Media and Terrorism in Africa: Al-Shabaab’s Evolution from Militant Group to Media Mogul

Abstract

It is no surprise to come across information or video on social or mainstream media that was posted by a terrorist organisation like Al-Shabaab. In this regard, researchers have attempted to answer the question of what terrorist organisations aim to achieve by gaining a strong foothold in cyberspace. This article explores the evolution of Al-Shabaab in terms of their media usage and presence—from a local insurgency using magazines and radio stations, to what can be described as a media mogul in Africa. The author explores how and why this group chooses to pursue a strong cyber presence, and what, if anything, Africa and the international community can do about it.

Introduction

It is no surprise to come across information or video on social or mainstream media that was posted by a terrorist organisation like Al-Shabaab. In this regard, researchers have attempted to answer the question of what terrorist organisations aim to achieve by gaining a strong foothold in cyberspace (See Cohen 2002; Furnell and Warren 1999). As the trend of using media in varying politically driven ways became more mainstream, research on these topics luckily followed—this includes work on the uses of social media, mainstream news media as well as terrorism in cyberspace (See Altheide 2007; 2013; Dean, Bell, and Newman 2012; Holman, Garfin, and Silver 2014; Oh, Agrawal, and Rao 2011).

John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini have been conducting research on what was then seen as new forms of terrorism, designed to flourish in the information age. They contend, ‘Terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical toward information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of transnationally interlinked groups than into building stand-alone groups’ (Ronfeldt, Zanini, and Arquilla 2000). This can be seen with modern-day terrorist organisations as well, where cells that formerly stood alone, emanating from state-related grievances and discontent, continuously align with the strongest (terrorist) player in the international arena. ¹ This ‘new’ type of organisational structure is empirically different from traditional leadership structures within terrorist organisations.

The ever-evolving nature of the information highway and the various uses calls for ever-evolving forms of research as well. The media’s role takes on many different forms and should be examined from different points of view: first, how the media perceives and presents terrorism; second, how terrorist organisations use and misuse the media to advance their insurgencies; and finally, how the public and targeted audiences are affected by what they see in the media.

Background

Because of the outrage that can be caused by the media, there is immediately a large amount of pressure on the shoulders of the international community—to be informed of and react to various tragic events around the globe. Since modern technology is ever evolving, the international community’s reaction to militant groups that use the media to advance their ideologies should be ever adapting. The research needs to match the threat. Clearly, merely blocking and removing information posted in digital media has not turned out to be a successful tactic.

Defining terrorism has long been a very controversial and difficult endeavour among academics. Terrorism is an essentially contestable concept; so much so that some advocate the abandonment of the term altogether because of the lack of analytical value and the fact that research can still be conducted without using the term (Jackson 2011). Being opposed to complete abandonment of the term, and to offer a more nuanced understanding, Richard Jackson (2011) has offered a ‘minimal foundationalist’ redefinition of terrorism. In his words:

Terrorism is violence or its threat intended as a symbolically communicative act in which direct victims of the action are instrumentalised as a means to creating a psychological effect of intimidation and fear in a target audience for a political objective. (Jackson 2011)

The reason for using this specific definition as a reference point throughout this article is because it acknowledges not only the violent act of terrorism but also the fear and intimidation that it induces.

Before analysing the various uses of the media by Al-Shabaab, it is important to establish the difference among mass media, social media and news media. These terms are continuously used throughout the article, and the differentiation in context is of importance to avoid ambiguity.

Mass media— ‘… a linear process by which [profit motivated] professional communicators use media to design and disseminate [meaning-encoded] messages widely, rapidly, and continually {over distance} to arouse intended [decoded] meanings in large, diverse, and selectively attending audiences in attempts to influence them in a variety of ways.’ (DeFleur 2010; Ells 2019)

Social media—‘…web-based services that allow individuals, communities, and organizations to collaborate, connect, interact, and build community by enabling them to create, co-create, modifies, share, and engage with user-generated content that is easily accessible.’ (McCay-Peet and Quan-Haase 2017)

News media—‘…any news-reporting or news-gathering agency and any employee or agent associated with such agency, including television, radio, radio and television networks, news services, newspapers, magazines, trade papers, in-house publications, professional journals, or any other news-reporting or news-gathering agency, the function of which is to inform the public or some segment thereof.’ (Law Insider 2019)

African Terror and Modern Media

Terrorism in Africa should not be seen as a collection of different militant groups, affecting different democracies and civilians. It should be seen as an interactive network of activities, beliefs and customs, all intertwined and constantly changing to reach goals formed decades before the international community even became aware of terrorism and applied certain labels to what terrorism is and how it should be handled.

