Abstract
Writing on Indian foreign policy, though largely dominated by the disciplinary concerns of International Relations (IR), has diverse writing traditions. These can be categorised in three broad categories. There are academic studies of Indian foreign policy (e.g., Hansel et al., 2017; Malone et al., 2015), research-based diplomatic writing (e.g., Menon, 2016; Rao, 2022) and finally the diplomatic memoir (e.g., Chandra, 2023; Devare, 2012). However, theoretically grounded analyses of Indian foreign policy, especially book-length studies, from Indian scholars are few and far between, with few exceptions, with most being edited volumes (e.g., Bajpai, 2014; Pant, 2008). Therefore, Basrur’s study of Indian foreign policymaking is a welcome addition to the field in terms of its approach to locating the analysis of Indian foreign policy within a chosen theoretical IR framework.
Basrur’s project is specific to identifying the reasons for what he perceives as a policy drift in four key areas of Indian foreign policy in the last two decades. Basrur chooses the India–US nuclear agreement, the Indian approach to the Sri Lankan Civil War, India’s nuclear strategy and its response to cross-border terrorism as core areas that have suffered from a policy drift and therefore not delivered optimum outcomes for India’s rising power aspirations. Focusing on the domestic context of foreign policymaking, Basrur chooses neo-classical realism (NCR) as his explanatory framework to plot the trajectory of policy drift in each of the above case studies. He argues that the lack of direction/intent/capability in policymaking in each of these cases adversely affected India’s ability to maximise its interests in achieving its power aspirations.
There is a comprehensive discussion of NCR as a theoretical framework in the book, responding to critiques of NCR. The primary criticism of NCR states that the theory is comparatively inefficient as it is not always possible to isolate and separate international and domestic variables of foreign policy. In responding to this critique, the author, while providing a succinct statement of the literature, makes a few claims that need further clarification. For example, the author takes issue with Nazirny’s critique of NCR as a framework that unproductively expands the ‘the amount of variance in state behavior explained by domestic politics’. Basrur dismisses Narizny’s (2017) critique as ‘off the mark’ without sufficiently demonstrating why. Basrur adds a ‘normative dimension’ to his analysis. An elaboration of how the ‘normative dimension’ addresses the primary critique of NCR would have added explanatory depth to the analysis.
The book provides a useful typological categorisation of current analyses of Indian foreign policy within the NCR framework. There is a well-grounded discussion here, categorising existing literature on Indian foreign policy into three typologies. In Basrur’s outline, Type 1 analyses explain a state’s departure from adopting policies that are in sync with systemic incentives, Type II analyses explain why states act in accordance with systemic incentives and Type III analyses demonstrate how choices in domestic politics can have an impact on the system’s processes and structure. With regard to Basrur’s study, while he states that his study should ‘naturally’ fit within Type I, he asserts that the conclusions from each of the case studies are relevant to understanding systemic effects.
Of the four case studies, the book categorises the India–US nuclear agreement and the Indian approach to the Sri Lankan Civil War as cases of ‘involuntary drift’, where material constraints prevented the shaping of an effective foreign policy. The other two cases of policymaking, that is, India’s nuclear strategy and response to cross-border terrorism with reference to the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, are identified as cases of ‘voluntary drift’, characterised by a ‘responsibility deficit’ on the part of policymakers.
In the case of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the author is of the opinion that electoral politics, rather than any substantive opposition to the deal on the part of the opposition parties at either end of the ideological spectrum, hobbled the process of building an effective domestic response to a major foreign policy goal. The Indian opposition, especially the Left parties, given their ideological position on US imperialism, naturally did not align with the government’s position, and the book flags this as a structural weakness of the Indian system. Similarly, the author characterises the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy, traditionally committed to precepts of non-alignment, as path-dependent and therefore unable to initially play a constructive role in the negotiation of the Indo-US nuclear deal. The author identifies the Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP) opposition to the nuclear deal as opportunistic rather than substantive. While the analysis of the BJP’s position and that of the bureaucracy does bear out, with regard to the Left’s position, one could also argue that such policy divergence is an integral part of the consultative process in all democracies with internal checks and balances intended to reflect a wider opinion of the electorate. This does not necessarily point to a weakness of the system in the institutional sense. Basrur argues that the Indo-US nuclear deal was the outcome of a major structural change in the nuclear realm.
