Chemical Weapons Convention First Review Conference: A Critical Evaluation

To date, there is no precise definition of WMD. Although the United Nations gives a definition, it is incomprehensive and inaccurate. WMD is defined by the United Nations as 'atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical or biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned”, and so-called conventional weapons. See, Tulliu Steve Schmalberger Thomas , Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-building (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2001), p.9; Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis, Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterpilferation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp.3–27, Jan Jodal, The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership (New York: Council of Foreign Nations, 2001), pp. 1–37; Another definitional aspects perhaps provides more insight-“WMD have been defined as nuclear, biological, including the killing of large numbers of civilians”, by Strategic of Assessment 1996: Instruments US Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), p.201. In short, the term “WMD” consolidates nuclear, biological and chemical weapons into one category because, despite differences in their effects and use, they share enormous lethality and symbolism.

Again, conceptual issue emerges pertaining to WMD. Biological Weapons (BWs) have special characteristics that distinguish them from chemical and nuclear weapons. In many respects, biological warfare defense requires an altogether different approach than that for nuclear or chemical warfare. For instance, counting enemy warheads for arms control or donning full protective gear in a potentially contaminated environment are relevant for nuclear and chemical scenarios; but not for biological. See, Bhushan K. Katyal G. , Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare (New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation, 2002), p.34. In the ultimate analysis, WMD is an open-ended concept, potentially allowing for the development of other technologies (dual use) of mass destruction. “Mass Destruction” is a relative term. In a hypothetical scenario, a single WMD then, can cause damage equivalent to that of hundreds of thousands of conventional high explosive or incendiary weapons. See also, Kalpana Chittaranjan, “Biological Weapons and Biological Weapons Convention, in Strategic Analysis, vol. XXI, No.6, September 1997, pp.875–86.

1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction, entered into force on 29^th April 1997. Text, as corrected and changed, available at http://www.opcw.org.

The systematic and proper study of chemical weapons began during the First World War. It led to an increasing awareness of the consequences of chemical warfare. As a result, the conclusions of the Geneva Protocol in 1925 acted as bedrock for Biological Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. As regards, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which has, until today, being an international agreement, 121 as of July 1989 (information received from the Depositary France), been joined. The Geneva Protocol bans the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and bacteriological weapons in war. It does not, however, prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and transfer of' such means of warfare. The limited scope of the Geneva Protocol, the increasing number of alleged violations of its provisions, and the spread of chemical and biological weapons horizontally and vertically have led to efforts to seek a comprehensive ban on such weapons which would outlaw their development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use. The most substantial part of multilateral negotiations in this context since the Second World War has taken place in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. A detailed description of the entire set of negotiations led to the CWC. See SIPRI Yearbook, various years (Stockholm Oxford University Press), particularly problems of Chemical and Biological warfare, vol. iv, Stockholm and New York 1971. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 are relatively simple as far as their content and mechanisms of implementation are concerned. It became increasingly clear at the beginning of the 1970s that such a simple approach to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons was not acceptable to some countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. One of the reasons given was that chemical weapons had a higher military value than biological ones. They had repeatedly been used in armed conflicts.

The prospects for the CWC are bound up with the larger transformation of international affairs wrought by the end of the Cold War. Originally conceived primarily as an instrument to strip the two superpowers of their arsenals of Chemical Weapons (CW), the Convention has taken on new importance in the search for a new world order. For a particularly rich source of information on specific issues and negotiating controversies underlying the text of the treaty, See Bernauer Thomas . The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Report UNIDIR/90/7 (New York: United Nations, 1990). See also the more chronologically ordered accounts in: World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69 onwards (now published by Oxford University Press); The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, volume, 1, 1976 onwards (New York: United Nations); Arms Control Reporter since 1982 (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies); and since 1988, Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin (Washington, D.C.: Harvard Sussex Program). A convenient way in to the new enormous documentation from the Geneva Disarmament Conference is through the 20-odd volume compilations of the CWC-relevent items, which External Affairs Canada has undertaken and made available.