Africa is lagging far behind the rest of the world in terms of broadband connectivity, social media usage and overall media penetration (Rosabel 2016). Yet, despite the low connectivity and penetration rates, militant and insurgent groups in Africa still use the media to their advantage. In the current technological age, wars are fought on screens as much as they are on the battlefield. How the media reports on warfare and conflict not only influences, in some cases, the policies of nations, but it also influences public opinion around the world. As technology evolves, the media is enabled to present more information, and at faster speeds and of a better quality (Shpiro 2002).

Media outlets that fall behind in terms of up-to-date news coverage simply lose out in this intense field of competition. Here, social media makes up the difference, especially in African states where media freedom and freedom of the press have become relative concepts. Yet, again, how much difference can social or new media make in this regard if it has far fewer users and far less reach than in the developed world?

The terrorism/media threat in Africa has shifted from hackers who gain access to bank accounts and official records to youths posting on social media about the promise of a better life and future through jihad. Not only have new technologies made it possible to produce materials intended as propaganda quite easily, but they have also made it easier to broadcast and distribute these films and images. Terrorists aim to inject fear in large groups of people; in this manner, they influence policymakers to advance their own goals. The modern form of terrorism, of which we are aware, developed in the mid-to-late nineteenth century—coincidently while mass media and democracy gained international momentum.

Within this article, discourse is seen both as a product of the society in which it is used and a force that, with its continuously changing nature, influences social values. This influence can go both ways—positive and negative.

Critical Discourse Analysis as a Basic Theoretical Aid

The ability of terrorism to induce fear and anxiety can be largely attributed to the discourses that arise from acts of terrorism, not to mention the obvious fear that the act itself induces. The discourses after such a vicious and publicised attack may be aimed at either the ruling government of the country in which the attack happened or the entire culture, values or history of that specific country. The receivers of the message, in the form of ‘audiences’, then receive and perceive various accounts of the story as it is analysed, created or even re-created through different sources of mass media and new media coverage. As Abraham Miller (1982) stated:

Terrorism and the media are entwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship. Terrorism [can write] any drama—no matter how horrible—to compel the media’s attention… Terrorism, like an ill-mannered enfant terrible, is the media’s stepchild, a stepchild which the media, unfortunately, can neither completely ignore nor deny.

Even though this statement was made decades ago, it still rings true today, and it is supported by recent research carried out around the world focusing on various countries, regions, terrorist organisations and forms of media (See Ahava 2019; Ashur and van Heelsum 2016; Elshimi 2018; Kampf 2014; Kassaye, Ashur, and van Heelsum 2016).

Not only does the threat of terrorism change and evolve daily, so do the individual groups’ relation to the media and other discourses. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) investigates the role of discourse in strengthening these unequal power relations and exposes how some groups and individuals are influenced, marginalised or even exploited by those who have what we will call the ‘discourse privilege’. While some discourses focus on and provide guidance on certain courses of action (some will be broadcast as moral, legitimate or even essential), those same discourses draw large numbers of support, while others are labelled as stupid, immoral and illegitimate ² (Howarth 2000). Thus, the general public and policymakers are in a way prescribed how they should react to certain events or crises. One of the functions of discourse analysis, and indeed this study, is to expose the foundation of these altered assumptions and reveal how they relate to differing interests within the international community.

CDA will further be used to show how language and the media can be used to deceive and, in some cases, exploit those at whom it is aimed. Language and discourse are at the fingertips of the powerful in society. ³

Al-Shabaab’s Evolving Discourse(s)

Recent history has continuously proven that terrorism and the media have a mutually beneficial relationship. Ever since the hostage-taking by Palestinian terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, where seven Israeli Olympic team members were kidnapped and killed by the Palestinian group Black September; the hijacking of Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 by Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad terrorists in 1985, seeking the release of 700 Shi’ite Muslims from Israeli custody; and, of course, the terrorist attack on New York’s twin towers in 2001, mediated mega-events have been routine in mass media. Terrorists deliberately wanted, and gained, the attention of international audiences. The media, on the other hand, reaped reasonable benefits from record sales and the attention gained by the same international audiences (Rohner and Frey 2007). The more recent attacks in London, France, Belgium and Spain follow the same pattern.

