Abstract
Diplomacy and its institutions have been constantly changing. The manner in which diplomacy was practised in the earlier centuries is vastly different from how it is being practised in the twenty-first century. These changes range from the emergence of the training of messengers, the start of record keeping of diplomatic exchanges, the establishment of resident embassies, codification of formal diplomatic processes, widening domain of actors and issues, the use of multilateral conferences, use of summitry and many others. This evolution has been both a result of and further resulted in changing the larger socio-political-economic dimensions that the world has undergone. Among the myriad contextual changes, the revolution in communications, information and media technology has been phenomenal. This has brought into focus terms like the CNN effect and Vietnam War Syndrome where it is argued that media has had an influence in directing foreign policy choices of countries. Hence, this article seeks to analyse the media’s interface with the most important institution of diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It specifically focuses on the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. Has the news media acted either as an impediment or an accelerator to diplomatic practice? Has the information overload caused the diplomatic fraternity to face a loss of autonomy in any manner? With the objective of seeking an answer to these questions from diplomacy’s perspective, the article explores the evolution of the External Publicity Division of the MEA, India. The External Publicity Division as it is generally known has been the nodal division leading the institutions’ interface with the media. The actuality of media’s interface with diplomacy in India’s case will be set in the backdrop of the existing literature in the fields of media, diplomacy and foreign policy.
Keywords
Introduction
Diplomacy can be understood as ‘the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents’ (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995, p. 1). There has been a continuous evolution of this institution since its emergence since the beginning of the human civilisation. ‘Even the most ancient and comparatively most primitive societies required reliable means of communicating and dealing with their neighbours’ (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995, p. 1). These changes range from the emergence of the training of messengers, the start of record keeping of diplomatic exchanges, the establishment of resident embassies, codification of formal diplomatic processes, widening domain of actors and issues, the use of multilateral conferences, use of summitry and many others (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995). One of the numerous conceptual tools that has been used to explain this variation in diplomacy has been the shift from ‘club model’ to ‘network model’ (Heine, 2013, p. 54). The former refers to traditional/classical approach where diplomats restrict themselves to other diplomats or government officials, whereas the latter is based on an extensive set of contacts domestically and internationally. This is because, ‘a traditional diplomatic perspective is insufficient in a world that is becoming increasingly more networked’ (Cooper et al., 2013, p. 24). This has caused the proliferation of various kinds of conceptual tools to practice, theorise, study and teach diplomacy, such as public diplomacy (PD), summit diplomacy, nuclear diplomacy, conference diplomacy, defence diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, digital diplomacy, health diplomacy, climate diplomacy and others. Situated among these changes is the change brought about by the revolution in information and communication technology (ICT). This has been one of the watershed changes that has fundamentally impacted the practice of diplomacy.
With the communications and news information being altered by the likes of telegraph, radio, television, internet and now social media, what has fundamentally been altered is the speed with which diplomacy is conducted (Seib, 2012, p. 2). Some initial examples would include Edward R. Murrow’s reportage for the Columbia Broadcasting System. According to Philip Seib (2012, p. 5), Murrow, through his radio broadcasts from London changed the way the American public thought about the Second World War, thereby galvanising the public’s support for American intervention. Another example would be from the Vietnam War.
The Vietnam War, the first ‘television war’ and also the first major US military defeat on foreign soil of the twentieth century, secured mythic standing as the most uncensored war in the history and also as the war in which the media sapped morale and the political resolve to continue—the so called ‘Vietnam War Syndrome’. (Cottle, 2006, p. 75)
On similar lines, the ‘CNN Effect’ has been defined as ‘the ability of real time communications technology, via the news media, to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events’ (Robinson, 2002, p. 2). The term gained momentum during ‘Operation Provide Comfort/Safe Haven’ after the first Gulf War in Iraq in 1991 and ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Somalia in 1992. It was stated that ‘the highly critical coverage of Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam Hussein’s forces’ and images/coverage coming out of Somalia had pressurised the various governments in the Western countries to jointly undertake these two humanitarian missions (Robinson, 1999, p. 301). Apart from affecting a policy change, the media can also lead to either an acceleration or impediment to existing policy. This has been termed as the ‘accelerant and impediment’ effects of the media by Robinson (2002, p. 39).
