In September 1982 the Social and Free Democratic coalition1 collapsed
after thirteen years' rule; the conservative Union parties coalesced with the Free
Democrats to return to power in Bonn. Two months later Brezhnev died in Moscow amidst
an ongoing new Cold War with the Reagan Administration. His successor, as the Chief
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), turned out to be the former KGB
chief, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov. With time running out for NATO's deployment of
new missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and other West European states,
and a significant conservative victory in the United Kingdom elections in June 1983,
elements of uncertainty in the crucial relations between Bonn and Moscow may have
increased. Between 1969 and 1982 the (SPD) had managed to reverse the (CDU's) twenty
years of hardline approach to the Soviet bloc. Despite irritations, Bonn under
SPD-led governments managed to keep its ostpolitik on an even keel. Central European
detente seemed to have survived the collapse of the larger, superpower rapprochement.
The critical question in mid-1983, following the conservative election victories in
Bonn and London and against the background of significant US-USSR rivalry, is whether
the latter rivalry would also suck into its vortex relative peace in Central Europe.
Should that happen, the Cold War would return to Europe, reinforce the anomalies
emanating from a divided Germany as well as the superpower adversary relationship in
turn. In this context the present article will, first, take a retrospective look at
ostpolitik, its causes and achievements, then explore Bonn's relations with Moscow as
they evolved while the SPD was in power and, finally analyze the implications of the
leadership changes in Bonn and Moscow for the future of ostpolitik.
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References
1.
1 The FRG's major
political parties are: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); its Bavarian wing,
the Christian Social Union (CSU); The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD);
The Free Democratic Party (FDP), and since March 1983, the Green
Party.
2.
2 Former Chancellor Kiesinger repeated in December 1966 Bonn's
earlier offers of 2 September 1956 and 25 March 1966 to sign a
renunciation-of-force treaty with Moscow and other East European states. Boris
Meissner, “Westdeutsche Ostpolitik: die
deutsch-Sowjetischen Beziehungen,” in Hans-PeterSchwarz (Ed.), Handbuch der deutschen Aussenpolitik
(Munich, 1975), p.
289.
3.
3 WillyBrandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975 (translated from
the German), (Boston, 1976),
p. 151.
4.
4 Ibid., pp. 151,
153.
5.
5 Ibid., p. 172;
Franz Schneider, Grosse Koalition, Ende oder Neubeginn? (Munich, 1969), p.
111.
6.
6 Willy
Brandt, n. 3, p. 169.
7.
7 Ibid.,
pp. 171–173.
8.
8 The
National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) under Adolf von Thadden had attracted
widespread attention in the late 1960's. The present author attended an NPD rally
in Upper Bavaria in the fall of 1968 and was impressed by the fiery, nationalistic
speeches made there as well as by the decor and the atmosphere suggestive of an
earlier Adolf's tactics. The Soviet hardline in the 1960'swas not least due to the rise of the NPD as well as the desire of the CDU-led
government preceding the Grand Coalition to participate in the much discussed
multilateral nuclear force.
9.
9 UN Charter
Articles 53 and 107. Ambassador Tsarapkin gave the Bonn Government a Soviet letter
in June 1968 reviving these articles. Willy Brandt, n.3, p.
190.
10.
10 WillyBrandt, Ibid., p. 194.
11.
11
Skirmishes of 2 and 15 March 1969 on the Ussuri came to public
attention. However, a total of over 400 skirmishes reportedly took place along the
Sino-Soviet border that year. Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
China-US Policy Since 1945 (Washington, DC, 1980),
p. 184.
12.
12 Willy
Brandt, n. 3, p. 194.
13.
13 GuentherSchmidt, Entscheidung in Bonn. Die Entstehung der Ost-und Deutschland
Politic 1969–1970 (2nd Edition)
(Cologne, 1980). p.
17.
14.
14 Willy
Brandt, n. 3, p. 194.
15.
15 Guenther
Schmidt, n. 13, pp. 20–21.
16.
16 Ibid.,
p. 21.
17.
17 Ibid.,
p. 22.
18.
18 Willy
Brandt, n. 3, p. 168.
19.
19 Ibid.,
p. 169.