It has become the norm for groups described as terrorists, both in the West and in Africa, to employ terrorism not only to propel their religious war but also as a communication strategy. Islamic State (IS), for example, places such emphasis on media that they have an entire section of their forces dedicated to producing and posting videos and recruiting materials online.

The media people are more important than the soldiers, ‘he said. ‘Their monthly income is higher. They have better cars. They have the power to encourage those inside to fight and the power to bring more recruits to the Islamic State—Abu Abdullah al-Maghribi, ISIS defector. (Miller and Mekhennet 2015)

In studying terrorism in Africa, the method needs to be as adaptable as that which is being studied. Al-Shabaab has in recent years proven themselves prone to changing and adapting according to what their ideology prescribes or how grievances and underlying factors shift. They have changed from a clan-related threat in southern Somalia to a threatening force of possible anarchy across Somalia and neighbouring countries. However, their discourse will make their aim clearer—which is not to deliberately create an anarchic environment.

Al-Shabaab: Born from Insecurity and Anarchy

Al-Shabaab has been known to be a more media-centred group, with radio stations and, especially, Twitter profiles dedicated to spreading their propaganda. This makes them stand out on the African continent, a continent not known for its wide range and scope of new media usage.

To understand the group today, as well as the factors that influence their discourse usage, the history of this dynamic and ever-changing group needs to be understood first. Al-Shabaab was born out of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—a loose formation of an Islamic system of law that established a sense of civil order after many years of violent revolt and anarchy in Somalia. The ICU managed to unite Mogadishu and open the airport for the first time in 16 years, thus establishing a sense of peace and security in the area, something that garnered them the support of the Somali civil society.

With the support of the USA, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and splintered the ICU, with the moderates going into exile and the militants forming Al-Shabaab. Once again, Somalia found itself and any prospect of Somali governance under the influence of greater, external powers. The splintering of the ICU led to more political disruption in Somalia, no chance of the formation of a central authority and—eventually—to the birth of Al-Shabaab.

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen was officially formed in 2006 by a group of young men who were the armed militia for the ICU. At their birth, they fought against the country’s Western-backed government and its allies to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law. Thus, religion as a political discourse created a space for Al-Shabaab to grow. The lack of attention given to Islamic law and, by extension, Sharia law, by the Western-backed government was used as motivation and justification for Al-Shabaab’s early actions.

The religious discourse defined Al-Shabaab’s repertoire of speeches and symbols and gained them considerable support in a society where religion had become more prominent since the collapse of the Somali state. Scholars like Tom Reese also hail the importance of poverty and personal insecurity in conjunction with increased religion (Reese 2009). Religion became the beacon of hope and trust towards which the civil society turned. Islam has certain commandments that deal with social justice and promote solidarity with the weak and poor in society. This resurgence of the importance of religion in the Somali society enabled Al-Shabaab to project an image and use relevant discourses that would paint them as pious and law-abiding citizens, basing their propaganda on legal justice. The governmental and ideological vacuum created an environment in which Al-Shabaab could grow.

There are those researchers who describe Al-Shabaab as a child of the so-called ‘War on Terror’. Robert Pape (2010), among others, considers the continuous presence of armies of occupation a major cause of terrorism, at least in one of its forms or discourses—the suicide attack. It has been argued that Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia (2006–2009) created fertile breeding ground for terrorism in the country. The invasion of Ethiopia was crucial for recruitment for Al-Shabaab and, indeed, for the creation and early evolution of the group itself.

Ken Menkhaus (2008) argues that aggressive Western policies and Ethiopian occupation pushed Al-Shabaab to organise and aided its recruitment. One should, however, be careful of not oversimplifying this argument—it should be noted that large clans and sub-clans, like the Rahanwhein and the Majerteen, supported the Ethiopian invasion/intervention. Al-Shabaab became organised even before the Ethiopian intervention, and the Ethiopian military doctrine hurt the Ethiopians’ own efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Somali public.

