Historical Perspectives on the Accommodation of Diversity in Africa: A Study of Nigeria and Ethiopia

Abstract

Many African countries are ethnically diverse. The dangerous conflicts arising from the complex ethnocultural character of these countries have made Africa the most politically unstable region in the world. Separatist ethnic conflicts and other manifestations of primordial contestation have accentuated the need for effective ethnic accommodation strategies in the context of Africa. This article historicises ethnic accommodation and nation-building strategies in Ethiopia and Nigeria, focusing principally on the successes and encumbrances. Relying on the historical approach, this article brings back to the front burner of academic discussion the challenge of ethnic diversity and the problems associated with the effective implementation of nation-building strategies in Africa. The article recommends that political leadership in Africa must prioritise efforts aimed at building the functional capacity of the state to translate ethnic accommodation strategies into effective tools for promoting unity in diversity.

Introduction

Since the era of decolonisation in Africa, the issue of nation-building has received the attention of social scientists and historians. The compelling need for this scholarly attention is the fact that the majority of African countries have artificial cultural and territorial boundaries because of colonial imperialism. Again, the vast majority of countries host a large number of ethno-linguistic groups, in contradistinction to the relatively ethnically homogeneous nation-states in Europe. More so, the focus on nation-building is important because of the relative instability of many African states linked to civil wars, military coups and others (Englebert and Dunn 2013). A major dilemma confronting Africa is how to manage its ethnic diversity. Many countries in Africa are heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and linguistic composition. The mismanagement of diversity in the African context has created problems that have historically threatened the existence of several countries (Green 2013). As argued by Osaghae (2004, 221), ethnicity has become a major ‘instrument of political competition and state organization in several African countries’.

Nigeria and Ethiopia are two ethnoculturally diverse African countries. They are also the biggest countries in Africa in terms of population. While Nigeria is the most populous country with 220 million people, Ethiopia has over 120 million inhabitants (Worldometer 2023). In terms of ethnic representation, while Nigeria has over 200 ethnocultural groups, Ethiopia has roughly 100 ethnic nationalities. In relation to economic profile, Nigeria has the biggest economy in Africa with 477.38 billion US dollars GDP, and Ethiopia is the seventh biggest economy with 120.37 billion US dollars GDP (Statista 2023). The Nigerian federal constitution of 1999 (as amended) shares political powers between the central government (headed by the president) and 36 subnational entities referred to as states. It has a bicameral legislature made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives. There is also the Supreme Court that adjudicates disputes horizontally and vertically. In the case of Ethiopia, the federal constitution adopted in 1995 divides powers between the central government (led by the prime minister) and nine regional states. The country has a bicameral legislature composed of the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation. Ethiopia also has a Federal Supreme Court that performs judicial functions.

The postcolonial state in Africa has been characterised by enduring challenges in the management of ethnic diversity. Unlike Europe, where many nation-states were formed around relatively homogeneous ethnic groups, African states inherited artificial colonial boundaries that combined disparate ethnic, linguistic and cultural communities into single political units. The mismanagement of this diversity has led to political instability, civil wars, secessionist movements and democratic breakdowns across the continent (Englebert and Dunn 2013; Green 2013).

Ethnicity, politicised and weaponised, has emerged as a central factor in political competition, state organisation and governance (Osaghae 2004). Among the most instructive cases for examining ethnic accommodation strategies in Africa are Nigeria and Ethiopia. Both countries are large, populous and ethnically heterogeneous: Nigeria with over 200 ethnic groups and Ethiopia with roughly 80 ethnic nationalities. Each has experimented with federal systems as mechanisms to manage diversity, albeit with different historical trajectories and outcomes. While Nigeria’s federalism emerged from colonial administrative arrangements and was formalised during its transition to independence, Ethiopia developed ethnic federalism after the fall of the Derg regime in the early 1990s, constitutionally embedding ethnic identity as a basis for political organisation.

The purpose of this article is to historicise and analyse the ethnic accommodation strategies of Nigeria and Ethiopia, highlighting both successes and persistent challenges. Using a historical-comparative approach, the article examines how different nation-building efforts have been shaped by colonial legacies, political leadership, institutional designs and contemporary dynamics. While exploring each country’s experience in detail, the article also draws comparative insights to contribute to broader debates on ethnic diversity management in Africa. It argues that beyond historical legacies, contemporary political choices, elite behaviour and the structure of state institutions critically shape outcomes. The article starts by a look into the issue of ethnic diversity in Africa in regard to colonial legacies, followed by a sub-chapter on historicising the management of ethnic diversity, where we analyse the case studies of Ethiopia and Nigeria before coming to comparative concluding remarks.

