Are Borders a Burden? Debates and Counter-Narratives on Nigeria’s National Security

Abstract

Nigeria is in a security quandary. The country’s security debacles are impacting its socio-economic and political landscapes. Aside from the protracted Boko Haram terrorism, banditry and kidnapping have taken on momentary dimensions in the country. Many studies have attributed this menace to the porous and ill-manned status of Nigerian borders, which lend ambience to unwholesome intrusions and thus render the borders a national burden. This study unpacks the state of Nigeria’s borders vis-à-vis the national security experiences of the country. It argues that, beyond the ‘porosity’ debates and narratives, the lingering cross-border challenges are the effects of patronage networks and internal crises that have engulfed domestic lives and state politics. It submits further that, notwithstanding the subjective colonial status and the uncoordinated management agenda of Nigeria’s borders, they have inherent geo-strategic potentials and advantages capable of transforming national lives and enhancing state security.

Introduction

The scholarship and practice of borders in Africa have largely portrayed them as burdens and limitations to a state’s political and economic advancement (Adetula 2014, 2015; Adams 2012; Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). Borders are considered a burden by most African states, including Nigeria. These views are not mere assumptions, however. They result from the visible challenges of borders across the continent. Nigeria’s borders, like those of other African countries, are products of colonial artificiality, and the security debacles in the country are primarily border-related (Adetula 2015; Babatola 2015; Okunade 2019). Notably, the deleterious effect of such subjective creation is over-flogged in literature and by policymakers in Africa. This narrative is what Alemazung (2010) designates as a ‘postcolonial colonialism’ by the African political elites, who perpetuate a continuous ‘milking’ of the continent’s wealth while ‘scapegoating’ the colonialists and the colonial borders. Additionally, artificiality is not peculiar to Nigeria and African borders; indeed, borders are artificial institutions that are outcomes of human constructs and engagements, such as conquests, wars and conflicts (Asiwaju 1993). Borders in Europe, for instance, are outcomes of wars (e.g., First and Second World War) and territorial conquests that ravaged the continent for centuries (Leach 1960; Ramutsindela 2014). Undoubtedly, Nigeria’s borders have been a source of conflict and confrontations between and among states since the early years of independence. ¹ This, of course, ‘justifies’, the over-flogged, one-sided accounts of the respective African borders in literature. The current state of Nigeria reflects its borders. The country is currently ravaged on all fronts by security menaces ranging from Boko Haram terrorism, banditry, kidnappings and herders–farmers’ conflict, among other pockets of unending political and religious upheavals. The Nigerian state is ranked as the third most unsecured and terrorism-proned space globally (Global Terrorist Index 2020). For instance, the Nigerian defence minister, Lucky Irabor, lamented during the October 2022 ministerial performance review that Nigeria had lost over 100,000 lives had innumerable displaced people and refugees, and had spent over USD 9 billion since the outbreak of Boko Haram in 2009 (Ogundele 2022). Similarly, a 2018 report by the International Crisis Group showed that herder-farmer clashes in Benue, Taraba, Adamawa, Zamfara and other northern border regions led to over 1,300 deaths (International Crisis Group 2018). As reported by the 2014 Business Day newspaper report, most of these attacks occur mainly in the northern border regions of Borno, Zamfara, Gombe, Benue, Yobe and so on, signalling a connection between porous borders and Nigeria’s security dilemma.

As unpacked in the later part of this work, a plethora of theoretical and empirical studies has advanced diverse narratives and debates on Nigeria’s borders and security challenges. The debates are mainly centred on subjective colonial demarcations, porosity, poor management and Nigeria’s idealistic border engagements in relation to its limitrophe neighbours. These arguments have also been largely favoured by Nigeria’s policymakers, and thus resulted in state-centric securitisation measures in terms of border ‘militarisation’, and border closures, among others, which have proven ineffective. The debates have ‘pressured’ Abuja to chase the ‘shadows’ of its borders and national security challenges rather than adopting a realistic bottom-up approach, which focuses on addressing the internal socio-economic crises that have placed a burden on the borders, resulting in national security concerns. This study thus advances a review of the state of Nigeria’s borders vis-à-vis the national security dilemma of the country. The study argues that, beyond the ‘porosity’ debates and narratives, the lingering cross-border challenges reflect the neo-patrimonial order and internal socio-economic and political crises that define the country’s domestic lives and politics. It submits further that, notwithstanding the subjective colonial status and uncoordinated management agenda of Nigeria’s borders, they have inherent geo-strategic potentials and advantages capable of transforming national lives and security. In furnishing our analysis, however, we adopt human needs theory and neo-patrimonial frameworks. As a methodology, the study adopts a qualitative research design and content analysis of secondary sources, such as literature, newspaper reports, online commentaries/reviews and other relevant documents.