James Hoge in a 1994 article has gone on to write ‘these capabilities of modern media to be immediate, sensational and pervasive are unsettling the conduct of foreign affairs’ as politicians and diplomats are no longer allowed quiet time for deliberation during crisis and were under enormous pressure to react or lose face both among the domestic population and international public (Hoge, 1994, pp. 136–137). In such an electronically charged environment, responding quickly may lead to a wrong policy choice and responding slowly may mean risking an image that the government is not in control or a weak government (Gilboa, 2001, p. 14; Grant, 2004, p. 9). At such an instance, the absence of a persuasive government policy/strategy on any issue would lead the media to play a catalytic role (Hoge, 1994, p. 138). The presence of a strong government policy/strategy, however, would go on to lessen the influence of the media. The same has been highlighted by Piers Robinson while stating that ‘when policy is unclear or ill defined the media can indeed have some influence on policy; on the other hand, the “media effect on policy decreases as the clarity on strategic interests increases”’ (Robinson, 1999, p. 305). Hence, ‘policy certainty’ plays a major role in determining the influence of the media. In absence of ‘policy certainty’, the agenda-setting, priming and framing roles of the media can have a greater influence.
As these studies have shown, there seems to be a general consensus that media does influence certain matters of foreign policy and diplomacy through influencing public opinion either for or against certain policies. In this context, this article seeks to analyse the actuality of media’s influence on diplomacy from diplomacy’s perspective in India’s case. Has the revolution in information and communications overload and the ensuing information overload caused a loss of plenipotentiary power and autonomy for the diplomatic community? How has diplomacy been forced to change its processes in the context of the ICT Revolution? In what manner can one understand the impact that the media, especially news reportage has on the processes of diplomacy? In this context, the article outlines the evolution of the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. This is because it is the most important institutional interface of diplomacy and media. The role of the Official Spokesperson of the MEA has been highlighted. Originally, this holder of this office was a faceless entity for the public at large, but with the evolution of processes that the External Publicity Division (XPD) has undergone, the Official Spokesperson has literally become the face of the MEA. The change in the nature of the Press Briefings that the XPD holds with the media has also been delineated.
The Diplomatic Community in India
This section deals with how some members of the Indian diplomatic community perceive this role of the media. There is a range of opinions where the media’s role is viewed as important/non-important and positive/negative. Some practitioners of diplomacy believe that the media’s role is very restricted and does not hamper the autonomy of diplomatic expertise. On the contrary, some believe that the growing influences of the media are inevitable and diplomats must imbibe this medium and take it into their stride. The actual and potential role of media in diplomacy has thus been viewed differently by various diplomats. However, on the whole, there is a general consensus that the media’s role has to be factored in for diplomatic practice and better implementation of foreign policy objectives.
Analysis and Interpretation of Data in Times of Information Overload
Before the revolution in ICT and the 24/7 news media, diplomats posted abroad were one of the main sources of information about the host country for the home government (Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995; Sofer, 2013). This is not the case anymore as almost everybody gets their information about various quarters of the world from the media. Hence, it is assumed that one of the most important functions of the diplomats have been taken away from them, hence reducing their importance. The argument is stretched further to say that due to the revolution in communications technology, diplomats have also lost their autonomy (Sofer, 2013). Previously when communications took months to reach from one place to another, diplomats had more autonomy to take decisions in their host countries. This has changed in present times, as they have to revert even the smallest matters to their political/bureaucratic bosses at home before taking any decision, leading to a loss of their autonomy.