It would be safe to say that Al-Shabaab is more than a mere product of continuous insecurity. This is where the export of Al-Qaeda’s ideology to Somalia comes into play and becomes one of the major influences on Al-Shabaab’s formation of discourse—in the form of words and deeds. Social bonds often predate ideological commitment, as in the case of Al-Shabaab, and are widely used to recruit jihadists. It was a network of former Afghanistan veterans that established Al-Shabaab, and the dissemination of ideas has been used by individuals with Al-Qaeda connections (Sageman 2008).

Stepping into the Media Battleground

Many of the discourses used by Al-Shabaab can be labelled as a media battle of sorts. Al-Shabaab’s usage of the media does share some features with other jihadist groups in their use of different media. Their ideology is propagated through the use of discussion forums, videos, radical Internet forums as well as social media (Burke 2018). They also use these media platforms to boast of attacks, show off their capabilities and verbally attack various governments around the world. It is important to note that Al-Shabaab used different forms of media and communication to reach their target audience. Social media and the rate of information and communications technology (ICT) development in Africa enable the group to reach vast international audiences. Al-Shabaab also makes use of more traditional forms of media—like local radio stations—to reach local audiences.

In Al-Shabaab’s early years, ⁴ they presented themselves as the only viable governing alternative left in Somalia. Their initial messaging was very nationalistic, and they described themselves as ‘the only remaining defenders of Somalia against foreign incursion’ (Mueller 2016). When the group started operating independently from the ICU, the successes of their guerrilla campaign against the Ethiopian military in Somalia garnered significant support for the group. They succeeded especially in the south-central part of Somalia, including the important port city of Kismayo (Wise 2011). To suit this image of an alternative governing force, the group started to develop strategic and media structures that could appeal to the wider Somali audience—locally and regionally. At the start of their ‘campaign’, Al-Shabaab produced a few propaganda films as a tool for recruiting both local and international jihadis. These films were circulated in many forms and can still be found on various sites like al-Kataib Media Foundation (Al-Shabaab’s own ‘production company’) and jihadology.net.

The media and messaging published in the Somali language were aligned with Al-Shabaab’s plan for Somalia—to establish the caliphate and get rid of the infidels. Al-Shabaab made use of Somali media mainly aimed at two specific audiences: the Somali locals living in Somalia and other Somalis living regionally. When aiming the message at local Somalis, a very specific discourse is used. Seminars on Islamic jurisprudence were held along with meetings about sport and the distribution of grain or livestock to locals (Harper 2019). These acts are a form of discourse, framing the group as the ‘saviours’ of the Somali society. Proof and photographic evidence of these events held by Al-Shabaab were obviously publicised. It can be argued that, because of the lack of advanced media and communication in Somalia itself, this boasting was aimed at a more regional and international audience. Al-Shabaab’s local source of communication with Somalis was mostly ‘face to face’ (Dickenson 2010) or using local radio stations.

An example of discourse aimed at both international and local audiences would include the 2006 film produced by Al-Shabaab [The Battle of] Badr of Somalia, which shows insurgents training and attacking targets. The video is set to Arabic nasheeds (musical recitations of poetry). Clips of Al-Qaeda Central (AQC) leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, can also be seen. This video is credited to the producer’s ‘media departments’ (Qism al-I’lam) or the Media of the Mujahideen in Somalia. These ‘credits’ make it unclear whether Al-Shabaab itself or another group produced the video (Anzalone 2016).

Using Framing and Critical Discourse Analysis to Understand the Al-Shabaab–Al-Qaeda Relationship

In 2007, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops entered Mogadishu. This prompted Al-Shabaab to shift the target of its strategic communications from Somali government members, the ‘invading’ Ethiopians and their international supporters to the troop-contributing countries of AMISOM. These troops were labelled and framed as Christian invaders, ‘crusaders’ and non-believers. Al-Shabaab created these specific frames and manipulated the discourses of the troops to establish themselves as the saviours of Somalia. Discourses used by the group presented the situation in such a way that the war in Somalia appeared to be part of a wider global ‘clash of civilizations’ (Kriel 2018). Although these communications and discourse usage were initially intended to garner local support, placing Somalia in the context of ‘a wider global’ issue immediately broadens their audience to a more international target. The issue of framing is highlighted here in the application of CDA—Al-Shabaab successfully constructed a reality in which they were ‘the good guys’. This form of framing is the one employed by insurgencies and mainstream media alike: emphasising certain events and facts, and seriously downplaying others—this form of framing and shaping discourse then creates a type of ‘filter’ that would include or exclude certain information.