The CWC will reinforce the existing norm against the use of chemical weapons and establish a new norm against possession of them. Norms receive scant respect among foreign policy realists, who too often are ill attuned to their relevance for real national interests. Norms are not all powerful, but nor should they be dismissed. They have worked historically, although not always as intended. Norms will grow more important in the fixture. Strictly speaking, there can be no legal fix to the problem of advanced armaments proliferation and use; there can be only a political fix. For a better understanding of the negotiations, legal nuances, implementation issues and to promote informed discussion through research, See Yepes-Enriquez Rodrigo Tabassi Lisa (ed.), Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters with Special Reference to the Chemical Weapons Convention (The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Convention 2002); Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (ed.), Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapon Convention (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

As envisaged by the current CWC, under Article VII of the Treaty, a National Authority should be created by each country to the CWC and that would serve as a useful point of contact with the Preparatory Commission responsible for working out the final implementation details. For more details, See, Harris Elisa D. , “Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Current Capabilities and Prospects for Control”, in New Threats Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Delivery Capabilities in the Third Word, An Aspen Strategy Group Report (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990), pp.68–75, For instance, take the USA and India, treaty compliance in municipal domain. There is Supremacy Clause pertaining to treaties in the US Constitution. See, United States Constitution See, United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause 2. In India, the constitution envisages legislation for giving effect to international agreements (Article.253) and Article 51 deals with promotion of international peace and security.

During earlier stages of the CWC, it probably would have been desirable to streamline the verification regime, focussing most attention on procedures for monitoring destruction of declared stocks and facilities and procedures for challenge inspections. See specifically, the 1993 CWC, Article VIII (“The Organization”) and Article XII (“Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions”).

Goldblat Jozef , Arms Control-A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (California: International Peace Research Institute with Sage Publications, 1994), pp, 104–05.

US national statement to the CWC Review Conference, by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen G. Rademaker, April 28, 2003. The U.S. statement mainly revolves round on ‘We confront a number of countries around the world that have or actively are seeking Chemical Weapons’. A number of countries are Syria, Libya, North Korea and Sudan.

As are all arms control agreements, the CWC is primarily political in nature. Its enforceability and verifiability as well as its meaning and prospects have to be addressed from a political perspective. Onsite inspections, for example, also have a political role. The circumstances in which they will take place will set the tone of the Convention. They may project a smell of suspicion each time they take place or they may turn into a political toy to harass or embarrass. See Bailey Kathleen C. , “Problems with a Chemical Weapons Ban”, Orbis 36, Spring 1992, p.245; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Costs of Verification and Compliance under Pending Arms Treaties (Washington, D.C.: September 1990), p.32.

Terrorism before September 9/11, and after, a deluge. The most likely scenarios for chemical or biological terrorism involve low-tech delivery methods that could result in a level of causalities similar to that caused by a conventional bomb. See Solomon Brian (ed), Chemical and Biological Warfare (H.W. Wilson Company, 1999); Peter R Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz (eds) Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2000).

In the United States, as in most democracies, arms control outcomes are shaped by four domestic factors: the ideas of key elites; the political and legal processes for exploring, negotiating, and conducting arms control; the role and involvement of key interest groups, e.g., weapons builders, the military, politicians, and pacifists; and public opinion. Although considerable attention has been paid to the formal processed for negotiating and implementing arms control agreements, these processes constitute just one vehicle by which compromises are reached. For a fuller discussion, See Krepon Michael Caldwell Dan , (eds.). The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); William C. Potter (ed.) Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980); Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Praeger, 1965).

The negotiation of the CWC began during the Cold War but after on-site inspections had been incorporated into nuclear treaties and were no longer taboo. As a result, the CWC does include strong verification provisions. The OPCW is charged with reviewing declarations and carrying out both planned and “challenge” inspections of facilities. An extensive analysis by Allan Krass in 1997 concluded, “There are some risks associated with the CWC. Some states may simply refuse to join and will have to be deterred or prevented from, acquiring chemical weapons by traditional diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or simply be allowed to have them. Experience with the nuclear NPT should allow no illusions about the risk… The CWC will improve transparency and reduce some military risks, but it will not make the world sea from chemical weapons”. See Krass Allan , The United States ard Arms Control (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), p. 127.

For CBW proliferation and implementation measures to counter the WMD threat See. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 2001), pp.5–9.

For a more clearer understanding, See George Alexander L. Farley P. J. Dallin A. , (eds) US-Soviet Security Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). This is a series of case studies of diplomacy associated with a range of arms control negotiations during the Cold War. They can be used to illustrate the links between arms control and the political environment in specific instances. And see A. Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Random House, 1976).