Diplomats have argued that these assumptions regarding loss of autonomy have been exaggerated. With regard to the media becoming the main source of information for the government and public, Former Ambassador Rana 1 (2011, p. 199) has written that this is absolutely true. All government leaders get real-time updates about various issues from news media. However, the news media only provides the news, whereas the analysis of how a particular issue or event in a foreign land may affect the country can come only from a diplomat. The diplomat being well versed in the language, political context and language of that country will be able to appropriately summarise the various effects it might have on the home country. ‘The resident embassy remains the MFA’s prime source for sharp analysis and policy advice. But hard news now comes from elsewhere’ (Rana, 2011, p. 199). According to Ambassador T. C. A. Raghavan, 2 it was true that people now have other sources of information but that has not reduced the role of the diplomatic mission. A hundred years earlier, an ambassador when posted abroad, s/he had real plenipotentiary power because s/he had no way of communicating with her/his government. Now heads of governments, foreign ministers, foreign secretaries can speak directly to each other on the phone. But still the role of the diplomat is not taken away by all this (Raghavan, 2018).
Although diplomats are no longer the main sources of information, it does not mean that they are being side-lined ( 3 Katju, 2018). To all this varied information, the diplomats provide a perspective which the mass media will not. The Ambassador is supposed to knit everything together (Katju, 2018). It is one thing to study a country, to analyse a country, to even report on a country, to be able to read about it and form opinions, but it is another thing to represent your government, live there and then give an assessment of what is happening and recommendations on what is to be done (Raghavan, 2018). So while news media have a huge impact in terms of reaching out and telling people what is happening, it would be wrong for a government to rely on that to make its assessments. In the end, the government needs its own people to inform on what is taking place on the ground and recommend on what is to be done as everything else is not protecting the countries’ interests (Raghavan, 2018). The media is reporting, assessing, analysing for all kinds of other reasons. They might be good reasons but those reasons are not the same as the government’s reasons. Hence, because of all this, the role of diplomats has not been reduced (Raghavan, 2018). According to Menon (2018) diplomats are no longer in the business of collecting information and are in the business of analysing the readily available information, which is a positive change.
Responding to Crisis Situations Under Media Pressure
It is argued that the 24/7 media glare forces diplomats to react to crisis situations, giving them less time to deliberate on the crisis issue and make an informed policy (Hoge, 1994). Due to this pressure, diplomats end up taking hasty decisions, which they would not have taken had the media pressure not been there. The diplomatic view in this regard is contrary. They are of the view that working under the media glare has become a fact of life for every profession. The speed of communications has changed for everyone and people have accommodated to it. Syed Akbaruddin, 4 spokesperson of the MEA from January 2012 to April 2015, was of the view that it is valid that the media has its own requirements and at times one has to meet those requirements. Hence, it would be plausible to say that there could be times where a diplomat is under pressure (Akbaruddin, 2018). There could also be times that under pressure, one could perhaps make statements without having all the important information. But even without all the important information, the diplomat is most likely to have more knowledge of the situation than anyone else (Akbaruddin, 2018). This 50% information that a diplomat gives to a media person, will be most likely, a little more information than the journalists already knows, which then gets published (Akbaruddin, 2018). Although the diplomat might be pressurised for time at that moment, but this hardly leads to a foreign policy posture, which in retrospect one thinks of as a wrong posture (Akbaruddin, 2018). Hence, the media pressure may sometimes lead to the statement which may be a bit sharper response or a cooler response, but one needs to understand that all initial statements of diplomats during crisis are more of a holding statement, till one gets more information and diplomats are trained to handle this (Akbaruddin, 2018). Due to the media glare, a diplomat may be compelled to react to the urgent issue rather than to the important one. However, this does not mean that one cannot discharge one’s core responsibility as a diplomat (Raghavan, 2018). It is a fact of life and it is not as if one is so caught up dealing with the tangential, urgent, emergent issues that one has no time for anything else (Raghavan, 2018). The core responsibilities of a diplomat very much remain.
