China's Foreign Policy: Opening to the West

1 Beijing Review, 30 April 1969, p. 18; SCMP 4511, p. 5; Jen-Min Jih-Pao, 25 September 1969.

2 Beijing Review, 30 April 1969, pp. 36, 39.

3 M. Gayn claims that Zhou Enlai informed visitors that Lin's group forced a 'reluctant Mao to name Lin his successor in 1969. See M. Gayn, “Who After Mao”, Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 51, no. 2, 1973, pp. 154–155.

4 The open confrontation between Lin Biao and his group and Mao took place at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee at Lushan at the end of August and beginning of September 1970. At this conference the Lin group made the main point about the creation of State Chairman. This position had not existed nor been replaced by a collective leadership. But Lin wanted to reintroduce it for his own. They (Lin group) figure that the position of head of the state Mao would refuse and that Lin would then be given the position of State Chairmanship. This manoeuvre failed. Mao took three measures to undermine Lin group: 1) started ideological campaign which marked the break of Chen Bo-da; 2) An emphasis was placed on dialectical materialism to oppose idealism and Metaphysics. Mao called it “throwing stones;” 3) Military reshaped in Mao's words, “Earth which is too hard is closed off to the air; if it is mixed with sand the air can enter it. The military commission needed the addition of several new elements,” 3) To undermine the foundations of the wall by reorganizing the Beijing military region. See, Jean Chesneaux, China: The Peoples Republic, 1949–76. Great Britain, 1979), pp. 154–155.

5 It is a facet of Mao's theory of Continuous Revolution.

6 Bill Brugger, Contemporary China (London, 1977), p. 350.

7 For details see Jurgen Domes, China After the Cultural Revolution: Politics Between Two Party Congresses (London, 1975); and A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era (Washington D.C., 1974).

8 People's Daily, (Beijing) 2 October 1969.

9 Domes, n. 6, p. 61.

10 Jurgen Domes, Internal Politics of China (London, 1973), pp. 154–155.

11 See Domes, n. 6, p. 65.

12 People's Daily, 11 September 1969; China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 781, 16 November 1969, p. 49.

13 See Domes, n. 6, p. 73.

14 Ibid.

15 See in detail “Why China Turned West” in Miliband R. Saville J. , Socialist Register (The Merlin Press, London, 1968), p. 291. pp. 154–155. Also see, Keesing's Publications Ltd., Wiltshire, 1970), p. 106.

16 The concept of 'two camps' has been elaborately dealt with by Liu Shaoqi in November 1948. See Internationalism and Nationalism (Beijing, 1951), pp. 154–155. Also see China Digest (Hong Kong), Vol. 5, 14 December 1948, pp. 154–155.

17 The theme dealt with by Liu Shaoqi in 1948 was also dealt with by Mao Tsetung. See “On the People's Democratic Dictatorship”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. 4 (Beijing, 1961), p. 415.

18 Barnett, n. 6, p. 247. In 1964 Mao emphasised this point against U.S. imperialism. See Beijing Review, 24 January 1964, pp. 154–155.

19 Barnett, n. 6, p. 247.

20 Ibid, p. 248. For details see V.P. Dutt, China's Foreign Policy (Bombay, 1964); Harold C. Hinton, China's World: The Foreign Policy of a Developing State (Columbia, University Press 1971).

21 Roderick MacFarquhar , (Ed.), China and the Great Powers (New York, 1977), p. 50.

22 Barnett, n. 6, p. 249.

23 Ibid., p. 250.

24 For details see A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, n. 19.

25 Barnett, n. 6, p, 251.

26 For a detailed discussion on the evaluation of the foreign policy-making in China, sec Donald W. Klien , “The Management of Foreign Affairs in Communist China”, in John M.H. Lindbeck , (Ed.), China: Management of Revolutionary Society (Washington, D.C., 1971).

27 Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 841, p. 2.

28 For the Joint Communique on the Agreement of 6 April 1954, see SCMP, 786, p. 359.

29 Barnett, n. 6, p. 255.

30 For a detailed account of the events in this year, see Gargi Dutt Dutt V.P. , China's Cultural Revolution, New Delhi, 1970). Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (London, 1974), pp. 154–155. Domes, n. 6, 30 p. 205.

