Both the G20 and BRICS forums were established roughly at around the same time. This article examines India’s engagement with both these forums in the context of its complex position as a leader representing the Global South and a newly emerged power seeking an elevated status in international diplomacy. The study begins by highlighting India’s initial scepticism towards the G20 and its preference for the transformative potential of BRICS. However, under Modi, India’s approach gradually shifted towards embracing the G20, driven by multiple factors. The article also explores the relevance of BRICS for India amidst its growing inclination towards the G20. It argues that India cannot afford to undermine BRICS, as it would strengthen China’s claims as the sole representative of the Global South. However, its aim to balance China within the BRICS has proven to be challenging owing to recent developments that have complicated matters for India.
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