Colonial Reinforcement of Ethnic Diversity in Africa

Without a doubt, colonialism has had a huge impact on modern African states and the processes of state-building and nation-building. As studies have revealed, state formation in most of Africa is intricately linked to colonialism. These studies have also discussed the nature of the ‘state’ in Africa from different theoretical points of view (also, comparatively) (Schraeder 2004; Smith 2003; Young 2012). The point must, however, be made that the historical process of state formation in Nigeria and Ethiopia is not exactly the same. While Nigeria came into being as a colonial invention or construct, Ethiopia was never colonised (except for the short-lived Italian occupation in 1936–1941). Although the historical trajectories of state formation in both countries are different, they were still influenced by the context of European colonialism.

The postcolonial state in Africa has a number of defining attributes. These include one-partyism (or non-existence of political parties, such as in Ethiopia until the 1980s), growing bureaucracy, varying degrees of state protectionism and neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and, in many cases, nepotism (Schraeder 2004). When it comes to state-building, we have to take the colonial past as an unchangeable fact. First, the existence of modern states in Africa is closely connected to the colonial past as the absolute majority of them were created by European colonial powers. Second, colonialism created space for the development of social, economic and ethnic inequalities, which in many cases prevailed until the postcolonial times and still influence daily realities in various countries. Anti-colonial movement in Africa was focused not only on fighting the nature of inequalities set up by the colonisers but also on dealing with the absence of a nation-building process in Africa (Gilley 2016).

Ethnicity, through primordialist lenses, could be seen as a given entity, which manifests itself via language, religion, clothing, customs and other important symbols. This expression led to deepening of differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Colonialism set up ethnic divides which in many places, particularly the British colonies, connected ethnic identity and territory and this connection was institutionalised by both the colonial state and the independent postcolonial neo-patrimonial state (Bøås and Dunn 2013). On the other hand, we may say that one of the countries where ethnicity is most politicised is Ethiopia, which has almost no history of European colonialism. It cannot, therefore, be generalised, and there cannot be a generally valid line between colonial past and politicisation of ethnicity, although examples of countries that had to overcome inherited racial issues can be found easily, for example, Rwanda or South Africa. It should also be emphasised that relative homogeneity (as we have it in Somalia and Rwanda) does not automatically shield a country from deep conflicts. Some countries with the most homogeneous population in Africa have experienced some of the most brutal (Rwanda) or longest (Somalia) conflicts in modern and contemporary Africa (Cooper 2005).

Historicising the Management of Ethnic Diversity in Africa

In the postcolonial history of Africa, we may find various approaches to accommodating diversity. In the first decades of independence (roughly since 1960), the majority of African states followed some form of centralised political organisation, which in many cases was legitimised by the need to keep the integrity of states. In several cases, particularly Nigeria, Congo, as well as Sudan, the internal rivalries and tensions combined with the international political context helped to spark secessionist attempts, which were crushed by the use of massive force. From the political point of view, particularly during the cold war context, the unitary form of governance made sense as all the African states were newly born, having rather minimal history of nation-building, while federal or any kind of decentralised forms of governance were believed to contribute to disintegration (Bøås and Dunn 2013; Ogot 1995; Schraeder 2004; Smith 2003). Next, we shall examine, in a historical manner, the different approaches to accommodating diversity that Ethiopia and Nigeria have experimented with or employed.

Case Study 1: Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, after Nigeria. Ethiopia, as we already mentioned, is a rather unique country as it was never systematically colonised and, therefore, we can hardly find a direct link between colonial legacies and postcolonial inherited troubles with accommodation of diversity, inequalities and ethnic favouritism in the Ethiopian political system, although all these aspects are tangible in Ethiopia. The modern Ethiopian state has undergone significant changes in the last 60 or 70 years as it has experienced the Imperial, socialist and federal political systems, now being shaken by civil conflict. In this part, we will discuss the development of the political system in Ethiopia with regard to ethnicity, accommodation of diversity and conflict. In the last 50 years, we have seen the shift from a unitary state centred around Pan-Ethiopianist ideals (and rather ignoring the internal diversity) to an ethnic federal system, which constitutionalised ethnicity and at the same time made it frozen in time and space. This is not only contrary to the belief of social constructivists that ethnicity is fluid, but it also, as we can observe these days in the war in Ethiopia, helps to ignite conflicts (Asnake 2013). The modernisation project set up by the Emperor remained largely a rhetoric, as it did not do anything either to decentralise the state nor mobilise the masses (Makki 2011).