31 See Donald S. Zagoria , The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1951–1961 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 154–155.

32 Domes, n. 6, p. 205.

33 Ibid., p. 206.

34 Zagoria, n. 31, pp. 154–155.

35 For details see, Khrushchey's Secret Speech as released by the U.S. Department of State on 4 June 1956, in Strobe Talbott, and Andre Deutch, n. 14, Appendix 4, pp. 154–155.

36 See Ibid., pp. 154–155.

37 Sec, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 9–16 December 1961, p. 18474 and 6–13 January 1962, p. 18528.

38 For Cuban Crisis, see Ibid., 3–10 and 17–24 November 1962, pp. 19057, 19089, 19093.

39 Domes, n. 6, p. 207.

40 For the background see Gargi Dutt , “China and India: An Uncertain Relation”, in Dutt V.P. , (Ed.), China: The Post-Mao View (New Delhi, 1981), pp. 154–155.

41 Regarding these views see articles published in People's Daily and Red Flag between 6 September 1963 and 10 February 1964.

42 Pravda (Moscow), 17 October 1964. The Tass News Agency, 15 October 1964. For details see Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), 7–14 November 1964, p. 20389.

43 On 16 October 1964 China exploded its first nuclear bomb and had proved its capacity as well as intention to acquire nuclear weapons systems. See Beijing Review, 23 October 1964, pp. 154–155.

44 Ibid., 13 November 1964, p. 6.

45 It was obvious after Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing that nothing had been achieved in the talks at Moscow. Contrary to expectation, Sino-Soviet relations did not improve even after Khrushchev's exit.

46 Harold C. Hinton , The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future (New York, 1976), pp. 154–155.

47 For a useful discussion on the Chinese and Soviet views on war, see John Yin, Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problems of War (Hague, 1971).

48 Barnett, n. 6, p. 260.

49 Domes, n. 6, p. 209.

50 In March 1966 Sukarno was forced to turn over the power to General Suharto. Sukarno was kept under house arrest until his death in 1970.

51 Lin Piao, “Long Live the Victory of People's War”, Beijing Review, 3 September 1965, pp. 154–155.

52 Ibid. Also see Yin, n. 47, p. 153.

53 Doak Barnett A. , China After Mao (Princeton, 1969), p. 247.

54 Domes, n. 6, p. 212.

55 “Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on United Action”, Beijing Review, 12 November 1965, p. 24.

56 Foreign Minister Chen Yi died in January 1972.

57 Beijing Review, 11 October 1968, p. 9.

58 NCNA, 3 March 1969. Also see, Beijing Review, 21 March 1969, p. 9.

59 This doctrine was a theory of limited sovereignty of 'Socialist' states, and the fraternal responsibility of other states to intervene in case of direct threat to the governing Communist Party. See Sergei Kouvalov's article on Brezhnev Doctrine in Pravda, 26 September 1968. Translation reprinted in Problems of Communism, Vol. XVII, no. 6, November-December 1968, p. 25.

60 NCNA, 25 March 1969; SCMP, 4387, pp. 154–155. Also see Beijing Review, 25 April 1969, p. 3.

61 Beijing Review, 30 April 1969, pp. 154–155.

62 NCNA, 4 April 1969; SCMP, 4393, p. 12.

63 Lin Piao , Political Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Peking, 1969); Beijing Review, 30 April 1969, pp. 154–155.

64 Ibid.

65 NCNA, 26 November 1968.

66 Joseph Y.S. Cheng , “An Interpretation of China's Foreign Policy—The Post Cultural Revolution Phase”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (Nottingham), Vol. 6, no. 2, 1976, p. 148.

67 Ibid., p. 149.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid, p. 151. For Roger's statement see New York Times, 8–9 August 1969.

70 Ibid., p. 153.

Lin Biao , “Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, in p. 19.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., p. 21.

74 Bill Brugger, n. 5, p. 363.

75 Ibid., p. 364.

76 The China Quarterly, No. 38, 1969, pp. 28–29.