This article, considering relative performance vs. market share delegation in a vertically related market, shows how the order of firms’ move and the type of delegation contract would affect the input-pricing decision of the upstream monopolist and examines which delegation contract is a dominant strategy for downstream firms. The major finding is that having considered input-price commitment and delegation decision together, input price–delegation–quantity competition order coupled with relative performance delegation is the dominant strategy for downstream rivals in a vertically related market.
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