Media Acting as an Impediment to Diplomacy
24/7 news media has often been accused of impeding diplomacy due to the display of rabid jingoism that gets relayed not only to the domestic public, but also to the foreign delegates and foreign public. However, many diplomats were of the opinion that this was a phenomenon that almost all the countries were experiencing. Mainstream media today, because of the way it is structured, cannot nuance the issue (Katju, 2018). Media’s negative reportage is not a new phenomenon whether it was the 50s, 60s, 70s or now (Raghavan, 2018). Except that technology has changed and apart from the newspapers, we also have the electronic, digital and various other platforms (Raghavan, 2018). According to Akbaruddin (2018), one should not overemphasise the role of macho media, either in the formulation of public opinion or consequently the public opinion in then influencing policy making. To some extent it does, but it is not a major one (Akbaruddin, 2018). One of the immediate irritants in the Agra Summit between India and Pakistan in 2001 was the event where Pakistani President Musharraf addressed the Indian media in an interactive session and kept harping on the issue of Kashmir. There were a number of editorials which cited this as one of the reasons which led to the final deadlock in the talks (Sharada Prasad, 2001). However, according to Shiv Shankar Menon, 5 the real reason it went into a deadlock was because both the parties were not clear what they wanted. If both sides had clarity with regard to the goals, then diplomacy could have been used to achieve them. Once the talks failed, then people blamed the media as an excuse for the failure (Menon, 2018). If both sides had achieved their objectives with regard to the talks, then Musharraf talking to the media would not have become an issue (Menon, 2018).
Whenever the government is negotiating anything or making and implementing any policy which has a huge impact on public opinion, the government is conscious of it (Raghavan, 2018). The media has a certain influence but one should not exaggerate that influence (Raghavan, 2018). On the substantive elements, the impact has been limited, at best perhaps even peripheral (Akbaruddin, 2018). In the end, if the government and political leadership decide on a course of action, the media does not stop them from doing it (Raghavan, 2018). Moreover, the media itself has been interested in few countries, a maximum of five to six countries (Akbaruddin, 2018). For example, the media is not interested in India’s ties with Nigeria or some other country that is not directly related to India’s immediate interests. They are interested only in the United States of America (USA), China, Pakistan and a few more. There would be individuals and some people certainly interested in these other countries, but it hardly causes an uproar in the media, except in exceptional circumstances (Akbaruddin, 2018). If the government is certain about a course of action, the government can withstand the impeding negative opinion (Raghavan, 2018). For example, the present government invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif for the swearing-in of our new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi (Raghavan, 2018). Mr Modi even dropped into Lahore to meet Nawaz Sharif in December 2015 on his way back from Afghanistan. It is not that India did not extend the hand of friendship despite the overarching negative public opinion and media rhetoric (Raghavan, 2018). This has been true for whichever political party has been in power in India. The media does not stop political initiatives (Raghavan, 2018).
Media Leading Towards a More Open Diplomacy
At the end of the First World War, one of the ‘Fourteen Points’ outlined by the then President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson stated ‘Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there will be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.’ The spread of multilateral negotiations and conference diplomacy at the platform provided by international organisations like the United Nations gave more strength to such open negotiations. With the media news reportage about these negotiations and its growing interest in matters of diplomacy, it was assumed that diplomacy had become more democratised, news about the negotiations being more accessible to the general public. From being conducted secretly, negotiations, especially in the multilateral domain, were now conducted more openly. But the question that arises henceforth is to what extent the media has led to the opening up of diplomacy by regularly updating news on the various negotiations or other diplomatic initiatives. According to Akbaruddin (2018), there cannot be any surety as to whether media’s influence could be called democratisation but it is certain that it had brought about greater responsiveness of the MEA to human interest stories (Akbaruddin, 2018). This responsiveness has taken place at many levels, among those involved in publicity, to those in the missions and seeped even up to the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs herself/himself. This was demonstrated by Sushma Swaraj’s excellent Twitter initiatives while serving as the Foreign Minister (Akbaruddin, 2018). Such a change had been taking place since 2012/2013 (Akbaruddin, 2018). The most substantive implication of this media–MEA interaction or the biggest influence has been on Consular issues (Akbaruddin, 2018).
