In this article we present various issues that underline public procurement, critically evaluate some of the procurement practices and discuss the role of the regulator.1 The objective of the study is to bring forth various issues that dominate public procurement, identify the challenges and suggest framework to address them. We lay particular emphasis on public procurement regarding IT and ITES. We evaluate the literature on public procurement as well as evaluate various procurement practises that are practised globally.
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