The Theory and Practice of Borders

Attempts to theorise the idea and practice of border as a boundary, frontier or borderland date back to classical intellectual engagement. In other words, border practices predated Westphalian internationalism, which formalised territorial borders as a key determining ingredient of a state in the modern international system (Minca and Vaughan-Williams 2012; Schmidt 2011). The evolution of boundaries and borders is as old as the history of man’s existence and social interactions. According to Kristof (1959), the practice of geography/border can be attributed to man’s existence rather than conceptual abstraction. This is to say that the border practice/engagement is as old as man. Conceptually, borders are seen as visible and invisible frontiers or boundaries that define/delineate a particular territory or nation-state. Martinez (1994) submits that borders can be alienated, co-existent, interdependent and integrated. By nature, borders can be either natural or artificial (Kristof 1959). Natural borders include seas, mountains, plains and rivers (Ramutsindela 2014). Artificial borders can be in the form of demarcations/delimitations superimposed boundary lines and buffer zones, as in the case of colonial borders. Instructively, natural borders are also artificial because they are usually outcomes or products of human construction in terms of peace agreements, treaties, territorial conquest or otherwise (Leach 1960; Ramutsindela 2014).

In classical thinking, however, borders are seen and engaged through the prism of military conquest. It is seen as an instrument of war, and, as such, the exploration, explanation and understanding of borders were limited to territorial preservation/conquest (Andreas 2004). The realist state-centric approach to border practices favours this traditional conception. These state-centric thinkers anchored the engagement of borders on territorial/military conquest. In accentuating this, Gilpin (1981, 23–24) notes that the primary aspiration of a state involves ‘the conquest of territory to advance economic, security and other interests’. This traditional border orientation/practice informed the military show of force in European borderlands (Brunet-Jailly 2010). In effect, the classical explanation of geographical borders places primacy on territorial acquisition and power tussle between and among bordering states. This approach sees borders as a ‘property’ of the state and thus must control/govern it through ‘necessary means’ to assert and exert its sovereign/territorial power (Andreas 2004, Gilpin 1981). The classical (realist) orientation of border practices draws attention to the security dimensions/imperatives but silences the multi-dimensional relevance and dynamics of territorial borders in international relations for years.

Following the changing patterns of interstate relations occasioned by the nuances of globalisation, which challenge the traditional conception of international relations, a new school of thought surfaced regarding the idea and practice of borders. This is denoted as the postmodernist or globalist school of thought. It detracts from classical thinkers’ state-centric explanation of border engagements. This development is what Newman (2003, 14) refers to as an ‘end to territorial absolutism’, that is, a shift from the absolute state’s monopolistic grip/control of its geographical borders. The argument, in effect, is that globalisation has fashioned ‘borderless borders’ in the modern world and that the dynamics/realities of borders have seemingly transited from the state-centric paradigm of mere security concerns (Kenichi 1990). In their analysis, for example, Nye and Keohane (1971) advance that since the 1970s, technological advancement and economic transnationalism have been driving cross-border engagements between actors and stakeholders in international society and, thus, signal a decline in the explanatory security paradigm of territorial borders. In essence, beyond the physical lines of barriers, postmodern thinkers see borders as bridges for cross-border flow and interactions, creating a ‘borderless’ global system (Friedman 2005; Ohmae 1990; Paasi 2009). Lambert (1986) puts this in perspective by observing that, in the contemporary world, economic-oriented state actors are substituting traditional warfare-oriented state actors, with cross-border trading/exchanges being given priority over territorial acquisition/conquest. This, in essence, echoes the socio-economic relevance of borders. Though postmodernists/globalists tend to downplay the role of borders as instruments of territorial demarcation/delineation, they argue beyond the state-centric ‘military conquest’ notion of borders and subtly draw attention to other socio-economic or transactional relevance of borders.

The two contending paradigms, in effect, see the practice of borders from different perspectives and unmask the multifaceted status and relevance of borders. Notwithstanding these contending views, we submit that boundaries/borders are not rendered irrelevant; they are only redefined to suit the internal dynamics and external ‘pressure’ of localisation and globalisation, respectively. Further, we advance that the security concerns of borders cannot be downplayed because emerging transnational issues vis-à-vis internal crises of the state are breeding new cross-border security threats affecting almost every aspect of the nation-state. The tinges of globalisation in terms of information and communication technological breakthroughs have created an ‘open border’ system and seem to have rendered border barriers redundant; they have also created a new set of border security threats such as terrorism. As we have demonstrated in the latter part of this work, states’ internal crises, such as poverty, unemployment and corruption, portend security threats at borders. These threats necessitate border securitisation and militarisation in the contemporary world. O’Dowd (2002) further stresses this in his observation that, in contrast to the border invalidity conception, the post-Cold War international order has further proliferated state borders. He adds that they have become more flexible, differentiated and salient as the single European market, for instance, has redefined the EU’s boundaries. Internal and external border regions have become conduits of collaboration between and among local governmental and non-governmental players, their respective national governments and the European Commission.