Another way in which the media has had an influence would be with regard to interconnections among the public across territorial boundaries. This has been highlighted as people-to-people linkages. According to Raghavan (2018), the public opinion fanned by the mainstream media on other countries, especially our neighbouring countries is on the whole negative, but there is a small section of the population which is positively influenced by changes in technology. This small section now finds that it can access opinions on the digital space not just in India but also in other countries (Raghavan, 2018). Twenty years ago the full spectrum of public opinion could only form their views based on what appeared in Indian newspapers or on Indian television channels. Now with the internet, it means that for those who want to, they can also access reportage from foreign sources. No doubt this affects only a small section but to this extent, technology has brought about a positive change in opening up the other country and bypassing the negative portrayal in the mainstream media (Raghavan, 2018).
Though people are increasingly more vocal about foreign policy issues on various platforms provided by the media, but to term this as influencing the making of foreign policy or democratising it would be an overstretch. The core considerations while making foreign policy is always economic, security, military and political reasons (Menon, 2018). The issues in this domain are not guided by what is published in the papers; it might be driven by interest groups such as the Federation of Indian Commerce & Industry, Confederation of Indian Industries and other interest groups in a polity (Menon, 2018). The media cannot be an interest group, because it is a medium and a channel rather an advocacy group. There was a time when the media spoke for the public, but that is less true today mainly because of the corporatisation of media (Menon, 2018).
The External Publicity Division of MEA, India
The External Publicity Division or the XPD Division as it is generally known has been the nodal division leading the institution’s interface with the media. Former Ambassador Kishan S. Rana has given a detailed critical analysis of the structure of MEA’s External Publicity Division (Rana, 2006, pp. 374–393). With regard to the MEA’s relationship with the press and publicity, he writes that ‘in 1950, soon after the inception of the Foreign Service, a separate Information Service of India was created, consisting of journalists and others directly recruited from the profession’ (Rana, 2006, p. 376). However, this practice was dismissed soon after as the new recruits from the journalistic field did not fit well with the diplomats. Also, the Pillai Committee Report (1996) on Indian Foreign Service had recommended that the work regarding information dissemination should be done by the IFS officers themselves (Rana, 2006, p. 376). Hence, this mantle was shifted to the External Publicity Division, which is commonly known as the XP Division of the MEA. According to Rana (2006, p. 377), the XP Division has been headed by the most talented and outstanding personalities, many of whom have gone on to become Foreign Secretary.
The website of the MEA India states that the XPD Division is the ‘interface between the Ministry and Media mandated with publicity of India’s foreign policy through briefings, press interactions and other media events’ (MEA India, 2022). This includes updating ‘the official MEA website and new media platforms; Liaison with MEA beat media; Facilitation of foreign media based in India; publications, documentary films and other publicity material aimed at projecting India’s soft power’ (MEA India, 2022). There is a different section on the External Publicity Division of the MEA in all the Annual Reports. The Annual Report 1999–2000 quotes the XP Division as being ‘an instrument of foreign policy management’ which implements several functions (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2000, p. 106). The key functions are related to promoting a favourable image of India to the world. It does so by articulating India’s foreign policy and its stand on various issues through dissemination of information and acting as a conduit between journalists (foreign and domestic) and the government. It is also responsible for the publication of India perspectives, a monthly issue for purposes of distribution abroad in various languages (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2000, p. 106).