Similarly, in the case of the Indian approach to the Sri Lankan Civil War, the author argues that opportunistic policies on the part of Tamil Nadu parties hampered the Indian preference for supporting the Sri Lankan government in the conflict. The fact that there was wide consensus among Tamil parties on support for the Tamil cause does not seem to have been factored in as an important policy input, thereby leaching the political process of the inherently diverse nature of the Indian polity. This reduces the application of the NCR framework to essentialised notions of national interest devoid of its diverse locations and productions.
In the second part of the book, the author holds that a ‘responsibility deficit’ caused a policy drift in the case of Indian nuclear strategy and the Indian response to cross-border terrorism. Basrur rightly tracks the ambivalent approach of the Indian establishment to fashioning a nuclear strategy immediately following the Pokhran II tests. He concurs with other scholars (Pant, 2008) that India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine lacked consistency, fashioned as it was by what he calls a ‘motley group of mainly civilian and military bureaucrats ranging from minimalist to maximalists’. Basrur identifies the positions of five key policymakers in the area of nuclear strategy and maps their differences on a spectrum from the minimalist to maximalist with regard to different aspects of nuclear deterrence, including testing, survivability, deployment, No First Use (NFU) and targeting. However, this mapping does not seem to feed into the analysis of the policy drift that holds the ‘epistemic weakness’ of the civilian leadership in the realm of nuclear strategy as responsible for a drift in envisioning an effective nuclear strategy.
With regard to India’s response to cross-border terrorism and the failure of a cogent response to November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, Basrur notes that since the Kargil Review Committee report of 1999, India has been aware of the challenges in tackling this issue in both its internal and external aspects. Given that Pakistan was a nuclear-armed state, the limits of Indian compellence in persuading Pakistan to give up this strategy had to be supplemented by a robust internal response. Basrur excoriates the central and state authorities for being inconsistent with the initiatives that were started in the wake of the 1993 Mumbai attacks to address the security concerns arising from cross-border terrorism. This includes enhanced measures for intelligence, coastal security and police reforms among others. Using a backward and forward mapping analysis, the author ascribes responsibility from the very top downwards to different agencies of the government. This includes dysfunctional national policy bodies like the National Security Council and the Crisis Management Group. For the on-ground response to the Mumbai attacks, Basrur flags longstanding hurdles and delays in making the Delhi-based National Guard and the state-level Mumbai Police Anti-Terror Squad and its Quick Response Teams operationally viable and efficient. Finally, Basrur underlines the massive intelligence failures at national and state levels, including the Special Protection Group, that were apparently on a security recce for the Prime Minister’s upcoming visit to Mumbai on the day of the attacks. After the Mumbai terror attack, a High-Level Enquiry Committee noted these intelligence failures, and the author presents the findings of this Committee to provide evidence for his observations. This chapter is the most well-structured and persuasive in making the argument for a responsibility deficit and establishing a policy drift.
Eventually, the author advocates for a greater centralisation of power in the foreign policymaking process to address both kinds of policy drift. Through the four case studies, the author’s focus is on civil-military, centre-state and technical/scientific-bureaucracy-political leadership dyads as unduly burdened by the political or consultative processes of Indian democracy in producing effective foreign policy. The study identifies the structure of the Indian parliamentary system, specifically the coalition governments, as responsible for drifting foreign policymaking. Whether this aligns with the core arguments of the NCR is debatable.
Each of the case studies is based on a comprehensive review of the existing literature on each case and provides a succinct treatment of it. Basrur provides a lucid and rich narrative for each case study and lays out all the variables for assessing the domestic linkages of the said foreign policy issue. The book also engages with critiques of NCR and provides a persuasive argument for it as an explanatory framework for foreign policy. For students of Indian foreign policy researching any of these areas, this book would be a valuable resource.