20.
20 LawrenceL. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic
and the Warsaw Pact Countries (London,
1971), p. 133.
21.
21 See JyotirmoyBanerjee, GDR and Detente: Divided Germany and East-West Relations—An
Outsider's Perspective (Bonn, 1981), 1981hapter I, pp.
3–16.
22.
22 KonradAdenauer, Erinnerungen—1953–1955 (Stuttgart,
1980) (3rd. Edition), pp.
527–8. Adenauer visited Moscow during 9–13
September 1955. He says, he thought to himself after hearing Khrushchev's plea on
10 September—“Dear friend, you will be quite happy some day if you don't have to
maintain any more troops in the West.” p. 528. (Present
author's translation).
23.
23 HenryKissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), pp. 410–412. Kissinger
also recalls British and French worries about ostpolitik in his Years of Upheaval,
excerpted in Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 22 February 1982, p.
181.
24.
24 Willy
Brandt, n. 3, p. 284.
25.
25 The “bridge
building” concept of the Johnson Administration was propagated, ironically, by
Brzezinski, who later turned sceptical to Bonn's ostpolitik. Josef Joffe, “Die
Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Zeitalter der Entspannung,” Europa
Archiv (Bonn), 23, 10 December 1979, pp. 719, 722. More on US suspicinos in
Guenther Schmidt, n. 13, p. 24. Such suspicion was not least perhaps due to the
SPD's historic links with Communism. On this see Hilmar Toppe, Der Kommunismus in
Deutschland (Munich, 1961), 1961nd Karl C. Thalheim, “Die Sowjetische
Besatzungszone Deutschlands,” in Ernst Birke and Rudolf Neumann (Eds.), Die
Sowjetisierung Ost-Mitteleuropas, Part I, (Frankfurt/M., 1959), pp. 333–371.
Brandt's resignation in mid-1974 on the issue of the uncovering of his aide
Guenter Guillaume as a GDR spy was partly due to his sensitivity to allegations of
the SPD's tilt towards the Soviet bloc. Guillaume had come to the FRG in 1956
disguised as a refugee; in fact he was an agent of the GDR's Ministry of State
Security (MSS or Stasi), belonging probably to its espionage wing called the Main
Administration Intelligence (HVA), with the rank of an army officer. His mission
was to penetrate the SPD, which he did. Details in Weltgeschehen (Munich), 11/74,
April-June 1974, pp. 248–259. On Stasi see Peter Christian Ludz et al., DDR
Handbuch (2nd Edition), Ministry of Intra German Relations (Cologne; 1979), pp.
736–738. It should be noted that Brandt had earlier been prominently anti-Soviet
as West Berlin's Mayor.
26.
26 Treaty
texts in Documentation Relating to the Federal Government's Policy of
Detente, Federal Press and Information Office, Bonn,
1974, pp. 13–16,
24–26, 36–38 and
71–75.
27.
27 Gromyko
is said to have made the distinction on 29 July 1970. However, a certain amount of
confusion between the concepts exists in their usage in Russian. Gerd Ruge and
Heinz Geyer, Deutschland und die Sowjetunion
(Bonn, 1972), pp. 77,
85–98.
28.
28 Treaty text in
Documentation Relating to the Federal Government's Policy of Detente, n.
26, pp. 95–105.
29.
29 Zahlenspiegel,
Ministry for Intra-German Relations, Bonn, 1978, p. 97. The figure for 1979 was
7.4 million but in 1981 it fell to 5 million. Former Intra-German Minister Egon
Franke's Speech of 11 June 1982, Bulletin, Federal Press and Information Office,
Bonn, 61, 17 June 1982, p. 531. (All Bulletin references are to the original
German editions unless otherwise specified).
30.
30 JyotirmoyBanerjee, “Ostpolitik under Stress,”
Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 14 May 1982, p.
6.
31.
31 German News
FRG Embassy, New Delhi, Vol.
XV, no. 10, 1 June 1973, p.
16.
32.
32 “Deutscher Osthandel hat sich belebt,” 27 May
1983, p. 1. However, a late 1982 report
suggested that the USSR had fallen from 10th to 12th place among Bonn's trace
partners. Die Deutsche Welle
(German Radio), 16 October
1982.