For Al-Shabaab to successfully frame themselves as the good guys, the contextual realities of Somalia and the surrounding region played into their discourses. The Mogadishu government has been continuously accused of gross corruption. In addition to the Mogadishu government and their questionable forms of governance, AMISOM troops—already established as one of the main justifications for Al-Shabaab attacks—were continuously accused of rape, smuggling and accepting bribes (Adan 2017; Smith 2014).

From 2007 to 2008, Al-Shabaab released messages with a more focused discourse aimed at the Christian West working against Islam and Muslims. This was accompanied by elaborate recruitment pitches (Anzalone 2016). Another influence on Al-Shabaab’s discourses and means of delivery was the creation of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This group was created at a large conference in Eritrea; the Eritreans wanted to take advantage of what they saw as ‘a second front in their cold war against Ethiopia’ (Hansen 2013). The leader of the ARS was former Sharia Court leader, Sheikh Sharif Sheik Hassan. Yusuf ‘Indha Ade’ Mohamed Siad—a major rival of Al-Shabaab during the Sharia Court days—became head of defence. This prompted Al-Shabaab to distance themselves formally from the conference held in ‘secular Eritrea’, a nation they claimed prosecuted jihadists. What followed was one of Al-Shabaab’s clearest anti-Somali nationalism messages.

Al-Shabaab used the fact that many of the representatives of the ARS were in mixed marriages—Muslim women married to atheists or Christians. According to Al-Shabaab, this was against the Quran, and the ‘correct’ form of fighting was not resistance, but jihad (Hansen 2008).

This indicated a shift in Al-Shabaab’s verbal discourses; they distanced themselves from all patriotic symbols, and suddenly, the conflict in Somalia became a war between ‘Muslims’ and ‘apostates’, and no longer between Somalis and Ethiopians. Although this cannot be considered a groundbreaking shift in their media use or discourse, it does serve as evidence of Al-Shabaab’s easily interchangeable discourse usage and creation. This gave the group a more international presence and attracted international support, since their cause was bigger than only Somalia—it was no longer only an insurgency inside Somalia. Creating this international presence required more than mere statements—suddenly, Al-Shabaab’s audience widened immensely, and they needed to maintain their appeal. The use of discourse in describing the Eritreans and the Ethiopians as apostates and infidels would evoke strong and, in many cases, emotional responses from those sympathetic to Al-Shabaab’s cause. Al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Godane, publicised a voice recording in 2014 where he blatantly encourages Somalis to take up jihad against Ethiopia:

Somalis, your religion has been attacked, your land divided, your resources looted directly and indirectly through the puppet government—our victory lies in Jihad… Ethiopia will fail as it has failed in the past and the Muslims will be much stronger… The aim of the [foreign] invasion is to divide the remaining Somalia between Kenya and Ethiopia under the cover of the establishment of Somali states. (Sheikh 2014)

The increased connections between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda coincided with Al-Shabaab’s lessening of nationalist messages, something that is strange because of the group’s initial goal of fighting Ethiopian ‘invaders’. The anti-nationalist sentiments grew to resemble Al-Shabaab as fighting a global war against the threat to the ummah, not only within Somalia (Hansen 2013), but videos released from 2007 onwards also regularly commented on world affairs and the establishment of the pan-Islamic caliphate. ⁵ Using this type of discourse would place the group in a global context—much like Al-Qaeda—in the war of good versus evil.

One of their most famous foreign fighters, Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, strengthened this idea with the following:

It is the same manhaj [religious methodology] repeated here from the mouth of the mujaahid shaykh Usaamah Bin Laden, the doctor Ayman ath-Thawaahiri, and the hero, Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqaawi. (Gartenstein-Ross 2009)

In March 2009, Osama bin Laden published a video titled ‘Fight on, Champions of Somalia’ in which Somalis were encouraged to fight against Sheikh Sharif, then-president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). A few months later, Al-Shabaab posted a response to Al-Qaeda, stating that ‘the winds of victory are still blowing on them and the enemy’s plans are collapsing’. Abu Zabayr, the leader of Al-Shabaab at that time, also directly asked Osama bin Laden and, by extension, Al-Qaeda for ‘guidance in this advanced state in the life of Jihad’ (Shuji 2012).