Historically, borders have represented a symbol guaranteeing a state’s sovereignty, and every state does all it can to defend and protect its carved territorial domains from incursion or interference from ‘outsiders’. Borders traditionally demarcated a state’s territorial sphere of influence (Brunet-Jailly 2010). Borders do not only define a state’s territory but also the lives of people, especially those living in the border regions or borderlands of a state (Okunade and Oni 2021). Both the borderlands and the state’s territorial borders portend hydra-headed influences. It can either function as an opportunity for transforming national lives or as a barrier. It is a conduit for opportunities and constraints (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996). It can also function as a door or bridge. It can be an instrument of separation or connection (Kolossov 2012), impacting a state’s political, economic and social dynamics. Borders, as institutions, delineate and protect ‘us’ (insiders) from ‘them’ (outsiders) (Newman 2003).

In the contemporary world, an adequately delimited or carved-out border not only protects the state from external permeations but also appropriates the territorial boundaries of a country and accords it statehood (Agnew 1994). According to Olaoluwa (2021), borders are not only domains of territorial conduit but also instruments of state power, that is, the design and implementation of state policies (foreign or domestic) are conditioned by geographical borders. In corroborating this, Okumu (2011) asserts that boundaries/borders define a state’s sovereign power by determining its territorial sphere and the extent of its administrative and jurisdictional influence. According to O’Dowd (2002), borders are vital to human actions and inactions; they are outcomes of the human desire for order, power and protection. It signals the human quest for sameness and difference. Highlighting the geo-strategic importance of borders, Roche (2014) submits that borders can ensure national security, delineate the territorial influence of a state, act as a symbol of national identity, generate wealth, protect against external threats and constitute a channel for cross-border flow. Since borders’ strategic importance to national lives and the idea that border control/management is fundamental to unleashing such advantages, the security concerns of borders become imperative.

Although borders have been under threat since early history, the 9/11 attack on the United States intensified border security concerns globally. Borders in many parts of the world have come under threats from cross-border criminalities such as human trafficking, smuggling and terrorism, among other clandestine transnational activities (Andreas 2003). This results in the ‘criminalisation’ of borders, the adoption of stringent border regimes and bored securitisation in terms of upgrading border surveillance technologies, stricter migration/visa policies, border fencing and the ‘invention’ of buffer zones, among others (Andreas 2003; Pratt and Brown 2000). This is what Newman (2006) referred to as the evolution of ‘securitisation discourse’, which further lends credence to the relevance of borders. These border changes are mostly the case in industrialised parts of the world, especially the Americas and the EU.

Nigeria, for instance, is in a state of security dilemma. The country’s security debacles are devastatingly impacting its socio-economic and political landscapes. These unabated security issues and challenges in Nigeria and some other African states have necessitated an unending discourse on border practices vis-à-vis national security. The core of the discourse on (African) borders revolves around migration (legal and illegal), which has been argued to constitute security threats worldwide (Eselebor and Okunade 2020). The argument, in effect, is that borders are channels for importing international threats into the domestic lives of a state. The practice of borders in Africa is largely centred on heaping national misgovernance and internal crises of state on the borders, and thus using them as a basis to justify border securitisation by the political elites. For instance, in East Africa, the Kenya–Somalia borders have been under securitisation since 2016, following the activities of the Al-Shabab terrorists in that axis (Faleye 2019). In southern Africa, South Africa has equally advanced various securitisation measures to check ‘intruders’ from neighbouring states. In the wake of the lingering Boko Haram terrorist activities and other cross-border menaces, Nigeria’s borders with the Francophone neighbours have also been ‘militarised’. Despite these securitisation efforts, security remains unabated (Eselebor and Okunade 2020). However, the following section reviews the various debates and narratives on Nigeria’s borders vis-à-vis its national security challenges that have rendered the former a ‘burden’ to national lives and justified its border securitisation measures.