33.
33 BrezhnevL., “Posetitelyam torgovo-promyshlennoi vystavki SSSR vs
FRG,” Pravda (Moscow), 9 October
1982, p. 1.
34.
34 Die
Deutsche Welle, 3 July 1982; Voice of America. 10 September 1982;
Helmut Schmidt noted the cuts in the ethnic German emigration and telephones in his
speech of 9 September 1982, Bulletin,
83, 11 September 1982, p. 744; New
York Times, 17 September 1982, p. 5.
35.
35 Radio Moscow
(German Service), 20 August 1982, featured military commentator Valentine
Sakharov’ commentary on that theme.
36.
36 Ibid. (German
Service), 30 August 1982.
37.
37 Deutsche Welle
Monitor, 3 December 1981, p. 1, quoting Radio Moscow (German) broadcast of 2
December 1981; the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn conveyed Moscow's protests against
the broadcasts of these radio stations. Die Deutsche Welle, 30
August 1982.
38.
38 KarenKaragezyan, “The Transatlantic Pied Piper,”
New Times (Moscow), 17, April 1982, p.
23. A recent report suggested that a sub-committee of the US House
of Representatives had granted $9.67 million to the Pentagon to train 93,000
Bundeswehr (FRG's Armed Forces) reservists for logistical backing of US troops in the
FRG in a crisis. Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt), 6 May 1983, p.
1.
39.
39
Brezhnev's Report of 23 February 1981 to the 26th. CPSU
Congress, Information Bulletin (Prague),
Vol. 19, no 7, 1981, pp.
28–29; Radio Moscow (Bengali Service), 9 December
1982, reported the presence of FRG naval units in the Indian Ocean. Reports from FRG
sources in Bulletin, 41, 11 May 1982, p. 338; 58, 15 June 1982, p. 496; Defence
Minister Manfred Woerner's denial, Wolfram von Raven, “Wegweiser fuer die NATO,”
Allgemeine Juedische Wochenzeitung (Dusseldorf), 10 December 1982, p.
3.
40.
40 The
immediate cause for Honecker's postponement of the summit was the storm raised in
Bonn over the deaths on 10 and 26 April 1983 of two West Germans at GDR
checkpoints of Drewitz and Wartha on West Berlin's transit. CSU chief Strauss
called it “murder”. BBC, 16 June 1983; VOA, 27 April 1983;
“Rad ab” Der Spiegel, 18, 2 May
1983, pp. 30–31.
41.
41
Brezhnev's Report to the 26th. CPSU Congress,
Information Bulletin, n. 39, p.
32.
42.
42 B/E.
pp. 27–28.
43.
43 Interview of Vasily Dinkov, Soviet Minister of the Gas
Industry, “West Siberia's Gas,”
New Times, 19 May 1982, pp.
18–21.
44.
44
Versailles Economic Summit (4–6 June 1982)
Declaration, Bulletin, 58,
15 June 1982, pp.
493–496.
45.
45 Congressional Quarterly Inc., The Soviet
Union (Washington, 1982), p.
182.
46.
46 In May
1982, unemployment in the FRG was already 1.8 million.
Bulletin, 53, 4 June 1982, p.
457.
47.
47 German
News, Vol. XXIV, no. 1, 21 January 1982, p.
7.
48.
48
Bulletin, 65, 25 June 1982, p.
563.
49.
49 The
turbines were produced under license from the General Electric Co. of the United
States. On 28 September 1982, Washington threatened counter measures against FRG
firms defying the ban. BBC, 29 September 1982; Die
Deutsche Welle, 29 September 1982.
50.
50 Radio
Moscow, 14 August 1982; 25 August 1982. The latter
commentary noted that of the 4,500 km. export pipeline, pipes totalling 3,000 kms.
had already been exported to the USSR.
51.
51 Die Deutsche
Welle, 23 August 1982, reported that the Frankfurt/M-based human rights
organization had provided documentation on the use of political prisoners to build
the Soviet gas pipeline. VOA, 25 September 1982, reported that Defence Secretary
Weinberger had made a similar allegation and that the State Department had called
for an international inspection. Radio Moscow (German Service), 25 September 1982,
criticized that organization and the conservative Springer publisher in the FRG
for “insulting highly qualified Soviet technicians” in this
way.