One of the most important functions of the XP Division is the assistance provided to journalists from abroad who visit India. The Division fixes their appointments with various ministries and their officers, industry and business class, academicians and others. This is to be done in order to promote a balanced coverage of India in the foreign media. The work of this division becomes all the more critical especially during crisis situations such as war and conflict. Former Ambassador Kishan S. Rana has written that during the initial days of the Kargil War, the media briefings were being handled by the Ministry of Defence. However, the Defence Officials ‘found themselves in deep waters on the nuances of words in relation to issues that went beyond the military operations being undertaken’ (Rana, 2006, p. 379). It was only on the seventh day of the incursion that officials from the MEA joined the briefings which brought about a better media management in such a crisis situation (Rana, 2006, p. 379). Kishan S. Rana (2006, pp. 378–381) writes that sometimes, it does happen that some foreign correspondents lose their impartiality for various reasons (Rana, 2006, p. 377). In such cases, resorting to gestures like visa restrictions for those journalists with biased reportage will do more harm than good. The solution is more effective communication (Rana, 2006, p. 378). ‘Problems from unbalanced reportage can be countered only by positive actions, not restrictions’ (Rana, 2006, p. 380).
A separate division for PD was established in the MEA in May 2006 as stated in The Annual Report of 2006–2007 (Multilateral Environmental Agreement, Government of India, 2007, p. 151). It states that ‘its mandate includes, inter-alia, outreach activities inside and outside India, and audio visual and print publicity’ (Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, 2007, p. 151). The projection of a better understanding of India’s foreign policy for publics both abroad and at home is the top objective of the PD Division. Importantly, the report mentions the need for discussion and domestic consensus-building as a top priority.
Such an understanding requires that issues of international politics, including those related to strategic issues, the reformation of global institutions so that they reflect contemporary realities, and the emerging global order are discussed and debated in our universities, think tanks and by the general public to evolve a national and consensual approach towards them. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2007, p. 152)
Hence, one of the main objectives of the PD Division was consensus building and inclusion of the voices of the domestic public into the shaping of foreign policy.
However, after having established it, this new division was again merged with the External Publicity Division (XP Division) in the year 2013. In 2006, the separation was done with the idea of having more focus on PD issues in terms of the other creative enterprises (Akbaruddin, 2018). However, in practice, the PD Division and the XP Division started functioning in silos (Akbaruddin, 2018). Hence, there was a lack of continuity with regard to the efforts being put, although the ultimate objective of both the divisions was same. In that bargain, one did not see this entire effort in a continuum. The media part was in one silo, the social media part was in another silo, the books–prints–lectures were in another silo and to function in silo is not the best approach (Akbaruddin, 2018). Hence, the two divisions were integrated back in 2013. But this was done keeping in mind the fact that the ability of the professionals should be strengthened at all levels of functioning. An effort was made to install the best directors with the Spokesperson keeping an overall eye on everything maintaining a holistic approach (Akbaruddin, 2018).
The Office of the Spokesperson of MEA
The most important link between the MEA and the media is the Office of the Spokesperson of the MEA. The Joint Secretary of the XP Division is the Official Spokesperson of the MEA. ‘The office of the Official Spokesperson and Joint Secretary (External Publicity) is the interface of the Ministry of External Affairs with the media’ (MEA India, 2022). This is a very important post in the MEA and the person who heads this Division becomes the face of the MEA after the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The distinguished personnel who have been the Official Spokesperson since independence are as follows: V. R. Bhatt (1949–1954); R. Ramamirtham (1954–1955); P. N. Haksar (1955–1958); R. Goburdhan (1958–1959); P. N. Menon (1959–1962); M. A. Rahman (1962–1964); I. J. Bhadur Singh (1964–1967); R. Jaipal (1967–1968); A. B. Bhadkamkar (1968–1969); S. K. Singh (1969–1973); A. N. D. Haksar (1973–1976); S. V. Purushottam (1976–1979); J. N. Dixit (1979–1982); Mani Shankar Aiyar (1982–1983); Salman Haidar (1983–1985); G. Parthasarthy (1985–1988); Aftab Seth (1988–1992); S. S. Mukherjee (1992–1994); Arif Khan (1994–1997); Talmiz Ahmed (1997–1997); Pavan K. Varma (1997–1998); K. C. Singh (1998–1999); R. S. Jassal (1999–2001); Nirupama Rao (2001–2002); Navtej Sarna (2002–2008); Vishnu Prakash (2008–2012); Syed Akbaruddin (2012–2015); Vikas Swarup (2015–2017); Gopal Baglay (2017–2017); Raveesh Kumar (2017–2020); Anurag Srivastava (2020–2021) and Arindam Bagchi (2021–till present) (MEA India, 2022).