The Imperial Times

The Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974) was perceived as a moderniser and someone who, through his diplomatic skills, put Ethiopia on the map of the world. Addis Ababa became the seat of the Organization of African Unity in 1963, the strategic and valued ally of the United States, and the Emperor enjoyed respect on all sides of the globe. Ethiopia was a very centralised state during the Imperial times, and the Emperor was seen as a semi-god. Article 5 of the constitution stated that ‘the person of the Emperor is sacred, his dignity is inviolable, and his power indisputable’ (The Ethiopian Constitution of 1931). The constitution was revised in 1955, and it only strengthened the role of the Emperor and clearly revealed its very centralising nature. The three components/pillars, which Ethiopia was based on, were the Emperor, portrayed as the descendant of Menelik I, son of Queen of Sheba and King Solomon; the Amharic language, which was the only official language of the Empire; and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The name of the Emperor was supposed to be mentioned at every religious service. The spread of the Amharic language into peripheral areas of the Empire was a logical outcome of social hierarchies. For those who wanted to claim the same rights as the peasants at the core of the Empire enjoyed, they simply must have spoken the ‘language of those who sought to take those rights away’ (Donham 2002, 11).

The Ethiopian unitary state had to deal with a number of issues that were beyond the capacity of the state bureaucracy. First, there was the issue of land, which belonged to the Emperor or the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and which, in practical terms, divided the Ethiopian society into two categories in the countryside, the neftegna (land-owners) and gabar (farmers, tenants). The neftegna were mostly former soldiers who, during the Emperor Menelik’s campaign at the end of the nineteenth century, contributed to the expansion of the Ethiopian state south, west, and eastwards, and as a reward were given land with the farmers or gabar. The neftegna–gabar system thus characterised the Imperial era and, up to this day, is a source of historical debates, grievances and resentments (Markakis 2011, 98–101).

Second, the Imperial court was not able to address the issue of accommodation of diversity as the official line, rooted in the constitution and the centralising and authoritarian nature of the Ethiopian state, combined with the inflow of Socialist and Marxist ideals of self-determination of nations resulted in a growth of secularist and anti-Imperial sentiments within certain segments of the society, particularly the students. Third, the Emperor rather ignored the religious reality in Ethiopia as the Orthodox Christians formed officially, and according to the constitution, the privileged group and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church were closely attached to the Imperial court. Its power in the countryside was enormous, but at the same time left the Muslim, or non-Orthodox Christian part of the society in the position of second-class citizens, a position that began to be improved during the Derg regime (Abbink 1998, 117).

Ignoring this set of interrelated issues, which revealed an absence of inclusive policy within the framework of the Ethiopian state and nation, resulted in a series of protests throughout the 1960s. What later became known as the Bale rebellion, or Gojjam rebellion (see Gebru 1996), was at least partly a consequence of the above-mentioned factors, which left a significant part of the population excluded from participation and decision-making and left the powers in the hands of a few. This was the time when the identity question, or the nationality question, came into being. The inability to address such issues by the government and the fear of losing control over masses through indoctrination weakened the centralised power and together with massive socio-economic troubles caused (besides other factors) by the global oil crisis and by what some see as a ‘feudal backwardness of the country’ (Young 2012, 126). In September 1974, the Emperor was overthrown and imprisoned. The revolution had massive support coming from student movements and peasants with the hope of achieving emancipation and equality.

The Derg Regime

The Derg regime that came to power after the revolution (1974–1991) tended from its very beginning to reshape the country at all levels of the society, as well as territorially in terms of reshaping the internal structure of the state. Some of the urgent issues which the new regime had to deal with were to harness popular demands for development, emancipation and elevation from rural poverty. In combination with the military nature of the regime, the system continued to be centralised and oppressive, this time mixed with Marxist–Leninist elements heavily supported by the Soviet Union (Keller 1995). It was primarily the land reform that the Derg saw as a crucial step towards modernity and modernisation. While the Imperial predecessor relied on landlords who ‘were the state’ (Donham 1999, 28), the new regime at the beginning of its existence began to engage educated urban youth that contributed to the regime change. That is how students became involved in ideological training in the countryside and in the process of setting up peasant associations necessary for the land reform to succeed (Donham 1999).

However, the class rhetoric was in many ways overshadowed by the crucial questions of the day, which was the national identity, which for a long time under the Imperial rule was centred around the Amhara–Tigrayan ruling circles and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Donham 1999). Just like during the Imperial times, however, assimilation attempts led rather to further centrifugal tendencies among multiple ethnic groups, most notably the Oromo, who began to see the Derg as a continuation of the Imperial regime based on the idea of homogenisation instead of accommodation of diversity. The rise of separatism was then only a logical outcome of those unwilling to be assimilated to the ‘core culture’ (Abbas 2014, 320–321). Some authors even referred to Ethiopian nationalism as being racist, particularly towards the Oromo (Assafa 2009).