Another major influence from Al-Qaeda can be seen in Al-Shabaab’s attacks and the specific discourse they employ. With the emergence of Al-Shabaab, the group mostly made use of guerrilla tactics aimed at the Ethiopian invaders in Somalia, and later the TFG. As the growing ties between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda emerged, Al-Shabaab increasingly made use of suicide attacks. At first, these attacks remained within the localised focus of the group and were aimed at the TFG officials and their infrastructure in Somalia, but they later became increasingly internationalised. Another example of the Al-Qaeda influence is that these attacks were largely carried out by foreign recruits (Wise 2011). The use of foreign recruits once again indicates Al-Shabaab’s ability to reach a foreign audience—and there is no doubt that Al-Qaeda’s influence and ‘marketing’ played a clear role in franchising Al-Shabaab as an international organisation. Al-Shabaab’s first attacks off Somalian soil occurred in 2010 when suicide bombers set off two blasts in Kampala, Uganda, where crowds were watching the Fédération internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. Spokesperson for Al-Shabaab at the time, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, claimed the attacks on Al-Shabaab’s behalf:

Al-Shabaab was behind the two bomb blasts in Uganda… We thank the mujahideen that carried out the attack, we are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia] troops from Somalia, blasts will continue and it will happen in Bujumbura [the Burundi capital] too. (BBC News 2010)

This attack as discourse could be aimed to please the local Somali audience, as their target was the troops invading Somalia, as well as the more international audience, to prove that the group was capable of international attacks.

In terms of more traditional discourse contributions, Al-Shabaab’s use of videos and messages through the Internet made Al-Shabaab notable across the globe. Before 2009, Al-Shabaab recruited almost exclusively from the Somali population. However, since their public communications with Al-Qaeda started, foreign fighters, who ideologically identified with the global jihad, were recruited. One of their most famous international fighters, Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, was a valuable English-speaking fighter. From 2010 onwards, messages from Hammami were regularly published online and distributed as Al-Shabaab recruitment (Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki aka Omar Shafik Hammami (al Shabaab)—Individual Profile, n.d.).

Al-Shabaab initially aimed their discourse at framing themselves as a nationalist group fighting a local cause. This goal held little motivation for foreigners to join the cause. However, foreigners influenced by Al-Qaeda’s discourse of resisting Westerners, and their subsequent war on Islam, took note of Al-Shabaab the moment that Al-Qaeda’s support became apparent.

Al-Shabaab and Their Discourses: From Radio Frequencies to Twitter Handles

The importance of social media in emergency situations has become vital in the past decade; the easy-access platforms have allowed civilians to communicate information on dangerous situations in mere seconds. Social media channels have also been utilised in the response and reactions of official authorities and the general public in these types of situations. The increasing rise in Twitter and Facebook usage during emergency situations is a sharp indication of the public’s acceptance of what is posted or tweeted as ‘truth’. Even though this can be described as the era of fake news or misinformation, the public still has a general trust in information circulated through the web. It subsequently creates a situational awareness that has before been nearly impossible in mass casualty situations (McGovern 2011). It is especially this feature that Al-Shabaab used to their advantage.

A study done in 2012 by Portland Communications indicated that Kenya was the second most active African country on Twitter, with only South Africa being more active on this social media site (Portland Communications 2012). ICT infrastructure in Kenya provides affordable and easy access to mobile phones and the Internet. Although Kenya has employed some questionable forms of censorship in the past, ⁶ the strictest forms of media control were only proposed by the Kenyan Parliament after the Westgate attack. The memorandum by parliament dictated terms of freedom of expression for journalists, banning them form publishing or broadcasting any material that might ‘undermine security operations’ (Habiba 2017). However, there is more open access to information in Kenya than in Somalia; something Al-Shabaab could rely on throughout their rise to regional presence. At the time of the attack, Al-Shabaab was using the Twitter handle @HSMPress. Due to retweets by Al-Shabaab followers, 4.5 million tweets appeared with this handle before the account was shut down by Twitter (Burke 2018). It was clear that Al-Shabaab was definitely comfortable enough on this social network that an account being shut down would not impede their aim of keeping the audience(s) captive. Between 21 September and 24 September 2013, at least eight different Al-Shabaab-affiliated ⁷ Twitter accounts were active and tweeted at least 556 times (Mair 2017). This included a quip directed at Twitter after the suspension of one of their accounts:

Alshabab has suffered another great casualty: Twitter account loss! (Simon et al. 2014)