The State of Nigeria’s Borders: Debates and Perspectives on National Security

The crux of this section is to unfold the diverse contending perspectives and debates on Nigeria’s borders as they relate to national security. Like most other African states, Nigerian land and sea borders, which consist of 4,047 km and 853 km, respectively, are products of the arbitrary drawing and fracturing of African lands at the Berlin conference in the late nineteenth century (Asiwaju 1984; Babatola 2015). Ikome (2012) asserts that Africa’s international boundaries have remained a significant source of instabilities in many African states, including Nigeria. According to him, this is due to the artificial, poor delineation/demarcation and porous status of the borders. Further, Babatola (2015) contends that the vastness of Nigeria’s borders and subjective colonial demarcation elements account for its security challenges and poor management. Aligning with this argument, through an empirical investigation into the makings and status of Nigeria’s land borders, Okunade (2017) submits that Nigeria’s vast border expanse is poorly controlled, creating an ambience for innumerable illegal route networks across the borders. He argues further that illegal routes are operated like a ‘free zone’ area by cross-border criminals, with ravaging impacts on national security and economies. According to Oladopo et al. (2021), Nigeria’s borders are porous, with negative implications for Nigeria’s economy as adulterated goods flood the country. A report by the former head of the Nigeran Immigration Service (NIS), David Parradang, affirms these perspectives. Parradang reveals that Nigeria’s borders have 84 legal entry ports/points, with over 1,400 illegal access points (routes) across the northern and southern border regions (Okunade 2017). In another account, Musa (2015) unveils over 250 unapproved footpaths from the Damaturu/Maiduguri frontier linking Cameroon, Chad and Niger neighbouring states. Babatola (2015) argues that this porous border is the source of illegal arms proliferation and insurgencies across the country. In corroborating this, Abdullahi (2010) asserts that over 70% of the illicit (small) arms deals in the West African axis are carried out through Nigerian borders.

Furthering the porous border debates, Adetula (2014, 2015) argues that Nigerian borders are a den of cross-border criminalities for migrants who take advantage of its permeability and illegal routes system as points of entry and exit to and from the neighbouring states of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. He argues further that insurgencies in the country are traceable to the dispersed Libyan rebels, who leveraged the socio-religious affinity and the ill-manned border status in the northern region to infiltrate the country sequel to the death of their former leader, Muammar Ghaddafi. Also, the West African Network for Peacebuilding (2020) released a report which heaped the blame for the increasing arms trafficking, banditries and kidnappings in the northern border regions on the porous borders. The dominant discourse on Nigeria’s national security is the artificiality and porosity of Nigeria’s geographical borders. Other scholars, such as Mark and Iwebi (2019), Adeola and Fayomi (2012), among others, submit that the porous and poorly managed status of Nigeria’s borders has created the ambience for cross-border crimes and insecurities in the country.

Related to the above debates are the poor border policing and lopsided border management strategies of the Nigerian state, resulting in a backlash on national security architecture. Several scholars, such as Akinyemi (2014), Akpomera and Omoyibo (2013), Bearzotti et al. (2015), Danfulani (2014) and Okunade (2019), among others, contend that Nigeria’s borders are poorly managed, ill-manned and inadequate (if any) sophisticated border security surveillance technologies, such as closed circuit television (CCTV), sensors/cameras, standby patrol vehicles and other communication gadgets, to monitor and scrutinise people at the point of entry and exit. Specifically, Eselebor and Okunade (2020) argue that the abduction of over 110 Dapchi schoolgirls in Yobe State, in the northern border region of about 75 km south of the border with the Niger Republic, cannot be divorced from poor border management in the Nigerian state. In addition, Akinyemi (2014) asserts that the poor border control is further worsened by the sociolinguistic affinities in border towns and villages, as some of the inhabitants of those communities carry dual nationalities and freely move and transact (legally and illegally) on either side of the borders.

The uncoordinated status of Nigeria’s border control/management is put in perspective by Gbemre (2016). According to him, the symbols of buffer zones in Nigeria’s borders are wood logs, empty barrels and expired automobile tyres, among others. He narrated further that immigration officials are more interested in extorting money from commuters than checking the validity of their documents at the point of entry and exit. As the authors affirm elsewhere, with commuters’ cash and willingness to bribe the border officials, migrants (documented and undocumented) and other cross-border criminal gangs can navigate the borders anytime. ² According to Onuoha (2013), Nigeria’s border policing is masked with self-deceit as border security officials are clandestine agents and abetters of cross-border criminalities. In 2016, for instance, a top official of the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) was reportedly arrested for abetting Boko Haram terrorists to smuggle loads of weapons and ammunition into the country through the northern border region (Nosiri and Ohazurike 2016). Lamptey (2015) argues that the ‘garment’ of corruption worn by border security officials is a ‘survival strategy’ in a country with a poor salary structure and a lack of motivation for security personnel. Similar to this debate is the lack of mutual understanding and coordination between and among the various border security agencies, such as the NCS, Nigeria Immigration Service and others. There is mutual suspicion and mistrust resulting in the divulgence of sensitive/intelligence information anytime there is planned/proposed border patrol by the security forces (Menner 2014). According to Menner (2014), notwithstanding the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) under President Buhari to secure the border and salvage the national security of the country, the mutual distrust between and among the Nigerian security agencies has so far impaired their efforts.