Call for Self-determination

Despite the rhetoric on self-determination of nations, the approach to ethnicity was rather cynical and pragmatic, and the primary feature of the regime was a loyalty towards the core. Ethnicity was rather defined through primordialist lenses, an approach which still exists today among the major political actors in Ethiopia, as we will see later. In fact, the Derg regime under Mengistu Haile Mariam (1977–1991) continued to build Ethiopia on a nation-building rhetoric while downgrading and downplaying ethnic sentiments in the Ethiopian periphery; in other words, those parts of the country that were incorporated to the Ethiopian Empire since the end of the nineteenth century. The system was based, just like its predecessor, on exclusion, and the true face of the regime came into being during the Red Terror campaign, which revealed that accommodation of diversity would lead only through obedience to official ideology and any kind of ‘counter-revolutionary’ elements would be seriously oppressed (Wiebel 2015, 13–29). The rise of violence in an unprecedented way overshadowed any debates concerning the national questions.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the generation of student movements, which supported the revolution gave an inspiration to the rise and growth of the so-called liberation fronts which all had a clear ethnic or ethno-regional affiliation, such as Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Afar Liberation Front. For the future of Ethiopia, this was a crucial element as ‘ethnicity had become a political force that could not be removed or ignored’ (Aalen 2011, 36).

Federal Ethiopia

Due to the inability of the Derg to deal with the nationalities question, the post-1991 era had to bring change and reshape Ethiopia along ethnic lines to satisfy those who remained deeply disappointed by the failed promises of the Derg. The new government, in which the TPLF—in the meantime turned into a coalition of forces known as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—played a major role, had to cope with the demands of various groups. At the very beginning, there were great hopes that Meles Zenawi, the future long-time Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and the leader of TPLF ‘has pledged to end domination by a single ethnic faction’ (CWIHP 1991). In 1995, the new constitution came into being, setting up what became known as ‘ethnic federalism’ that paved the way to extreme politicisation of ethnicity instead of finding a modus vivendi among ‘liberation fronts’ and desires of ethnic groups they represented. Its most controversial part was Article 39, guaranteeing every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia ‘an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’ (Federal Negarit Gazeta 1995, 96).

Ethiopia was divided into nine regional federal states (Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, Afar, Somali, Gambella, Benishangul/Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region, Harari) plus Addis Ababa. The intention was clear, to fulfil the demands of self-determination while keeping the integrity of the state. There are controversial and opposing views on the role of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in promoting the ethnic federal system. On the one hand, it is clear that the TPLF comes from Marxist roots, and for many TPLF cadres, the leading role of the political party in a centralised system was the ideological basis. On the other hand, on many occasions, Meles’s vision, at least in some of his expressions, was to turn from an ethnically divided country to ideological political competition comparable to Western countries (Milkias 2001). Similarly, at another occasion, he called for a true democratic opposition (Washington Post 2006), however cynically it might have sounded after the 2005 elections, which ended up in massive arrests and dozens of people killed, particularly in the streets of Addis Ababa.

Despite the words on democratisation and liberalisation, the system encouraged ethnic mobilisation and ethnicity became highly politicised in every conceivable way. The problem of the Ethiopian version of federalism has been that the central government kept and maintained a strong control over popular empowerment and taxing policies. It was also characterised by huge inequalities which have left some regions (e.g., Gambella, Somali and Afar), lacking the technical and material resources, which is obvious especially at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy (Keller 2014, 83–84). Article 39 was, until recently, practically missed with the exception of the Sidama movement.

The Abiy Ahmed Era

Even after Dr Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018, and the superior role of TPLF ended, the unitarist and centralising tendencies kept overshadowing federalist and decentralising forces. This then resulted not only in the civil war in Tigray but also in the fact that a number of other liberation fronts began to join TPLF in their struggle for self-determination. In a statement from summer 2021, the Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF) proclaims its allegiance with TPLF and OLF and claims that:

We believe that if the federalist forces are united, Abiy Ahmed’s minority unitarist forces are no match to us and can be dealt with effectively. By hastening the demise of the unitarist forces, a multinational federalist country that recognizes and respects the rights of every nation, nationality and people to a full degree of self-rule can be built. (SNLF Press Release 2021)

All these statements copy a rather primordialist approach to ethnicity, and to collective identities which are superior to individual identities and citizenship. One of the major aspects of the Ethiopian politics inherited from both Imperial and Socialist eras is the emphasis on collectivity, ethnicity and impermeability of ethnic identities, which resembles the Soviet-style approach to nationalities and their ‘self-determination’. At the same time, the political pressure from the centre as well as from other political actors reshape the social and ethnic climate in the country which according to some is, according to social constructivist perspective, way more diversified (see Schlee 2003) than it seems from speeches and official proclamations of the leaders, either unitarist or federalist.