For background on Russian CW destruction, See Hart J Miller C.D. (eds), Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Political, Legal and Technical Aspects, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, no. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). As regards Russian proposals those time, which included-proposals on verification of destruction of CW production facilities and on nonproduction of chemical weapons (1986); monitoring of CW stockpiles at storage locations and mandatory challenge inspections at any site (1987); CW-related data exchange, confidence-building measures; and national and international trial inspections (1988). In April 1987, the Soviet Union announced that it had stopped production of chemical weapons. For Russian CW destruction assistance, See also, Russian Embassy Statement, Stockholm, 6 March 2002, CBW Conventions Bulletin no 53 (September 2001), pp.40–41, 44.

After the Paris Conference, in Wyoming, the first ever Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons was signed: the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding. This agreement provided for data exchange on each country's CW stocks and facilities as well as for series of visits to such facilities. The first phase of the implementation of this agreement was completed by early 1991. In 1990–91 the Soviet government invited German and Polish representatives to verify that Soviet chemical weapons were not being stationed either in the territories of the German Democratic Republic or in Poland.

Statement by Denis MacShane, UK Foreign Office Minister, April 29. The essence of the statement is ‘compliance needs to be addressed as a central issue’. See also Roberts Brad , Chemical Disarmament and international Security, Adelphi Paper no.267 (London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992).

For a background on Russian CW destruction, See Hart J. Miller C.D. (eds), Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Political, Legal and Technical Aspects, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, No. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); For a rather detailed view of official Russian thinking about Chemical Weapons, See Reuters, “Russia Destroys Chemical Arms” 22 November 2001 URL http://www.iht.comatticles/39631.htm; Pikayev, A. Russian implementation of the CWC; J.B. Tucker (ed), The Chemical Weapons Convention, Implementation Challenges and Solutions (Monterey, Calif, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2001), p.35; Russia to destroy all Chemical Weapons Stockpiles by 29 April 2012, Interfax (Moscow), 11 December 2001, in FBIS-SOV-2001–1211, 12 December 2001.

Decree 98–1081 of 5 December 1996 by the French Government.

In 1993, France hosted the signing ceremony in Paris of the Chemical Weapons Convention. France ratified the Convention 2 March 1995. In 1996, prior to the CWC's entry into force on 29th April 1997, France put following bodies in place.

(i) A National Authority attached to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in charge of relations with international bodies in the Hague;.

(ii) An International Committee for the Implementation of the CWC (CICIAC);.

(iii) A Steering Committee concerned by the Prime Minister's private office and in charge of defining general outlines;.

(iv) Several working groups to conduct research in technical and legislative areas under the CICIAC's authority.

Statement by Ambassador Zhu Zushou, Permanent Representative to the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the First Review Conference of the CWC, April 28, 2003. China's statement to the CWC Review Conference stresses on “The Convention is … based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”. For Chinese arms control perspective and security, See also China's Diplomacy (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2002 ed).

The OPCW is the body, which oversees the implementation of the CWC. In 2001, it faced a serious budgetary shortfall. As a result the number of inspections was reduced and some technical assistance and cooperative activities were postponed or cancelled. The budget problems will continue in 2002. For more information, See SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.666.

For a critical evaluation of the tendency to overstate the nature and character of CW proliferation, See Robinson Julian Perry , Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Problem in Perspective in Findlay Trevory , (ed.) Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferaiion: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) pp. 19–35; See also, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, “Proliferation Threats of the 1990s”, Committee Report, 24 February 1993.

For a critical evaluation of the tendency to overstate the value and character of CW proliferation and the Chinese perspective on WMD, See Robinson Julian Perry , “CWs Profile: The Problem in Perspective” in Findlay Trevor , (ed), CWS mid Missile Proliferation: With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), pp, 19–35.

Statement by Ambassador Shymala B. Cowsik, Permanent Representative of India to the OPCW and Leader of the Indian Delegation to the First Review Conference of the CWC, April 29, 2003. India underlines and emphasizes on ‘The multilateral process for arms control and disarmament faces the most serious challenges’.