According to Vivek Katju (2018), until the 1990s, the Spokesperson of the MEA was never identified in the media. It was a faceless entity and in all newspapers, it was mainly cited as ‘The Office of the Spokesperson’. It is only recently that this institution of the MEA has been highlighted among the public through the media (Katju, 2018). The Press Briefings too were not institutionalised and regularised. It used to take place on a case-to-case basis, as and when required. It was only regularised from 2012 on a weekly basis (Akbaruddin, 2018). Before that briefings were not structured and used to take place on an individual level and on the occasion when the Spokesperson wanted to say something on any specific issue/event (Akbaruddin, 2018). It was also decided in 2012 that along with the weekly Press Briefings, there would be background briefings by the Spokesperson as well as the Joint Secretary of the Division concerned on a specific issue (Akbaruddin, 2018). For example, background briefings were to be held on different geographical divisions so that when the journalists wanted to write about it in the near future, they would do so keeping the larger context in perspective having been given the background information (Akbaruddin, 2018). Hence, briefings would be held on the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh, or fishermen’s issue with Sri Lanka, or workers issues in the Gulf, broad issues in which journalists would be interested and did not have access to the material that the MEA would provide them in these specific briefings (Akbaruddin, 2018).
Another important change with regard to the Press Briefings that was implemented in 2012 was regarding the nature and structures of these briefings itself. This is related to the broadening of the nature of journalists attending these briefings. According to Akbaruddin (2018), the External Publicity Division realised that not only the English press but also the regional media press were interested in specific foreign policy issues. For example, the Tamil Press had huge stakes in the fisherman issue with Sri Lanka and they needed information regularly on it. Similarly, the Bengali press was mostly interested on India’s foreign policy issues with Bangladesh. Hence, the interest in foreign policy issues was broader that the English media and intellectuals operating mostly from New Delhi (Akbaruddin, 2018). The increasing interest in the regional language media was because, first, they had more space than English media, and second, they were catering to small towns and cities where from where there is a substantial young population that goes outside for purposes of work and education (Akbaruddin, 2018). For example, a lot of youngsters from all over the country are going for higher education abroad; professionals from Kerala going to the Gulf for purposes of work and many other such cases. Hence, the media in these states have to cater to an audience whose children and relatives are abroad for various purposes (Akbaruddin, 2018). Each language media have their own interests and specificities. But the larger point was that there was an increasing appetite for foreign policy-related issues throughout the country (Akbaruddin, 2018).
Hence in 2012, the MEA decided to open up and broaden the segment of journalists who would have more access to cover the MEA (Akbaruddin, 2018). Certain decisions were taken through which it was ensured that all the journalists, whether English and Hindi or regional language saw themselves on a common footing. In the weekly Press Briefings that hence began, all journalists were allowed to ask one question each. Previously, the nature of these briefings was such that all the questions would be asked by a few journalists (Akbaruddin, 2018). Earlier journalists from areas other than New Delhi and many newcomers were side-lined and felt that they were not getting enough opportunities (Akbaruddin, 2018). This was changed in 2012 with the structural changes that the MEA brought about with regard to reaching out to the regional media thereby broadening its scope (Akbaruddin, 2018). This started bringing in more number of journalists to the regular briefings of the MEA generating more interest in diplomatic issues. The number of journalists attending these briefings before 2012 was approximately 20–25 and after these changes were brought about in 2012, the number increased to 75–80 attending on a regular basis. This increase in number took place over a year (Akbaruddin, 2018).
