Have words lost all their meaning and have men's minds lost all anchorage? For this surely is the way to madness, and the great men who control our destinies are dangerous self-centred lunatics, who are so full of their conceit and pride of power that they will rather rain death and destruction all over the world than give up their petty opinions and think and act aright.1
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References
1.
1 From an article, “The Death-Dealer,” National Herald (New Delhi), 2 April 1954, in GopalS. (Ed.) Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology (Delhi, 1980), p. 395.
2.
2 Expressed in a confidential note written at Wardha, 25 August 1940, entitled “Nonviolence and the State,” quoted in Ibid., p. 388.
3.
3 SisirGupta, “Ethos of the Non-Aligned,” Secular Democracy (New Delhi), August 1976, pp. 79–81.
4.
4 For a summary of disarmament efforts made by the Non-Aligned Movement see Cuijeto Job, “The Non-aligned and Disarmament,” Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XXVIII, 5 October 1977, pp. 7–8 and Mico Cusic, The Freedom, Independence and Integrity of the Non-Aligned Countries (Belgrade, 1979), pp. 23–29 and 39–44.
5.
5 Adopted on 3 June 1978. Final Document reproduced in Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. VI, nos. 1–2, April-May 1982, p. 107.
6.
6 Indira Gandhi's message conveyed in Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao's Statement to the United Nations General Assembly during Second Special Session on Disarmament. Text may be seen in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), Vol. XII, no. 12, December 1982.
7.
7 NikhilChakravarty, “Role of the Non-aligned,” World Focus (New Delhi), no. 28, April 1982, p. 28.
8.
8 Report of the Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons made to the United Nations (hereafter “UN Study on Nuclear Weapons”) published in Strategic Digest, Vol. X, nos. 11–12, November-December 1980, Table I.
9.
9 Ibid., paras162–170.
10.
10 The Effects of Nuclear War (Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Washington1979), pp. 3, 10–11.
11.
11 RogerParkinson, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York, 1970), pp. 315–319.
12.
12 McGeorgeBundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs (New York), October 1969, pp. 9–10.
13.
13 AndreBeaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York, 1974), p. 8.
14.
14 ColinS. Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon,” in HeadR.G.RokheE. J. (Eds.), American Defence Policy (Baltimore, 1975), pp. 126–149, may be seen for an analysis.
15.
15 “UN Study on Nuclear Weapons,” n.8, Table 2 and para 9.
16.
16 “US Nuclear Weapon Accident,” The Defence Monitor (Washington), Vol. X, no. 5.
17.
17 See Vice-Admiral G.E. Miller (retd.), “Existing Systems of Command and Control” in FranklynGriffithsJohnC. Polanyi (Eds.), The Dangers of Nuclear War (Toronto, 1979), 1979or a resume of available information on this highly classified subject.
18.
18 Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, 1977), p. 102.
19.
19 GeorgeKennan, “The Only Way Out of Nuclear Nightmare”, reproduced in Mainstream, (New Delhi), Vol. XIX, no. 40, 6 June 1981, p. 32.
20.
20 For a perceptive account of such influences on the Mitterand Government, see Schofield Coryell “Shift on N-arms,” reproduced in MainstreamVol. XXI, no. 14, 4 December 1982.
21.
21 In an interview to Jonathan Power, International Herald Tribune (Paris), 10 October 1977.
22.
22 For instance Paul Nietze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an age of Detente,” Foreign Affairs, January 1976.
23.
23 MichaelCaryer, “What Price Deterrence,” reproduced in Mainstream, Vol. XX, no. 18, 2 January 1982, p. 29.
24.
24 The Effects of Nuclear War, n. 10, p.4.
25.
25 “UN Study on Nuclear Weapons,” n. 8, para 79.
26.
26 RogerD.Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s (Stanford, California, 1979), p. 10.
27.
27 See, for instance, Lt. John W. Jenson, “Nuclear Strategy: Differences in Soviet and American Thinking,” Air University Review, March-April 1979.
28.
28 FredC. Ikle, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out The Century,” Foreign Affairs, January 1973, p. 269.
29.
29 For a perceptive insight into the psychological factors influencing nuclear decisionmaking processes see Trevor C. Salmon, “Rationality and Politics: The Case of Strategic Theory,” British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 2, no. 3, October 1976.
30.
30 UN Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (hereafter UN Study on Disarmament and Development) reproduced in Strategic Digest, Vol. XI, no. 12, December 1981, paras 403 and 407.
31.
31 Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, n. 18, p. 81.
32.
32 For the precise responses made by the nuclear weapon powers see “UN Study on Nuclear Weapons,” n. 8, para 489.
33.
33 Powerful voices have been raised in the West favouring no-first-use pledge. See, for instance, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1982.
34.
34 For a discussion see “UN Study on Nuclear Weapons,” n. 8, paras 86–92.
35.
35 FisherD.A.V., “Safeguards—A Model for General Arms Control,” International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, (Vienna), Vol, 24, no. 2, June 1982, p. 48.
36.
36 See, for instance, Milton Leitenberg, “The Numbers Game or Who's on First,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), June/July 1982.
37.
37 For a summary of the United States debate on this question, see Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, n. 18, pp. 11–13.
38.
38 Notably, Emile Benoit, Defence amd Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, 1973).
39.
39 UN Study on Disarmament and Development, n. 30, para 391.
