The geographical distribution of the 101 participants (observers (10), and guests (12) excluded) at the Harare Conference was as follows: Africa 51, Asia 29, Latin America 18, and Europe 3. The African participants included all the member countries of the OAU. The three European participants were, Cyprus, Malta and Yngoslavia.
2.
See MohamedBala, Africa and Non-Alignment Kano, 1978), pp. 20–21.
3.
Quoted in RivkinArnold, The African Presence in World Affairs (Glencoe, 1953) p. 196.
4.
See LefevreErnest, Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism and Non-Alignment, (Ed.): Lawrence Markin (New York, 1962) p. 95.
5.
For details see MathewsK., “A Polemical Note on the Growth and Decline of Pan Africanism,”Nigerian Journal of International Studies (Lagos), Vol. 5–7, 1981–83, pp. 45–61.
6.
For text see LegumColin, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York, 1962), pp. 137–38.
7.
The following six African countries attended the Bandung Conference: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Libya and Ghana. For details see, RomuloCarlos P., The Meaning of Bandung (University of North Carolina Press, 1956); G.M. Kahin, The Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956).
8.
See Keesings Contemporary Archives 7–14 May 1955, pp. 14183–4.
9.
The following are the ten principles of international relations enunciated at the 1955 Bandung Conference:.
10.
Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the United Nations;.
11.
Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;.
12.
Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small;.
13.
Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;.
14.
Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;.
15.
(a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers;.
16.
Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries;.
17.
Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the ***territorial integrity or political independence of any country;.
18.
Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties’ own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;.
19.
Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation;.
20.
Respect for justice and international obligations.
21.
Quoied in JouveEdmond, L'Organisation de l'Unite Africaine, (Paris, 1984) p. 247 (Translated from French).
22.
Ibid.
23.
See AjalaA., “The Organization of African Unity and Non-Alignment”Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 7, 1981, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 107.
24.
Ibid.
25.
See OAU, FM/Res. 12(***11).
26.
See Africa Research Bulletin (London), Vol. I, No. 10, 1–31 October 1964.
27.
See Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XV, November 1964), p. 16.
28.
TelliDiallo, “The Organization of African Unity in Historical Perspective,”African Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1965, p. 23.
29.
See ThompsonScott W., Non-Alignment in the Third World: Record of Ghana, Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. II, 1968, p. 1235.
30.
Quoted in A. Ajala, n. 12, p. 109.
31.
The African Liberation Movements represented at Lusaka included ANC of South Africa; ZAPU of Zimbabwe; SWAPO of Namibia; FRELIMO of Mozambique; MPLA of Angola and PAIGG of Guinea.
32.
See Africa Research Bulletin, 1–31 November 1970, p. 1879.
33.
For details see, AjalaA., n. 12, p. 110.
34.
For details of the 6th Non-Aligned Summit in Havana see. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XXX, no. 702, 1983 (Special Issue).
35.
For details of the 7th Non-aligned Summit in New Delhi see, Review of International AffairsVol. XXXIV, no. 792, 5 April 1983 (Special Issue).
36.
The Harare Summit produced a Political Declaration which ran into 112 pages and an Economic Declaration running over 85 pages in addition to a Special Declaration on South Africa taking up 15 pages. For details and text of declarations see, Review of International Affairs No. 895, 20 September 1986.
37.
See GuptaAnirudha, “Non-Aligned Africa and the External Powers,”The Non-Aligned World (New Delhi), Vol. 1, no. 2, 1983 pp. 178–189.
38.
See GoldsboroughJ.O., “Dateline Paris: Africa's Policeman,”Foreign Policy. (Washington D.C.) No. 33, Winter 1978–79, pp. 174–90.
39.
For details see GavshonArthur, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West. (London, 1982), pp. 258–85.
40.
See HaveenH.WilletsP., “The Practice of Non-Alignment: On the Present and Future of an International Movement,” in TandonY.A.ChanderanaD. (Eds.) Horizon's of African Diplomacy (Nairobi, 1974) p. 28.
41.
GuptaAnirudha, n. 26, p. 182.
42.
See West Africa No. 3586, 26 May 1986, p. 1105.
43.
See AnglinDouglas, “Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment,”Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), Vol. 2, No. 2, 1964.
44.
See MazruiAli, Towards Pax-Africana (London, 1967) p. 173.
45.
See AkeClaude, “Non-Alignment in the Contemporary World: An African-Perspective,”AAPS Newsletter, July-September 1986, pp. 8–9.
46.
See ArnoldHugh, “Africa and a New International Economic Order,”Third World Quarterly (London), Vol. II, No. 2, 1980, pp. 295–304.