The nuances of globalisation in cyberspace engagement have also been argued to complicate the porous border vis-à-vis national security challenges in Nigeria, particularly in Africa (Okumu 2011). Akinyemi (2013) asserts that globalisation has further complicated the inadequacies of control over Nigeria’s border, consequently undermining national security. The argument, in essence, is that there is an interaction between virtual borders (outer space and cyberspace) and physical borders (land, sea and airspace), and that cyberspace has bred a ‘borderless world’ and deterritorialised state borders, allowing for transborder criminalities in many states of the world, including Nigeria (Awosusi 2022; Garuba 2010). The internet has made recruitment and sponsorship of transborder criminals in Nigeria easier; that is, internet usage has made it easier to access information on the operations of the security agents and outmanoeuvre them.

Another over-flogged narrative in this regard centres on Nigeria’s pursuit of pan-Africanism, that is, the deployment of Nigeria’s border resources as an instrument of its Africa-centred foreign policy, anchored on the principle of ‘good neighbourliness’ (Adam 2012). In a recent study, Ogunnubi and Awosusi (2021) specifically argue that Nigeria, through its idealistic border diplomacy, espouses border tolerance to project itself as an African giant. The core of the argument is that Nigeria is trading off its national security on the platform of pan-Africanism by favouring the advancement of ‘borderless borders’ as a regional integration agenda. Nigeria has reportedly subjected its borders to insecurity through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol of Free Movement of Persons and Goods and the recent AU-led African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). According to Akinyemi (2013), the ECOWAS ‘Borderless Protocol’ is a conduit for cross-border illegalities in Nigeria and the West African axis. The Nigeria’s episodic expulsion of ‘illegal’ African migrants in the 1980s on national security grounds is usually cited to strengthen this narrative (Aremu 2013). This is further echoed by Opanike and Aduloju (2015), who argue that the institutional weakness of the ECOWAS Protocol in terms of the lack of regional police to scrutinise illegal immigrants has bred cross-border criminalities such as human trafficking, terrorism and banditry, impacting the national security of most ECOWAS member states, including Nigeria.

The debate on the state of Nigeria’s borders vis-à-vis national security is unending. It is worth noting that the various debates and perspectives are centred on four key topics, namely ‘artificial colonial border legacies, border porosity, poor border management and Nigeria’s border tolerance in advancing pan-Africanism’. These arguments have been endorsed by many scholars, both Africans and non-Africans, stakeholders and Abuja policymakers, resulting in tagging the borders as a ‘burden’ to the Nigerian state. As a result of the border securitisation measures, which have so far failed to yield any substantial result, these debates and narratives have subtly shifted Abuja’s focus from the reality of the borders and its national security challenges. Abuja is, thus, ‘pressured’ to adopt top-down state-centric measures, which have so far proven ineffective, rather than addressing the internal crises that have placed a burden on the borders and resulted in national security debacles, despite efforts to maximise the border potential.

Beyond the Burden: Counter-Narratives and Exploration of the Geo-Strategic Potential of Nigeria’s Borders

As observed above, the manner of border engagement in Africa has influenced the broad perception of borders as barriers to national security. Meanwhile, within the respective African states’ borders reside inherent opportunities capable of birthing a ‘new Africa’. However, the crux of this section is to present the border and its attendant challenges from a ‘below’ perspective. That study advances beyond the ‘burden perception’ and ‘porosity narratives’ of Nigeria’s border discourse and surfaces the latent internal socio-economic and political crises stressing the borders. To this end, it is posited hereunder that, as much as the respective debates are indisputable, they do not capture the dynamics of the borders. Nigeria is riddled with unending problems and vices ranging from the north–south divide to unemployment, poverty, corruption, prebendalism, clientelism and so on, which cannot be divorced from the border security issues in the country. In contrast to the porosity debates, the aforementioned internal crises in the country have rendered the borders ungovernable and vulnerable to ‘intruders’. The Nigerian borders and their security imperatives have become political instruments in the country. While other issues stressing that the borders will be a focus of future treatise, analysis hereunder centres on poverty, unemployment, clientelism, corruption and the north–south divide.

Poverty and Unemployment: The Latent Burdens of the Borders

Despite its self-bestowed ‘African giant’ leadership title, Nigeria is notorious as Africa’s capital of unemployment and poverty (Akpakan et al. 2015). Unemployment and poverty are two of the internal ‘minor’ crises behind the ‘bigger’ security (internal and cross-border) issues terrorising the domestic space of the country. Nigeria currently has a population of over 200 million, a higher percentage of which is either unemployed, underemployed or living below the poverty line. As reported in 2011 by the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria’s unemployment rate stood at 23.9% compared to 21.1% in 2010 and 19.7% in 2009, when Boko Haram insurgencies started. Similarly, in a recent Business Day report, Nigeria’s unemployment rate increased from 21.8% in 2018 to 33% in 2020 (Ologunagbe 2022). In the World Poverty Clock’s 2020 report, the number of people living in extreme poverty in Nigeria rose from 86.9 million in 2018 to 93.7 million in 2019. The World Bank (2022) also reveals that 4 out of 10 Nigerians live below the national poverty line. According to the 2022 report by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, the number of Nigerians living in poverty stands at over 133 million, accounting for over 63% of the country’s overall population (Premium Times 2022). The increasing inflation rate and corruption further exacerbate this situation. As of 2020, inflation had increased to 12.3% compared to more than a quarter (8.7%) in 2014 (Ologunagbe 2022). On corruption, the World Bank estimated that 80% of energy revenues benefit only 1% of the population (Asfura-Heim and McQuaid 2015, 12). Transparency International (TI) has consistently ranked Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries globally. For instance, a 2021 TI Corruption Perception Index ranked Nigeria 154 out of 180 most corrupt countries globally (Transparency International 2021).