52.
52 VOA Editorial,
“Reflecting the Views of the United States Government,” 24 June
1982.
53.
53 VOA
Editorial, 5 August 1982.
54.
54 West
German views articulated by State Minister in the Foreign Office—Peter Corterier's
Speech in Bremen on 8 September 1982. Bulletin, 84, 14 September 1982, pp.
770–771, and Hanns W. Maull, Erdgas und Wirtschaftliche
Sicherheit (Bonn, 1981) pp.
39–42. Maull says Moscow did at times cut off
supplies in the past, e.g., to Yugoslavia, China, Finland and the United States, p.
42.
55.
55 LotherRuehl, “Der Beschluss der NATO zur Einfuehrung nuklearer
Mittelstrecken-waffen,” Europa Archiv,
4, 25 February 1980, pp.
101–2.
56.
56 Bundeswehr
1955–1980, Defence Ministry, Bonn, 1980, p.
43.
57.
57 Bonn Defence
Ministry's Statement of 24 May 1977, Abruestung und Ruestungskontrolle,
Auswaertiges Amt, Bonn, 1978, p.
114.
58.
58 Schmidt's Speech
on 28 October 1977, Ibid., p. 125.
59.
59 Lother
Ruehl, n. 55, p. 102.
60.
60
Genscher's Speech, 19 January 1978, Abruestung and
Ruestungskontrolle n. 57, p. 131, reflects his satisfaction at US assurance. On 8
January 1983, President Reagan declared that “close consultations with our allies”
was a “cornerstone” of US relations with Moscow.
Department of State Bulletin,
Washington, Vol. 83, no. 2071,
February 1983, p. 2.
61.
61 The
Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1979,
Bonn, 1979, pp.
75–76.
62.
62 Ibid., pp.
125–126, 128.
63.
63 Bundeswehr
1955–1980, n. 56, p. 46.
64.
64 Former
Bonn Government spokesman Kurt Becker's statement of 16 March1982, Bulletin, 26, 20 March
1982, p. 263.
65.
65 VOA, 6 July
1982, quoted Bonn Government spokesman Lothar Ruehl on the continued SS-20 buildup
despite Brezhnev's assurance to the contrary. VOA 13 July 1982, announced Soviet
Defence Minister Ustinov's denial of the buildup. VOA 16 July 1982, quoted unnamed
FRG newspaper to say that the Soviets were setting up from early 1982 the accurate
and shorter-range SS-21 missiles on GDR territory and that over 21 launching pads
existed. Die Deutsche Welle, 10 September 1982, reported 3 new SS-20 launching
pads and two more under construction. VOA, 10 May 1983, reported a total of 351
SS-20s, of which 243 were targeted against West Europe, and said that the buildup
continued.
66.
66 LotharRuehl's “Der Beschluss der Nato Zur Einfuchring nuklearer
Mittelstrecken-waffen” n. 55, p. 109.
67.
67
Osteuropa (West Berlin), 5
May 1980, p. 450.
68.
68 Neue Zuericher
Zeitung (Zurich), 10 October 1979; Neues Deutschland, (East Berlin),
8 October 1979.
69.
69 Gromyko's
one-hour Press Conference, 23 November 1979 in Bonn, fully televised, was
witnessed by the present author. Text in Osteuropa, 3 March 1980, pp. A136–139.
Gromyko repeated his warning.
70.
70 Ibid., p. A139.
The Warsaw Pact Communique repeated Gromyko's earlier warning in
Bonn.
71.
71 Gerhard
Wetting, “Die Mittelstreckenproblematik aus Sowjetischer Sicht,”
Ibid. p. 199.
72.
72 helmut
Schmidt's Speech, Bulletin, no. 33, 8 April
1982 p. 274. Richard Burt, US Assistant State Secretary,
confirmed this independently. Interview in Der Spiegel. 18, 2 May 1983,
pp. 146–149.
73.
73 HelmutSchmidt, Ibid.
74.