Recent development in Ethiopia, which brings together former enemies (TPLF and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)), may show that for many political actors or liberation fronts, the ethnic collective identity stands above all others, including the rights of citizens. Although it may seem paradoxical since Oromia was the major victim of human rights violations during the EPRDF regime (Tronvoll 2008), both parties share the primordialist approach to ethnicity as the primary defining principle. Limits of federalism in Ethiopia could also be seen in the example of the right to secession based on Article 39 of the constitution. The oppressive nature of the TPLF/EPRDF regime only strengthened the secessionist ideals of some of the groups, particularly the Oromo, standing in opposition to pan-Ethiopianist visions (Khisa 2019, 548).

Recent Developments after 2020

The period following 2020 has been profoundly turbulent for Ethiopia, exposing deep structural weaknesses in the country’s ethnic federal system. In November 2020, tensions between the federal government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the TPLF escalated into a full-scale armed conflict. The Tigray War, which lasted until November 2022, resulted in massive civilian casualties, widespread displacement and severe humanitarian crises, with UN estimates suggesting that millions were at risk of famine conditions during the peak of the conflict (UN OCHA 2022).

Beyond Tigray, Ethiopia continues to face widespread instability, particularly in Oromia, where the OLA maintains an armed insurgency against federal forces due to perceived broken promises of federalism. Similar patterns of unrest are evident in regions such as Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara, where localised ethnic violence has flared intermittently. The growing demands for new regional states by groups such as the Wolaita and Gurage further demonstrate the centrifugal pressures within Ethiopia’s ethnic federal system.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s efforts to promote a pan-Ethiopian national identity have been perceived by many ethno-federalist actors as attempts at recentralisation, provoking resistance and, in some cases, violent confrontation. The post-2020 developments thus underscore the inherent contradictions within Ethiopia’s federal design, where constitutional guarantees of self-determination coexist uneasily with attempts to maintain national unity. The Ethiopian case vividly illustrates the risks associated with institutionalising ethnicity as the fundamental basis of state organisation, especially when compounded by weak institutions, elite competition and uneven economic development.

Case Study 2: Nigeria

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with a population of over 200 million people. According to historical accounts, what later became known as Nigeria existed as self-governing empires and kingdoms before Imperial Britain imposed itself on the indigenous nationalities to establish the Nigerian colony. The British colonisation of Nigeria (1861–1960) was a year short of a century. In 1914, Lord Lugard, the British governor-general of Nigeria, amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates into one administrative and legal structure while practising indirect rule through traditional institutions. Nigeria is a multiethnic state inhabited by more than 250 ethnic groups, thus making it one of the most ethnically complex countries in Africa. These ethnic groups speak different, distinctive languages and dialects. The three dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani (in the north), Yoruba (in the west) and the Igbo people (in the east). These ethnic groups, put together, constitute over 60% of the total population of Nigeria.

Here, we examine the development of Nigeria’s federal system under British colonial rule and in the immediate post-independence era. We also look at the issues of ethnicity in Nigeria’s federalism and the extent to which the federal system has helped accommodate diversity, especially between 1954 and 1966. Federalism is a product of the people’s desire to form a federal union without necessarily losing their cherished socio-cultural and political identities. Consequently, federalism is an attempt to reflect the different political, social, cultural and economic interests within the broader framework of unity in diversity (Wheare 1963). According to the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, the country is a federal republic, with executive powers exercised by the president. The president is the head of state and head of government. Legislative power is held by the legislature known as the national assembly. The two chambers of the legislature are the Senate (upper house) and the House of Representatives (lower house). Geographically, Nigeria is divided into two regions, namely, the north and south. For political exigencies, the country is further subdivided into six geopolitical zones: south–south, southwest, southeast, northwest, north-central and northeast. Each of the geopolitical zones is made up of six states, apart from the northwest and southeast geopolitical zones that have seven and five states, respectively. Each zone comprises people with similar traditions, background and culture (Lanre 2017).

By 1946, the Richard constitution had come into effect with immense prospects and possibilities for federalism. The constitution introduced regionalism in Nigeria, which strengthened the desire for true federalism. The Macpherson constitution of 1951 replaced Richard’s with some modifications. The constitution created the House of Representatives with powers to make laws for the country, and regional houses of assembly were empowered by the constitution to make laws for the regions, albeit on specific matters. The 1954 Lyttleton constitution was epochal as it further strengthened the pillars of Nigeria’s federal system. The constitution restructured the civil service and the judiciary by way of regionalisation. The federal capital territory, Lagos, was created from the western region. The Supreme Court was also established for the country. Nigerian nationalists believed a federal system of government was the most suitable for Nigeria rather than a unitary government. Nnamdi Azikiwe had proposed in the early 1950s the creation of eight instead of three regions based on Nigeria’s diversity (Falola and Heaton 2014). However, as we will see, Nigerian elites perceived ethnic and regional identities in a primordialist/essentialist way, which affects Nigerian politics to this day.

Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, 1954–1966

Nigeria’s federalism attained a glorious height under regional rule (1954–1966). The federating regions of east, west and north witnessed rapid developments in social and economic terms. In the western region, governments made a tremendous impact in education, commerce, agriculture, health, infrastructure and so on. Notably, the western regional government under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo introduced free and compulsory universal primary education and provided free health care services for children in the region. The first television station in Africa was established in the western region by his administration as well. Awolowo was Nigeria’s foremost federalist. In his Path to Nigerian Freedom, published in 1947, Awolowo intellectually outlined a systematic federalist body of manifestoes, the first by a Nigerian politician. He advocated federalism as the only basis for equitable national integration and, as head of the Action Group, he led demands for a federal constitution, which was introduced in the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, following primarily the model proposed by the western region delegation led by him. As premier, he proved to be (and was viewed by many) as a man of vision and a dynamic administrator. Awolowo was also the country’s leading social democratic politician (Booth 1981).

Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe led the eastern region. Under his premiership, several achievements were recorded in commerce, education, agriculture and in other sectors of the economy. The northern region, led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, also accomplished great feats in several sectors of the northern economy. Under the premiership of Ahmadu Bello, the Northern Regional Development Cooperation and other corporations were established to lift the people of the region out of poverty by way of job creation. As observed by Suberu (2009, 71–71), the political arrangements during this period created a federal system that promoted the hegemony of the three major ethnic groups, and especially the oversized northern (Hausa–Fulani) region. This situation largely intensified ethnic identity polarisation and discord in the context of Nigeria. There was, therefore, a little space for inclusive policies and understanding among the representatives of each group, and further jeopardising the goal of ethnic accommodation.

Post-independence Nigeria

Nigeria’s multiethnic groups are unique in their cultural value systems, traditions and religious beliefs. Prior to British colonisation of what later became known as Nigeria, there were various kingdoms and empires. These arrangements were altered with the conquest of Lagos in 1861 by the British and the subsequent amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914. Following nationalist struggles and aggressive campaigns, Nigeria eventually gained political independence on 1 October 1960. With independence, the responsibility to keep the country alive, promote ethnic accommodation and foster development fell on the local elites who succeeded the departing colonialists. The accommodation of diversity and peaceful development was, however, complicated by ‘the interchange of power between the political and the military classes, a development that helped in the past to deny the nation political stability’ (Benjamin 2012, 59).

When Nigeria attained political independence in 1960, it inherited a federal structure that was made up of three regions. They were the north, east and west. Shortly afterwards, the differences among the three regions became visible with the resurgence of three regionally-based and ethnically inclined political parties whose ideologies were steeped in the socio-cultural values of the ethnic nationalities which constituted the regions. These parties were the Northern People’s Congress led by Alhaji (Sir) Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto from the core North, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens led by Dr Azikiwe from the East and the Action Group led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo from the West (Joseph 1987). This political arrangement laid the foundation for a convoluted political system replete with interethnic rivalries, mutual suspicion and mistrust. For example, between 1960 and 1965, these arrangements threatened the existence of the Nigerian state. In September 1978, Olusegun Obasanjo gave a speech in this regard, in which he referred to tribal, religious and linguistic sentiments as Nigeria’s major problems (Joseph 1987, 93).

Legacies of the Biafra War

In an attempt to acquire political power by ethnic leaders, the situation degenerated into political riots, arson, killings and other acts of vandalism, especially in the west. Subsequently, there was a bloody military coup, which terminated the First Republic in 1966. After 13 years of military rule, the Second Republic was born on 1 October 1979. The political scene and actors were almost the same as the First Republic. The problem of ethnic politics, particularly the reckless struggle by the ethnically inclined political leaders to gain control at the centre and controversies that surrounded the general elections of 1979 and 1983, contributed largely to the demise of the Second Republic (Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008).

Ethnic politics was downplayed significantly in the aborted Third Republic because the process of formation of the two political parties, namely the Social Democratic Party and National Republican Convention, did not allow for ethnic influence. The parties were created by the military in a two-party system arrangement, which prevented ethnic dominance of the two national political parties. However, the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, which was generally believed to have been won by M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba man from the west, eventually led to the demise of the Third Republic and the resurgence of ethnic politics in Nigeria. The annulment of the June 12 election, which is still regarded as the freest and fairest election in Nigeria’s electoral history, sowed a seed of discord and the rise of ethno-nationalist claims between the Yoruba people of Western Nigeria and the northern military and political elites who many believed orchestrated the annulment (Ukeje and Adebanwi 2008).

