I examine the extent to which a shift from a mutual consent divorce regime to a unilateral divorce regime (UDR) succeeds in preventing domestic violence. In my framework, a partner may be inclined to violence but dislikes being subjected to a partner’s violence. I find that, when payoff from marriage is positive, both parties choose the maximum level of violence under a mutual consent regime (MCR). There is a parameter zone within which domestic violence falls as a transition is made to a UDR. Further, I find that policymakers can reduce the cost of filing for divorce. I also find that the marriage rate changes with the switch in the regime.
AmatoP. R., & KeithB. (1991). Parental divorce and adult well-being: A meta-analysis. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 53(1), 43–58.
2.
BeckerG. S., LandesE. M., & MichaelR. T. (1977). An economic analysis of marital instability. Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141–1187.
3.
CohenL. (1987). Marriage, divorce, and quasi-rents; or ‘I gave him the best years of my life’. The Journal of Legal Studies, 16(2), 267–303.
4.
DeeT. S. (2003). Until death do you part: The effects of unilateral divorce on spousal homicides. Economic Inquiry, 41, 163–183.
5.
FriedbergL., & SternS. (2003). Economics of marriage and divorce. University of Virginia.
6.
GerberG. L. (1991). Gender stereotypes and power: Perceptions of the roles in violent marriages. Sex Roles, 24(7–8), 439–458.
7.
GonzálezL., & ViitanenT. K. (2009). The effect of divorce laws on divorce rates in Europe. European Economic Review, 53(2), 127–138.
8.
JohnsonM. P. (2006). Conflict and control: Gender symmetry and asymmetry in domestic violence. Violence Against Women, 12(11), 1003–1018.
9.
LeesonP. T., & PiersonJ. (2017). Economic origins of the no-fault divorce revolution. European Journal of Law and Economics, 43(3), 419–439.
10.
McLanahanS., & BumpassL. (1988). Intergenerational consequences of family disruption. American Journal of Sociology, 94(1), 130–152.
11.
RasulI. (2003). The impact of divorce laws on marriage. University of Chicago. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.604.2816&rep=rep1&type=pdf
12.
RasulI. (2005). Marriage markets and divorce laws. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22, 30–69.
13.
StevensonB. (2003). The impact of divorce laws on marriage-specific capital. Harvard University.
14.
StevensonB., & WolfersJ. (2006). Bargaining in the shadow of the law: Divorce laws and family distress. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 267–288.
15.
TampieriA. (2009, July 9–11). Education and marriage: Theory and evidence. BHPS-2009 Conference, Colchester, UK.
16.
WolfersJ. (2006). Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A reconciliation and new results. The American Economic Review, 96, 1802–1820.