At the end of 2001, India had destroyed approximately 29 percent of its Category 1 CW and over 39 per cent of its Category 2 CW (Opening statement by the Director-General to the Executive Council of the OPCW at its Twenty-Seventh Session (note 87), Para 14. Category 1 CW consists of Schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components. Category 2 CW consists of all other (non-schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components). See CWC, Part IV (A), Para. 16. For more details, See SIPRI Yearbook, various issues, particularly 2002 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

For a fuller discussion and understanding on this, See Annual Report 2002–2003, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 94–97; Annual Report 1999–2000, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, particularly page 10; See also Annual Reports of the various years since 1992, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and Ministry of Law and Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India. The Government of India introduced the Chemical Weapons Bill, 2000 in Parliament as per the obligations envisaged in the original CWC (1993). The Act of Parliament received the assent of the President of India on the 26th August 2000. The Act is known as “The Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000”. See No,34 of 2000, The Gazette of India Extraordinary Part-II Section 1, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 28th August 2000.

The NAM comprises 116 Members States out of which 82 are States Parties to the CWC. Since the Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties in October 2002, 4 countries have ratified or acceded to the Convention, making a total of 151 States Parties. The NAM CWC States Parties and China welcome the representatives of Thailand, Palau, Guatemala and Andorra to the deliberations of this Review Conference.

Statement by Ambassador Noor Farida Ariffin, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the OPCW on behalf of the States Parties of the NAM to CWC and China, April 30…. The NAM countries' statement stresses on ‘Implementation of the Convention; should not be carried out in a discriminatory manner’.

Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, April 29 in the First Review Conference. The ICRC urges the First Review Conference to consider the implications of new scientific and technological developments.

Available at OPCW website: http//www.opcw.org.

See Gallagher Nancy W. , Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Policy (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 116–37.

Verification disputes have received more sustained attention than any other aspect of arms control. This ‘verification paradox’ seems less daunting when one knows more about the causes and consequences of verification arguments. For a nuanced understanding upon this, See Krass Allan , Verification-Hov is enough? (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), Stephen Meyer, “Verification and Risk in Arms Control”, International Security, Vol. 8. No. 4 (Spring 1984), p. 113; Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), Kenneth Adelman, ‘Why Verification is More Difficult and Less Important”, International Security, Vol. 14. No.4 (Spring 1990) pp. 141–6; Lewis Dunn, “Arms Control Verification: Living with Uncertainty”, International Security, Vol. 14, No.4 (Spring 1990), pp. 165–75; Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds), The Proliferation Puzzle (London: Frank Cass, 1993); and Steven Weber, Cooperation and Discord in US-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). In simple terms, the economic side of globalisation implies that the integration of national economy into international economy. In other respect, globalisation refers to a process where ‘people, activities, norms, ideas, goods, services, and currencies are decreasingly confined to a particular geographic space and its local and established practices’. Because of this process politics, economics, culture and ideology are interwoven. Manifestations of the globalization process include the interpretation of industries across borders, the spread of financial markets and an emerging worldwide preference for democracy. Rapid industrialisation and innovation and a globalised trade in high technology goods, virtually all of which has potential military applications, have rendered impossible measures that effectively curtail access to the military capabilities based on these goods and technologies. Efforts to control weaponisation and use must focus not just on the capability but also increasingly on the will to pursue these activities. A culture-driven outlook of international politics and regional cooperation prevails internationally regional arrangements in the economic arena, there have been equally important changes in the Asian region; since the Cold War ended, a new debate has emerged that concerns the Asian challenge to Anglo American liberalism and U.S. predominance. The emergence of Japan and China as regional leaders and players through the integration of cooperation between the States in East and South East Asia has a crucial role. Many scholars agree that there is a trend towards three competing trading blocs-the Western Hemisphere, central on the U.S; Europe centred on the European Community (EC), and Pacific Asia centred on Japan and China. In a similar fashion, increased tension and conflicts can be found in the Asian region. This suggests that a debate on globalisation versus regionalisation. We should not fail to understand that this is an era of regional international relations. The emerging regional integration in Asia, the impact of Asian values and Asian identity may perhaps make the Asian region as a level playing field. For a wide ranging discussions on the impact of globalisation, See James Rosenau “The Dynamics of Globalisation: Toward on Operational Formulation” Security Dialogue, 27/3, 1996, pp.247–62. See also Yannis A. Stivachtis, “The International System and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction” in Eric Herring, (ed.) Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (London.: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 123; Louise Amoore et al, “Overturning Globalisation” New Political Economy, 2, no. 1, pp. 179–95; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “Global Public Policy”, Foreign Affairs 76, November/December, pp. 127–38.