Reagan's Strategy in South Asia

Abstract

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to the United States in August 1982 was seen by many as the beginnings of a new era in Indo-US relations. The American and Indian press hailed it as a turning point in US policies towards the sub-continent, but the Indian Prime Minister cautioned that it was no more than an exchange of views. In concrete terms, the United Slates agreed to supply fuel to the Tarapur Nuclear Power Plant and promised a more sympathetic response to India's requests for loans and credits to the IMF and the World Bank.¹ But on all security matters the two remained as far apart as ever. There was no agreement on US arms to Pakistan, the growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean or, Afghanistan.

Those who perceived the visit as a positive sign for the future argued that summit meetings never produce dramatic results but in this instance, it crystallised and gave shape to a whole range of imperceptible shifts in the region.² The willingness on the part of the United States and India to seek closer ties reflected their desire to gain advantages from the changing alignment of power in South West Asia. For instance, India's attempts to distance itself from the Soviet Union were noted in Washington and so also Pakistan's friendly overtures to India. The United States was aware of the slight but discernible thaw in Sino-Indian relations. They further pointed that this general relaxation of tensions was viewed by them (United States) to be in its interest since it at the same time denied the Soviet Union opportunities to expand its influence.

Although it is true that India and Pakistan have been exchanging views on the “No War Pact,” China, too has held preliminary negotiations with India on their common borders, Indira Gandhi has distanced herself from the Communist Party of India signalling displeasure with Soviet policies in South and South West Asia³ and some new tensions between the United States and Pakistan have arisen, but the question still remains whether these disparate actions add up to a major re-alignment of power in the region and whether this is likely to trigger an equally serious change in the United States policies.

If we were to assume that such a change is indeed in progress, it can only be a result of changed perceptions of threats and opportunities in Washington, threats that emanate from the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and opportunities that arise from the strengthening of pro-American elements in the region. Because, in the first place, it was the fear of Soviet expansion that brought enhanced US presence to South West Asia, particularly to Pakistan. Before 1979, the sub-continent was either ignored or perceived as only a test case for Carter's human rights and nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is therefore important to ask how and in what way has the Reagan assessment of Soviet intentions towards South West Asia changed to warrant a fundamental departure from commitments and ties with Pakistan forged just over a year ago. Secondly, how far such a realignment is likely to go and what do the nations in question—US, India and Pakistan gain from it?

Since the Reagan Administration's policies have been motivated by an overwhelming concern for the vital interests of the United States in the region, these questions can only be answered by first examining precisely how the United States sought to safeguard these. This would necessitate discussion of four main questions:

1 The strategic rationale behind President Reagan's policies and the change in perceptions that led to the reversal of the Carter approach;

2 the role assigned to South West Asia and particularly to Pakistan in this strategy;

3 the alternative courses of action open to the United States as a result of changing perspectives in the region; and

4 whether the policies and recent adjustments towards South Asia signal a real departure from the strategic postures of 1980, or merely a continuation of the same approach but within a different diplomatic framework?

The aim of this paper is to show that the present US initiatives signalled by the invitation to Mrs. Gandhi may ease tensions in the region but does not constitute a fundamental change in the strategic posture of its perceptions of the covert threats to its interests in the region.