74 VladlenKuznetsov, The Soviet Union Proposes
(Moscow, 1981), pp.
53–54.
75.
75
Brezhnev's Report to the 26th. CPSU Congress,
Information Bulletin, n. 39, p.
39.
76.
76 This followed
Brandt's consultations on 2 July 1981 on the nuclear balance in Europe with
Brezhnev in Moscow at the latter's invitation, B/E, n. 42, p.
27.
77.
77 Ibid.,
p. 27.
78.
78 Andrei
Gromyko, Safeguarding Peace is the Main Task
(Moscow, 1981), p.
19.
79.
79 Brezhnev met
with trade union leader Oskar Vetter and the Chief Minister of North
Rhine-Westfalen, Johannes Rau, respectively.
80.
80 Bonn
had first proposed zero option. Helmut Schmidt,
Bulletin, 33, April 1982, p.
274; 1981, p. 5.
81.
81 Text in To
Promote Peace and Good-Neighbour Relations. On the Visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the
Federal Republic of Germany’. 22–25 November 1981 (Moscow, 1981), pp. 17–19,
Brezhnev added that Moscow was ready to cut nuclear arms, including United States'
FBS and Franco-British missiles, by the 100's p. 50. Also The Statesman,
25 November 1981, p. 5.
82.
82 B/E. n.
42, p. 3.
83.
83 Ibid.,
p. 6.
84.
84 Treffen des
Generalsekretaers des Zk der SED und Vrsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich
Honecker mit dem Bundeskanzler der BRD, Helmut Schmidt, in der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik, 11–13 December 1981 (DDR, East Berlin), pp.
47–62.
85.
85 German
News, Vol. XXIV, no. 1, 21 January 1982, p.
3.
86.
86
Ibid., Vol. XXIV, no. 2, 18 February
1982, p. 7.
87.
87 The
Statesman, 4,5 and 6 February 1982, pp. 1,5 and 6, respectively. On 9 February
1982 Brezhnev suggested that INF levels on both sides be cut down to about 300
units each. The Soviet Union Proposes. n. 74, p.
182.
88.
88 The
Statesman, 4 March 1982, p.
10.
89.
89 Ibid.,
17 March 1982, p. 1.
90.
90 Kurt Becker's
Statement, n. 64.
91.
91 Helmut Schmidt's
Speech, n. 72, p. 274.
92.
92
Bulletin, 39, 7 May 1982, pp.
318–319.
93.
93
Ibid., 58, 15 June 1982, p.
497.
94.
94 German Democratic
Republic Backgrounder, GDR Embassy,
New Delhi, 15 June 1982, p.
8.
95.
95
Bulletin, 66, 30 June 1982, p.
581.
96.
96 Foreign
Affairs Bulletin, GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs East
BerlinVol. 22, no. 22, 5 August 1982, p.
172.
97.
97 Ustinov's
views, Radio Station Peace and Progress, Moscow, 19 August 1982, Bahr's Moscow
visit, die Deutsche Welle, (English Service),
23 August 1982.
98.
98 Analysis in Adolf Michaelies,
“Regierungswechsel Und Aussenpolitik,”
Allgemeine Juedische Wochenzeitung, 8 October 1982,
p. 1.
99.
99 On the government change in Bonn in the Fall of 1982 and the
elections, see David Binder, “West Germany's Coalition
Broke Much New Ground” and “Third Party Holds the Balance in Hamburg Politics,”
New York Times, 1982, p. 5;
JamesM. Markham, “Schmidt's Foes Eager to Take Over,” 19 September 1982, p.
3, and “Age and Arithmetic Overtake Bonn's Coalition,” Ibid., Section 4,
p. 1; New York Times, 2 October 1982, pp. 1. 4; Bulletin, 90, 5 October 1982, pp.
823–826; No. 129, 16 December 1982, pp. 1158–1167; No. 131, 20 December 1982, pp.
1177–1179; No 3, 10 January 1983, p. 17; “Parteien ruesten fuer Neuwahler,”
DaD-Brief, 3 December 1982, 8116; 17 December 1982, 8141; 11 March 1983, 8272/1; “SPD
Signalisiert Konstruktive Opposition,” Ibid., 31 March
1983.