How are the teeming unemployed and poor populations surviving these internal ills? In the words of Kayode, the implications of poverty and unemployment among Nigerians are increasing militancy, criminalities (internal and cross-border), political thuggery, prostitution, cybercrime and other vices threatening the country’s raison d’etre. In a country with no hope of a better life, most unemployed people, especially youths, resort to employing all ‘necessary means’ such as criminalities and other informal cross-border trading, as a survival strategy. Although it is difficult to measure, more than half of Nigeria’s unemployed population, especially in the border regions, is in the informal cross-border trading sector. This is in tandem with the human needs theorists’ argument that, in a situation where a man has no alternative means to meet his basic needs, he is bound to resort to violent acts, criminalities or illegalities as a means to survive (Coates and Rosati, 1988). The root of the stress and strains on Nigeria’s borders is captured by Okunade (2017), who empirically submits that the numerous illegal route networks across Nigeria’s borders are ‘invented’ as a means of survival. He adds that the border communities’ residents utilise those routes’ advantages to navigate their way to the other side of the borders to traffic human beings, smuggle and engage in other cross-border illicit acts to make a daily living. For instance, reports on poverty and unemployment in Nigeria show that northern states such as Taraba, Borno and Gombe are the poorest (Ologunagbe 2022). This may be why the northern border regions of the country have the most worrisome security challenges, as in the case of Boko Haram insurgencies in the area.

Besides, informal cross-border trading is a very ‘lucrative’ business in Nigeria, involving a vast network of connivance between state and non-state actors (e.g., border security officials) (Adetula 2015; Faleye 2019). The borders are conduits of ‘opportunities’ for many frustrated unemployed Nigerians, who rely on the porosity to smuggle used clothes, bags, shoes, cars, popularly known as ‘tokunbo’, and other agricultural products for sale to major dealers in the country. For instance, many vehicle and textile dealers in Nigeria rely on these smugglers for their primary supplies. As the borders offer the poor and unemployed citizens the opportunities the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) denies them, it has been occupied and engaged for purposes that are detrimental to the national integrity. This situation is better put in context by the domestic noise that usually greets Abuja’s efforts to militarise or check the security situation of the borders. In 2019, for example, most citizens openly condemned and pressured Abuja to reopen its land borders, which had failed to yield expected results when they were closed for almost 2 years. In actual fact, used cars, vehicles, rice and other products flood Nigerian markets in spite of border closures and a ban on illegal importation of certain goods (Omotuyi 2022). This lends credence to the positions of Flynn (1997) and Nugent (2008), among others, on the powerful influence of non-state actors on African borders over the state agents.

Cross-Border/National Insecurity: A Means to a Domestic Political End

Nigeria’s borders have become a ‘resourceful’ tool for furthering Nigeria’s domestic politics, cloaked in patronage and clientelism that characterise the Nigerian polity. An ‘unholy’ alliance between and amongst Nigeria’s elites (political and economic) has fashioned a self-sustaining patron–client relationship that has ‘empowered’ the political elites to challenge any national effort or policy that opposes their interests. In protecting their interest, Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) note that Nigerian politicians habitually deploy extra-judicial approaches, such as illegal militias, to threaten or annihilate any personality who stands in their way. This captures the neo-patrimonial sociopolitical order where patrons (rulers/leaders) appropriate state wealth meant for the good of all through clientelism (the patron–client relationship) and other means possible (Englebert 2000; Van de Walle 2001).

In Nigeria, most of the efforts and policy initiatives aimed at turning the borders into national assets are usually thwarted by corrupt political elites and their clients/cronies. For instance, despite Abuja’s efforts to securitise the northern border region and repel the menace of the Boko Haram terrorist group, which MacEachern (2020, 2–3) refers to as Nigeria’s ‘borderland phenomenon’, they continue to cause havoc in the country, maiming, killing and displacing civilians even when the activities of their counterpart terrorist groups, such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, are gradually fading off in the international scene. As of 2020, records show that over 2.7 million people had been internally displaced in north-eastern Nigeria (Bonny 2020) by unscrupulous elements who found ambience across the borders and masked themselves as bandits and unknown gunmen, terrorising the people. The trend of the FGN-led anti-terrorist campaigns and re-integration programmes for ‘repentant’ terrorists tends to have a political undertone as well as indulging cross-border criminalities in the country. As a pointer, an erstwhile Cameroonian military commander once noted that Boko Haram usually takes on a brutal dimension at the approach of Nigeria’s general elections. The rate of bombings, heartless killings and displacement of people and communities on the eve of the 2014 general election and the relative calmness the country experienced immediately after Muhammadu Buhari won the presidential election in 2015 lend credence to this assertion. In the words of the Cameroonian military commander:

We notice that Boko Haram’s operability intensity is variable according to the current political situation in Nigeria. Every time we get closer to the election there is an intensity. But when the elections are over these groups also leave and just small raids are conducted here and there. (Bonny 2020)

In effect, Boko Haram and other cross-border insurgencies in Nigeria are sponsored by some political elites either to discredit the ruling government, as an electioneering tool (to get the support of the civilians) or as a means of diverting public funds to private purse. According to Didier Badjeck, a former Cameroonian military spokesperson, ‘The issue of Boko Haram’s violence is continuing and looks like some powers (political elites) are behind, who want the conflict to continue…’ (Bonny, 2020)). The 2017 TI report on Boko Haram activities further exposes the political economy of this cross-border menace. According to the report:

Nigeria’s corrupt elites have profited from the conflict; with oil prices at a record low, defence has provided new and lucrative opportunities for the country’s corrupt kleptocrats. Former military chiefs have stolen as much as US $15 billion—a sum equivalent to half of Nigeria’s foreign currency reserves—through fraudulent arms procurement deals. (Transparency International, 2017: 2)

This argument is further affirmed by the Vice President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, who says that about $15 billion was stolen from the fund accrued by the FGN to further the anti-terrorism campaigns across its borders (BBC 2015). Some political elites are not only amassing wealth through the national security situation of the country but are also using it to advance their political ambitions and balance political power between northern and southern Nigeria. Mbah et al. (2017) echo this while observing that the tussle between and among the northern and southern political elites over the control of state power has fuelled cross-border insecurity (insurgency) in Nigeria. They add that the political ambition and thirst for control of state power led to the emergence of Boko Haram terrorists and fuels insecurity in the country. This captures the situation in Nigeria, as political ideology no longer divides Nigerian politicians, but the desperation to control state power. This has led to using any strategy, including the ‘porous’ border advantage, as a means to an end. Forest (2012) states that Boko Haram resulted from government and elite delinquency, breeding an anarchical Nigerian state. In 2012, for instance, Goodluck Jonathan, the former President of Nigeria, lamented that some supporters of the Boko Haram terrorist group were not only members of the three arms of his government but also the country’s security officials (members of the armed forces) (Olojo 2013). In 2012, a member of the Boko terrorist group, Shuaibu Bama, nephew of a Nigerian serving senator, was arrested by the security forces at the house of a former governor (Isah 2012). This partly explains why Abuja’s anti-terrorism campaign remains mere national noise.

Although Olojo (2013) opines that the blame game between and among Nigerian politicians on Boko Haram sympathisers may be a covert political instrument in defusing opposition within the context of national politics, the reluctance of Abuja to deploy ‘overwhelming’ military force to curb the cross-border menace also lends substance to our argument that national insecurity remains a political tool in the country. As Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) observed, Abuja is unwilling to deploy an all-involving military approach and external support to crush the Boko Haram terrorists. Also, FGN’s little or no attention to communities, towns and people displaced by the Boko Haram terrorists and the advance to rehabilitate the latter under the guise of ‘repentance’ have invalidated whatever theory the political elites concoct to cover up their neo-patrimonial politics.

Moreover, Abuja’s border securitisation policies and efforts are only on paper. The north and south political dichotomy has influenced the making and implementation of border policies. For instance, while Abuja declared border closure against the neighbouring states, Omotuyi (2022) argues that such a policy was only targeted at the Nigeria–Benin (southern) border while the northern borders were only closed on paper. This explains why border criminalities persist across borders in spite of earlier border securitisation efforts. This is to situate the argument that, rather than deploying the borders as a resourceful national asset, they have become political tools for furthering the north–south divide and neo-patrimonial order that characterise Nigeria’s domestic politics. In so doing, Abuja has ‘relinquished’ its borders to Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), bandits and other cross-border criminals.

The ‘Relinquished’ Nigeria’s Borders and the Inherent Potentials

As a departure from the various one-sided accounts of Nigeria’s borders, it is hereunder advanced that, notwithstanding the subjective colonial nature and security conditions of these borders, they still have inherent benefits to the Nigerian state. In the West African axis, Nigeria has the most geographical potential, not only for the expanse of its land borders and access to the sea but also for its location in the ‘heart’ of the subregion. Geographically, the Nigerian state lies between latitudes 4° and 14°N and longitudes 2° and 15°E, with a total area of 923,768 km ² (910,768 km ² of land and 13,000 km ² of water areas), making it the 32nd largest nation-state in the world. The borders cover 1,049 km of international border expanse with the Niger Republic in the north, 87 km with Chad in the north, 1,690 km with Cameroun in the east, 773 km with the Benin Republic in the west and 853 km of coastline (maritime border) with the Gulf of Guinea (CIA World Factbook 2023). Nigeria is ranked 18th among 46 countries with a stretched land border expanse (Parradang 2014).