The Biafra war (1967–1970) also exposed the troubles with Nigeria’s federal order. Besides socio-economic reasons, the Biafra war was also a conflict over identity and the political future of Nigeria. When Yakubu Gowon started an operation for the re-unification of the state, he proposed dividing the country into 12, instead of 4 regions. The eastern region was therefore split into three parts, a move which was supposed to detach non-Igbos from the Biafra (Childs Daly 2021, 43–44). There were other ethnic accommodation strategies introduced after the war. A notable strategy was the introduction of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). Successive administrations have recognised the NYSC scheme as a credible framework for promoting understanding and brotherliness among the diverse ethnic groups (Oriakhogba and Fenemigho 2016).

The unpleasant experience of the aborted Third Republic indicated of existence of an inverse relationship between ethnicity and good governance. Since then, ethnic politics has been a recurring feature of Nigerian politics with a lot of negative consequences for the country’s march towards a stable democratic system. The results are obvious: loss of human life, decreasing economic capacity, interethnic mistrust and environmental degradation. It is equally responsible for upspring of ethnic militias that have become a recurring decimal in Nigeria, not only in the Niger Delta where there have been repeated clashes over oil and environmental degradation (Falola and Heaton 2014). Each of these groups has made varying degrees of demands on the central government. These demands revolve around inclusiveness and greater accommodation in the scheme of things by the central government. The federalist framework for accommodation during that era was truncated by the military incursion into Nigerian politics in 1966 (Wodu 2020).

Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity

Many provisions contained in the 1999 federal constitution (as amended) have continued to generate ripples among keen watchers and observers. While the constitution is federalist in name, it gives wide powers to the central government (at the expense of the federating units). In fact, many are quick to link the problems plaguing the country to that constitution. The flaws in the constitution notwithstanding, it contains a number of provisions for promoting ethnic accommodation. The 1999 Nigerian constitution has a special clause, which takes into consideration the diverse nature of the country. According to Chapter 2 (subsection 3) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended in 2011 and 2018, there shall be accommodation of all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria (The Constitution of Nigeria 1999).

A major ethnic accommodation framework provided for by the constitution is the federal character principle (section 14, subsection 3). The framers of this constitutional provision believe that given the multiethnic composition of Nigeria, it would be difficult to foster national unity and loyalty if one ethnic group dominates the country. This provision seeks to give every Nigerian a sense of belonging in both the leadership, civil service and administrative spheres of the Nigerian state. The thinking is that the federal character principle would help to redress the ‘horizontal inequalities that exist between different regions and ethnic groups’, promote ‘the equitable representation of different in all tiers of government’ and prevent ethnic domination (Demarest et al. 2020, 315). The Federal Character Commission was established to implement this particular principle. As good as the federal character principle may look, there are major problems with its implementation. These problems include ‘legal and administrative constraints, chronic underfunding, and political interference’ (Demarest et al. 2020, 315).

In terms of the management of ethnic diversity, we cannot deny the fact that there are fundamental problems with the 1999 constitution. For instance, given the deep divisions in the country when President Muhammadu Buhari came into office in 2015, agitations for the return to the pre-1966 federal system of government became so popular, especially in the south and middle belt of the country. Nigeria, as presently constituted, is a unitary system masquerading as a federal system. The present Nigerian federal arrangement not only overloads the centre (in terms of powers, functions and resources) but also inhibits development in all ramifications. The absence of equity, fair play and justice is limit inherent in the federal system as presently configured. The continued failure of the Nigerian federal government to restructure the country is generating tensions in the polity. For instance, separatists and many stakeholders, including ethnic nationalities, have denounced the current federal system. Critics believe that the over-centralisation of security machinery, fiscal matters and resource ownership is driving discontent with the Nigerian federal system. In the southeast, agitations for the creation of the Biafra nation are a very popular movement. This same situation exists in the southwest, where people have been agitating for the establishment of Oduduwa Republic. Without a doubt, the absence of true federalism has heightened separatist agitations in Nigeria.

Recent Developments After 2023: Rising Separatist Agitations and Federal Fragility

Nigeria’s post-2023 political landscape continues to reflect the persistent challenge of managing ethnic diversity within a nominally federal framework. The general elections of February 2023 resulted in the election of Bola Ahmed Tinubu as president. Despite the peaceful conduct of the polls, widespread allegations of electoral irregularities, coupled with ethnic and regional grievances, intensified political tensions (Premium Times 2023).