100.
100 See Kohl's reply to Henry Kissinger,
Bulletin, 113, 19 November 1982, p.
1036. President Carstens dissolved the Bundestag on 7 January 1983.
The FRG's election laws require a minimum score of 5 per cent votes for a party to
enter the legislature.
101.
101 VOA,
13 November 1982.
102.
102
“Kohl-Reagan Talks Joint Communique,” 16
November 1982. Bulletin, 113, 19 November 1982, pp. 1029,
1031.
103.
103 The
Christian Science Monitor, (Midwestern Edition), 18 April 1983, p. 5; Die Deutsche
Welle, 23 May 1983. A few days before Kohl's US visit, Reagan asked the Congress
to extend the Export Administration Act due to lapse in September and tighten law
on technology exports to the USSR. “Wo er mag,” Der
Spiegel, 16, 18 April 1983, pp.
29–30.
104.
104 Die Deutsche
Welle, 16 May 1983.
105.
105 See also analysis in Howard Reason,
“Bonn-Moscow Talks: How Strong Ostpolitik’?”
The Christian Science Monitor, 6 May 1983, p.
8.
106.
106 BBC, 7 October
1982; Bulletin, October 1982, p.
1.
107.
107 Congress
restored the funds following a third and successful Pershing II test by the US
Army. VOA, 20 November 1982. Woerner preceded Kohl to the
United States.
108.
108 Bulletin, 1, 3
January 1983, p.1.
109.
109 Ibid.,
p. 121, 2 December 1982, p.
1095.
110.
110 Andropov's Speech, Soviet
Review, USSR Embassy New DelhiVo. XIX, no. 56, 30 December 1982, p.
18; BBC, 21 December 1982, Subsequently Andropov mentioned the
aircraft levels. Der Spiegel interview of 19 April 1983, reprinted in New Times
(Moscow), 18 May 1983, 5.
111.
111 New York
Times, 22 December 1982, p.
1.
112.
112 Whence the
Threat to Peace, Military Publishing House, USSR Ministry of Defence,
Moscow, 1982, p. 65.
113.
113 VOA,
28 January 1983.
114.
114 Gromyko's
Speeches, 17 and 18 January 1983, Europa Archiv, 5, 10 March 1983, D 138,
D140.
115.
115 Reagan had
already got Bonn's “flexibility” message and said as much on 22 February 1982,
VOA, 23 February 1983.
116.
116 Die Deutsche
Welle, 25 February 1983; VOA, 25 February
1983.
117.
117 Analysis in
Dieter Schroeder, “Von den deutschen Interessen,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich),
26/27 February1983, p. 4.
118.
118 Ibid.,
p. 1.
119.
119 Die Deutsche
Welle, 27 February 1983.
120.
120 Die
Deutsche Welle, 10 March 1983. Interestingly, former chief of the 12th Panzer
Division of the Bundeswehr, Major Gert Bastian, who had retired at the turn of the
1980's in protest against NATO's missile plans, joined the Greens and became a
member of the Bundestag Defence Committee. Deutsche
Welle, 24 April 1983. V. Pavlov, “A General Rebels,” New
Times 17 April, 1983, pp.
20–21.
121.
121 VOA, 13 March
1983, quoting that day's Washington Post.
122.
122 Radio
Australia, 15 March 1983.
123.
123 VOA,
17 March 1983.
124.
124 Ibid., 19 March
1983.
125.
125 Text
of the Pravda interview, Soviet Review,
Vol. XX, nos. 5, 7, April 1983, p.
3. VOA 23 February 1983, quoted Bonn spokesman Dieter Stolze's
article of the day before. It alleged that the USSR was building two new SS-20 launch
sites which would bring the total number of SS-20s to 351. “Andropov's Kidney and
Heart Ailments,” The Telegraph (London), 27 March 1983, p. 3 The same news item
reported that among the four Soviet Army Generals who received the rank of Marshal,
the highest military rank, was Mrhuladimir Tolubko, 57, who headed the Soviet
Strategic Rocket Forces, including the SS-20s.
126.