Another important decision that was implemented was that these Press Briefings started getting video graphed, the clips of which could be used by the television media. Hence, the reach was extended further (Akbaruddin, 2018). Prior to 2012, these briefings largely catered only to the print media and were sporadic in nature. Once it got regularised and on-camera briefings started, the electronic media also got its sound bite on foreign policy issues (Akbaruddin, 2018). This did disappoint some people in the media as their privileged access was taken away, but overall the decision was for the betterment of the entire media fraternity (Akbaruddin, 2018). What also began was that the Press Releases started being published in some regional languages apart from English and Hindi. There were Press Releases in Malayalam, Tamil, Bengali and other some regional languages (Akbaruddin, 2018). The rule that was followed was that if the External Publicity division got a request from at least five people for a release in a particular language, the MEA would provide for it (Akbaruddin, 2018). A series of these measures allowed the MEA to broaden its appeal and it was found that the fastest-growing media was the regional media other than English (Akbaruddin, 2018). The difference between the regional language media and English/Hindi media is that the regional media is much more in tune with what their audience wants (Akbaruddin, 2018). Hence, it can be said that the regional media press was much more people centric (Akbaruddin, 2018). When the nature of these questions changed, that led to a change in the outlook and focus area of the MEA itself with issues of individual and human interest started becoming important (Akbaruddin, 2018). Before that issues of human interests were not the MEA’s forte. It was only about bigger broader country-to-country ties (Akbaruddin, 2018).
Conclusion
The nature of reinvention and evolution of the XPD of the MEA India is symbolic of the fact that the interlinkages between diplomacy and media is ever increasing. The rise in the number of press briefings, the reaching out to the journalists from the domestic regional media to be included in these briefings, the beginning of the video-graphing of these sessions for the electronic media—all these changes go on to show that the state sees the media as an important tool for supplementing its diplomatic processes. The growing use of the multiple platforms provided by social media is a further addition to this expansion. Hence, one can say that media is being constantly used by the diplomatic community and the government to influence the public narrative on foreign policy issues both at home and abroad. One can say that these changes have fundamentally altered the processes of diplomacy. Originally, the Office of the Spokesperson of the MEA was a faceless entity, but this has changed keeping in tune with the image/video format of the presentation in contemporary times. Although diplomats are no longer the main information providers with regard to their host countries and no longer possess plenipotentiary power, their major engagement is analysing and contextually interpreting the data in times of this information overload.
It would be axiomatic to state that the world of diplomacy has become relatively more open to the public due to the interaction with the news media and use of other forms of media by the diplomatic community. However, it would be an overstretch to argue that this is a democratising/opening up of diplomacy. The spreading of new/open diplomacy and open negotiations does not mean that old diplomacy, whose main feature was secrecy is no longer being conducted. The two are co-existing and the latter is hardly affected by the news media. With regard to the media acting as an initiator, accelerator or obstructor of diplomacy, it would be appropriate to state that the fundamental independent variables for diplomacy lies mostly in the domain of the short-term/long-term foreign policy goals. These are majorly determined by the diplomatic/government/political class keeping the national interest and the larger context in perspective. Media does have a role to play, but its influence is secondary in nature. If the government has policy certainty regarding its diplomatic action/inaction, then it is unlikely that the negative/positive media reportage can force a change of action. Nonetheless, the invaluable change that has been brought about by the media is the speedy response to human interest concerns of the people at home and abroad by the diplomatic community. Hence, one can say that the impact is majorly noticed in the domain of Consular services. It has also resulted in better people-to-people connections across national boundaries due to not only the availability of news from either side, but also opportunities for direct exchange of communications. There is huge potentiality with regard to the influence of the media on diplomacy and diplomacy’s positive use of the media, but the actuality is otherwise.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.