This geographical potential has, undeniably, earned it substantial credit in relations with other states within Africa and beyond since independence. The borders have, for example, tied the ECOWAS region to the economic tentacles of Nigeria. It has made the country an indispensable market for all West African states and beyond. Available statistics show that Nigeria constitutes over 60% of the West African economy (Olagbaju et al. 2020). According to the NCS, the country earned between 4.7 and 5.8 billion naira daily from import duties when the land borders were closed between 2019 and 2020, far more than it generated when the borders were open (Oguntoye 2020). This resonates with the observation of Wilson and Donnan (1998) that borders are institutions of economic and political opportunity for nation-states as well as for a host of other interest groups and agencies, legal and illegal. Borders, therefore, are an integral element in Nigeria’s economy. This is evident in the regional objection that greets Nigeria’s intermittent border closures. The 2019 closure is a case in point. Aside from the volume of money the borders yield to the national treasury, they provide ‘informal’ job opportunities for millions of Nigerians. Available statistics reveal that about 90% of cross-border trade in Nigeria is carried out by informal traders dealing in used clothes, cars and some agricultural products (Iloani 2021). This is to argue that a substantial number of Nigerians earn their living, legally and illegally, through the borders with overall impacts on the national GDP. The borders remain conduits of survival for the teeming unemployed Nigerian populace, especially youths.

Further, Nigeria’s Africa-centred foreign policy, which earned it a putative regional hegemon and ‘African giant’ leadership title, is premised on its geo-strategic border potential (Ogunnubi 2013). Nigeria’s role in Africa, either as a ‘regional enforcer’ or hegemonic leader, is predicated on its geo-strategic border advantages on the continent. Through the enormousness of its geographical position and border tolerance, Nigeria has placed itself at the heart of African geopolitics and economies. According to Okunade (2019), the delimitation of Nigeria’s boundaries with its limitrophe neighbours is to define and defend their territorial integrity from external intrusion and influence. Borders primarily preserve those in the border communities and the state’s sovereignty. It is a symbol of nationhood. Notwithstanding the cross-border security challenges of Nigeria’s borders, they represent a symbol of social identity and the emblem of its international recognition. They stand for integration and difference, implying homogenisation processes within the border and differentiation from ‘the other’ outside (Paasi 1998). In this sense, they provide not only the preconditions for social identity and collective action but also ward off possibilities that might otherwise flourish. Given the marginalised and ‘vulnerable’ status of most of those living in the northern and southern borderlands, the borders serve as a source of ‘comfort’ through ethnoreligious relations, trade and cultural relations with other communities on the other side of the borders.

To fully harness the inherent potential of these borders, Abuja must address its increasing national security challenges by addressing its internal crises and framing realistic border policy frameworks. The statist top-down border policy measures, which resulted from the neo-patrimonial politics of Abuja policymakers, have apparently proven unproductive. In engaging the borders as instruments of regional cooperation, economic relations or security, Abuja needs to design a bottom-up border policy framework that would galvanise the needs and interests of its local population, especially the border communities. Non-state border actors, such as local chiefs, leaders of Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and some individuals in border villages who wield significant influences across the borders (see Flynn 1997), should be strategically engaged by the FGN to play vanguard roles in youth empowerment as well as campaign/sensitisation on the implications of cross-border illegalities for the overall national lives. Also, for collective security efforts across borders, the FGN should design border security initiatives to build synergy and mutual trust between the local security groups in the border regions and the state security officials.

Conclusion

The attempt has so far been to reposition the various perspectives and debates on Nigeria’s border vis-à-vis national security challenges. Nigeria is in a fragile state. The Boko Haram insurgency, banditry, kidnapping and so on have wreaked serious havoc on the people and economy. These have been invariably blamed by policymakers and scholars on the subjective and porous nature of the borders. As posited here, the borders are subjective, porous and ill-managed, but beyond that, they are only at the receiving end of national ‘burdens’. Borders are naturally artificial and an asset to national lives. Nigeria’s borders are mere victims of internal crises in terms of corruption, poverty, unemployment and neo-patrimonial order, among other indices defining the Nigerian state. Notwithstanding the lingering stress of the borders, they portend geo-strategic advantages that can transform Nigeria and reposition it on the global scene. It is, thus, recommended that approaching Abuja’s border practices from the bottom-up and addressing its internal challenges holds a prospect for its border security and, by extension, national security.