126 “White
House Fact Sheet on INF Proposal: Text,” Background
Information and “President Reagan's Statement on Nuclear Proposal: Text,” Official
Text, American Center, Calcutta, 31 March 1983, pp. 1–3 and 1–4,
respectively.
127.
127 Helmut Kohl's
Government Statement of 4 May 1983, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 5 May 1983, p.
11; “Reagan-Vorschlage in Genf Ausloten,” DaD-Brief, 15 April 1983, 8332,
p. 1.
128.
128
“President Reagan's Address in Los Angeles: Text,”
(Speech delivered on 31 March 1983), Official Text, American Center,
Calcutta, 1 April 1983, p.
7.
129.
129
“Reagan-Vorschlage in Genf Ausloten,” n. 127, pp.
1–2. Date of the talks unspecified.
130.
130 VOA, 25 January
1983; VOA, 3 February 1983 reported State Secretary Shultz's talks on the SS-20 in
Beijing with the Chinese Foreign Minister in an unscheduled session. The “White
House Fact Sheet on INF Proposal” n. 126, mentions “discussions with other friends
(outside NATO. JB) including Japan,” p.
3.
131.
131
Gromyko's Press Conference of 2 April1983, Soviet Review, Vol. XX, no. 15,
7 April 1983, pp.
12–13.
132.
132 VOA, 6 April
1983; Die Deutsche Welle, 6 April 1983.
133.
133 VOA, Ibid;
Radio Moscow (German Service), 7 April
1983.
134.
134 VOA, for
instance, reported on 7 April 1983 that US Satellite Intelligence had detected a
3,040km. -range mobile Soviet Cruise Missile that outclassed US Cruises. Earlier,
in February 1981 at the 26th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had warned that Moscow would
develop the Cruise if NATO went ahead with its deployment plans. On 12 April 1983,
VOA reported that the US believed that the USSR had exploded a nuclear device of
over 150 KT, the SALT II ceiling. On 12 May 1983, it reported that Moscow was
developing two new ICBMs, the SALT II permitting only
one.
135.
135 VOA, 12 April
1983. The Japanese argued that the Soviet Missiles in Asia were mobile and, hence,
could be aimed at Japan.
136.
136 “Rad
ab,” Der Spiegel, 18, 2
May 1983, p. 30.
137.
137 “Wo er
Mag,” Der Spiegel, n. 103, p. 28.
Andropov, in an interview with Der Spiegel, confirmed that he expected Kohl to visit
Moscow. 19 April 1983, n. 110, p. 6.
138.
138 The Christian
Science Monitor, 18 April 1983, p.
5.
139.
139 VOA, 18 April
1983. Isakov, appeared on CBS TV.
140.
140 The
Christian Science Monitor, Andropov's Speech in Soviet
Review, Vol. XX, no. 20, 12 May 1983, pp.
2–5. US and Soviet counts of French warheads tally
but not those of the British warheads. The West says that the 64 British missiles
carry a total of 192 warheads; the Soviet figure, however, is 336. The Christian
Science Monitor, 6 May 1983, p. 6.
141.
141 Weinberger's
reaction, VOA, 4 May 1983; Ned Temko, “Andropov Arms Control Offer: More Politics
than Substance,” The Christian Science Monitor, 5 May 1983, pp. 1,
13.
142.
142 See CDU vs. CSU
controversy over ostpolitik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 May 1983,
p.1.
143.
143 Sueddeutsche
Zeitung, 5 May 1983, p.2.
144.
144 The Statesman,
31 May 1983, p. 1. The Williamsburg Statement was issued on 30 May 1983. On NATO
Foreign Ministers' meeting, Die Deutsche Welle, 9 June 1983. This was followed by
the NATO Defence Ministers' Brussels resolution reiterating the same. Die Deutsche
Welle, 1 June 1983.
145.
145 VOA,
30 May 1983. New Times, 22 May 1983 noted this on p. 15 and
called it “a deliberate attempt at blackmail.”.
146.
146 Andropov
postponed summit from 4 to 5 July. BBC, 4 and 5 July 1983;
VOA1983.
147.
147 Der
Spiegel, Vol. 16, 18 April 1983, pp.
35–38.