At the time of the attack, Al-Shabaab was already known to target Kenya. The fact that they live-tweeted the attack also left no doubt about who was behind the attack. However, a study by the Qatar Computing Research Institute (QRCI) looked at tweets from civilians during the attack, more specifically, eyewitnesses. When considering a more modernised hostage situation, one might argue that civilians would be required to hand over cell phones and other devices. It has been established that Al-Shabaab would not want that, since by giving eyewitnesses a chance to ‘report’ what is happening, they are once again strengthening their image and reach. This action—or lack thereof—is another form of discourse pointing to how Al-Shabaab uses media, either directly or through subsequent users, to advance their cause and spread a message.

Considering Al-Shabaab’s usage of social media and accompanying discourses during the attack, it should be reiterated that their religious motivation was not at the forefront of their campaign. This attack was more focused on Somali nationalistic goals, once again warning the Kenyans to remove their forces from Somalia. What did, however, link to their anti-Western, jihadist ideology, was their discontent with Kenya for aligning with ‘the enemy’—referring to AMISOM and their Western troop-contributing countries.

Jackson defines terrorism as a communicative act—as mentioned in the introduction of this article—which aligns with the study’s theoretical application of CDA, where the actions of terrorists are also identified and analysed as a discourse in itself. However, it is not only the actions of terrorists that instil fear but also the way in which the message is relayed before, during and after the attack. This means that the employment of fear-instilling discourses is not something only used by terrorists. There can be no denial that this is, in fact, employed with maximum efficiency by terrorist organisations, in particular, seen in the case study of Al-Shabaab and the Westgate Mall attack. What makes terrorist organisations’ message important to this study is the combination of communicative actions and violent actions.

Conclusion

Effectively, Al-Shabaab had an interrelationship with the media since their birth. It started with framing themselves as the saviours of a ravaged and divided country. This framing and manner of messaging evolved as new and improved technology became available.

It has been clear since Al-Shabaab’s early years that they realise the importance of using arising opportunities. As messaging evolved, framing evolved to reach a regional audience, then later an international audience—each time when the opportunity presented itself. Discourses used were not messages sent into a void hoping that the correct audience might be reached. Discourses were created for specific audiences, targeted and designed for that specific audience and delivered in a mode that ensured that the particular audience was reached—whether through radio stations, YouTube videos, media statements or tweets. This is, once again, a display of Al-Shabaab’s effective use of messaging and discourse to a certain end. The messaging by the group also underwent an evolution by means of pressure—from both outside and inside the group.

Together with external influences on Al-Shabaab’s discourse and relationship with media, internal influences such as personalities, egos and leaders all play a role as well. Al-Shabaab has proven time and again that it should be regarded as a living organism, changing and evolving to adapt to the society or situation in which it finds itself. Messaging, target audiences and general discourses evolved and changed as the group did, contributing to Al-Shabaab being a complex and even vibrant case study in research.

The media, locally and especially internationally, played an integral part in further disseminating Al-Shabaab’s message. Suddenly Al-Shabaab’s discourses were no longer sermons, YouTube videos or media statements. It became something left to the interpretation of various audiences around the world. The media could shape the message and story in such a way that they will have enough to report on to relay news and keep a headline relevant for quite some time. This was to Al-Shabaab’s advantage—no publicity is bad publicity. The more the story was covered, the more different interpretations, contexts and angles were examined and published, and the more Al-Shabaab’s message was disseminated. Through the Westgate attack, Al-Shabaab was even able to use local eyewitnesses and audiences around the world to send a message.

Al-Shabaab’s reign of terror will not end soon, although credit should be given to AMISOM and various other actors working to ameliorate the threat from the group. Al-Shabaab has discovered the secret to success in this century—relevance. By using the media available to them to their advantage, they have proven that decreased numbers and territory do not equal decreased capabilities and, even less so, decreased media coverage. In fact, journalists and academics alike have spent hundreds of hours studying not only how Al-Shabaab works physically, but how they work through the media as well. They have discovered revolutionary tactics that are increasingly hard to contain. By parading as an average media user, Al-Shabaab effectively reaches possible jihadis around the world—and this can be done from a single smart device or computer. Until the international community, and especially bodies associated with terrorism, adapt their media and discourse usage, groups like Al-Shabaab will always be one cyber-step ahead.