Over the years, Nigeria’s regional hegemonic leadership in (West) Africa, especially within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, has been debated within academic and foreign relations circles. A major component of this regional leadership aspiration was its quest for a ‘borderless Africa’. As an important arrowhead of its pro-African foreign policy, the Nigerian government proactively crafted a benign national border policy to give practical expression to the free mobility of persons and goods within the West African subregion. Despite a demonstrable commitment to free mobility within Africa over the years, Abuja suddenly imposed a restrictive border policy shortly after it signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement and approved the contentious visa-on-arrival for African migrants. Considering this context, this study makes three arguments: First, it interrogates the rationale behind the liberal border diplomacy of the Nigerian government. Secondly, the paper contends that the inability to ‘silence the guns’ in Africa despite all efforts has seriously militated against the aspiration for intra-African mobility and borderless Community in West Africa. Lastly, the study examines the dire implications of Nigerian nationalistic border diplomacy and its declining soft power for the future of ‘borderless West Africa’.
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