways may have been more ‘valuable’ to the group (Lessman, 2022). In this sense, Nussbaum's (2003: 14) capability of ‘being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life’ may be particularly salient as an overarching national capability inequality in this context.

As cited previously: ‘a ‘non-core’ country will require more resources connected with Olympic hosting than will the ‘core’ country, if the two are to attain a similar level of ability to host’ (Sen, 1980, cited in Nussbaum, 2003: 4). In this way, the ability of ‘non-core’ nations to host MSEs is constricted by their possessed capability set – influenced by their less suitable local context. Additionally: ‘The inter-national world is made for countries with an average set of abilities and disabilities, and not for the country whose condition is non-average’ (Nussbaum, 2003: 4, changes in italics). In this way ‘non-core’ MSE hosting is pressured on both ends – one being capability inequality and the other being the lack of acknowledgement of this inequality within the ‘core’ hegemony of the Olympic Games. Therefore, the core argument of this paper is that ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ nations have different capabilities from which to draw on in hosting an environmentally sustainable MSE, engendered by a less appropriate local context. Rather than these capabilities being accounted for in the planning and delivery of the event, they were exacerbated by the ‘core’ context within which the events were produced – requiring host capabilities to align with the required ‘core’ capabilities valued by the 'core' hegemony of the event.

Suggestions

Various opportunities emerged which may limit inter-national inequalities. Despite an analysis of Rio's wider MSE ‘master plan’ being outside the scope of this research, capabilities developed throughout event hosting prior to Rio 2016, such as organisational and governance improvements and the construction of facilities and infrastructure, enhanced environmental sustainability. Therefore, the essence of the promotion of capabilities through MSE hosting is one that should be nurtured. This study also supports calls for the reduction of environmental pressure on MSE hosts – through multi-city hosting (Boykoff, 2017) and reduced MSE scale (Müller et al., 2021) – potentially through lower-order events (Black, 2008).

The study identified issues in IOC subscription to ‘one-size-fits-all’ standards – wherein policies are unappreciative of local contexts, causing environmental damage (Kim, 2020) – supporting, and theoretically evidencing, recent literature promoting context-specific responses (Chalip et al., 2017; Azzali, 2020). Additionally, the discussion of discrepancies in organisational value raises the question of whether it is preferable to have ‘core’ organisations with environmental expertise or local, less established, organisations which possess local knowledge. However, perhaps there is a middle ground. Environmental policies should account for the contexts and developed capabilities of the host nation, particularly regarding ‘non-core’ countries (Rowberg and Rincker, 2019). Therefore, this study suggests the relocation of power and restructuring of environmental policies to better reflect a bottom-up process which prioritises host values. Additionally, consideration of possessed host capabilities may reveal potential hosting pathways more appropriate for the event context.

Various authors highlight the lack of enforcement and punishment within MSE environmental policy as a negative, alongside suggestions for increased ISO control (Sobol, 2015; Fermeglia, 2017; Boykoff, 2017; Geeraert and Gauthier, 2018). This study questions the viability of punitive measures regarding ‘non-core’ countries. Whether such measures would improve environmental sustainability or simply perpetuate inter-national inequality, maintaining the sacrosanct bastion of ‘core’ MSE hegemony, is uncertain. This study leans towards the latter – considering MSE punitive measures an approximation of the disproportionate impact on the economically marginalised through austerity measures (Hastings et al., 2017). This study asserts that prior to punitive enforcement of environmental goals the acknowledgement and attempted remediation of host inequalities should occur.

Conclusion

This article has considered two research questions. The first question was: What can a Capability Approach to inter-national inequality inform us about MSE environmental sustainability? Whilst resource disparities have been considered as the primary factor of inter-national inequality in Olympic environmental sustainability (Rowberg and Rincker, 2019) this article has employed CA to argue that this is just one factor which contributes to host capabilities. It suggests that it is the possessed capabilities of the host, rather than resources or utilities, which defines sustainable MSE delivery.

The second question was: What can a comparative analysis of London 2012 and Rio 2016 inform us about the relationship between inter-national inequality, MSE environmental policy, and capability? This article has compared the capabilities revealed through event hosting to illustrate the inequality in capability which exists between a ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ MSE host. It established four key inequalities between the two cases: environmental starting positions; prevalence of expert local organisations; structural and regulatory conditions; and economic instability. Following this, it illustrated how ‘non-core’ nations possess national capabilities less valuable in hosting an environmentally sustainable MSE than ‘core’ nations, leading to a less successful event. It also highlighted how a ‘core’ hegemony within the world-system did not appreciate this capability inequality, exacerbating it through necessitating alignment with a ‘core’ event context – reaffirming the hegemony of the ‘core’ (Lee, 2016; Dowse and Fletcher, 2018).

The article made several suggestions towards overcoming this inequality. Most important is the acknowledgement and attempted remediation of capability inequality within the MSE process. By appreciating the relationship between inequality of capability and the ‘core’ context of MSEs the injustices of ‘non-core’ hosting noted throughout this article may be addressed.