Abstract
Uganda’s March 2025 military intervention in South Sudan was officially announced by the chief of defence forces (CDF) of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) via social media. The informality of the announcement was much in habit with how the current government runs Uganda. The intervention followed armed clashes between elements of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and a militia group called the White Army in Upper Nile state of the Republic of South Sudan. This article argues that Uganda’s intervention can appropriately be explained from a realist approach. The main question the article seeks to answer is: Is Uganda a stabiliser or a meddler in South Sudan affairs? For the March 2025 intervention, Uganda has generally cited the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation and Status of Forces Agreement 2014 with South Sudan to denote a stabilisation role. However, the intervention can be deemed as Uganda meddling in the internal affairs of South Sudan on two grounds: first, the UPDF’s active support of the government and, second, General Kainerugaba’s threats against Riek Machar in particular and the Nuer community in general.
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