In the southeastern region, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has sustained its separatist campaign. Despite the arrest and detention of its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB’s influence remains strong among the Igbo youth. Frequent ‘sit-at-home’ orders have severely disrupted economic and social life in the southeast, highlighting the depth of disillusionment with the Nigerian state (Vanguard 2023).

Simultaneously, in the southwest, elements of the Yoruba Nation movement continue to agitate for regional autonomy or outright secession, citing perceived marginalisation and insecurity. The Middle Belt region has also witnessed growing calls for constitutional restructuring to address long-standing issues of resource control, ethno-religious violence and political exclusion (Daily Trust 2023).

Meanwhile, insecurity across Nigeria’s northern regions—in the form of banditry, farmer–herder clashes and jihadist insurgencies—has deepened interethnic suspicions and strained the already fragile federal system. The federal government’s responses have been criticised as reactive, militarised and insufficiently inclusive, further eroding public trust in state institutions. Despite the existence of frameworks such as the federal character principle, critics argue that the current federal system remains highly centralised, with power and resources disproportionately concentrated at the centre. The lack of substantive devolution continues to fuel perceptions of exclusion and injustice among Nigeria’s diverse ethnic nationalities. The ongoing dynamics suggest that unless meaningful reforms are implemented—including constitutional restructuring, greater devolution of powers and deliberate efforts at nation-building—Nigeria’s federation will remain vulnerable to recurring ethnic tensions and separatist pressures.

Concluding Remarks

Historically, as we can see, Ethiopia and Nigeria have experimented with different ethnic accommodation strategies. The problems associated with the implementation of these strategies are deepening centrifugal tendencies in these countries. The mismanagement of ethnic diversity by the members of the political class, elite corruption and exclusion are creating environments for mistrust and regional centrifugal tendencies. In most cases, the members of the political class often manipulate primordial fault lines to gain political mileage.

The dysfunctionality of the federal arrangements and ethnic policies in both countries cannot be blamed exclusively on the colonial past. The reason is that Ethiopia was never systematically colonised, and Nigeria attained glorious heights in the pursuit of federalism when colonialism was winding down and in the early period of its postcolonial era. Research on the dysfunctionality of federal accommodation of diversities in Africa should, therefore, go beyond colonial legacies and focus more on the interlinked issues of corruption, exploitation, exclusion/inclusion, ethnic favouritism and economic inequalities in order to understand why in certain countries (in this case, Nigeria and Ethiopia) peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups is rather complicated. The political class has not done enough in harnessing the benefits of diversity and in translating nation-building (ethnic accommodation) policies into effective tools for promoting unity in diversity.

Ethiopia and Nigeria represent two significant experiments in the accommodation of ethnic diversity in Africa, yet their experiences highlight both the possibilities and pitfalls of federal solutions. Both countries adopted federal structures to manage ethnic plurality; however, the design, implementation and political dynamics of these federations diverged sharply.

Nigeria’s federalism, although originally colonial in design, evolved into a multistate federation that sought to balance ethnic and regional interests within a single national identity. Despite flaws such as over-centralisation and elite manipulation, Nigeria’s federal structure has managed, at least partially, to prevent full-scale disintegration. However, the persistence of separatist agitations, such as the IPOB movement and recent calls for the Oduduwa Republic in the southwest, underscores the fragility of Nigeria’s national integration project.

In contrast, Ethiopia institutionalised ethnicity as the primary organising principle of its federation through the 1995 constitution, granting ethnic groups the right to self-determination, including secession. While this system initially promised recognition and empowerment, it has increasingly deepened ethnic divisions, hardened identities, and culminated in violent conflicts such as the Tigray War (2020–2022) and ongoing unrest in Oromia and other regions. Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism, rather than fostering unity in diversity, has often incentivised ethnic mobilisation and competition.

A common thread in both cases is the manipulation of ethnic identities by political elites for personal or factional gains, the failure to develop strong civic institutions that transcend ethnicity and the absence of equitable economic development across regions. Colonial legacies remain relevant but are insufficient to explain contemporary dynamics. Instead, the political choices of postcolonial elites, the structure of institutions and the degree of inclusiveness in governance largely determine whether ethnic diversity becomes a strength or a source of instability.

Effective ethnic accommodation in Africa, as shown by the Ethiopian and Nigerian cases, requires more than constitutional design; it demands a sustained commitment to inclusive governance, equitable resource distribution, political sincerity and civic nationalism. Without these, federal structures—whether territorially or ethnically based—remain vulnerable to manipulation, conflict and disintegration. Despite economic growth in both countries, visible primarily in bigger urban centres, there exist a great amount of polarisation, distrust, and even hatred among various societies or their representatives, which is difficult to overcome while suppressing calls for equality.