The Carnegie Report makes a references to South Asia a ‘basket case’ and recommends that South Asia's military potential should be taken into account, together with its emerging economic potential. See HarrisonSelig S.KempGeofferey, India and America after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), pp. 1–77.
2.
Domestic structure theorists take into account a nation's dominant belief systems, ideas, political structure, as well as economic and social factors. In International relations, there is a growing emphasis on explanatory scheme which, while not discounting international structural constraints, increasingly take into account domestic structural characteristics. A definition of domestic structure can be found in jack Shyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
3.
Proliferation optimism has largely come to be identified with the writings of Kenneth Waltz. See, WaltzKenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies), Autumn 1981. Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2., Fall 1993, pp. 44–79, and in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton), 1995, pp. 1–45.
4.
SaganScott D.WaltzKenneth N., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), pp. 1–45.
5.
Ibid, pp. 1–9.
6.
Ibid, pp. 10–17.
7.
Ibid, pp. 10–17.
8.
FeldmanShai, “Is there A Proliferation Debate?”, Security Studies, Vol. 4, no. 4, Summer 1995, p. 791.
9.
Proliferation pessimism may be identified with the writings of DunnLewis A., Controlling the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1982). See also the writings of Scott Sagan in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapon: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), pp. 47–91.
10.
KarlDavid J., “Proliferation and Emerging Nuclear Power,”, International Security, vol, 21, no. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 88–89.
11.
David J. Karl argues that pessimism informs the conventional wisdom on proliferation issues and is the corner stone for U.S. non-proliferation policies. See KarlDavid J., “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers”, International Security, Vol. 21, no. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 87–119.
12.
The response of the regional writers has been typically post colonial. Focusing on the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime, Brahma Chellaney's article, “South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power” focuses on the West's attempt at managing a nuclear arms race because traditional technology control measures have failed to prevent other countries from attaining nuclear capabilities. The rest of the article, however, focuses on non-recognition of those capabilities. ChellaneyBrahma, “South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power”, International Security, Vol. 16, no. 1, Summer 1991, p. 52.
13.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, September 21, 1994, Roundtable on South Asia (Washington, D.C.: 1994).
14.
This point has been noted in all major reports on South Asia. See, Report of The Carnegie Study Group on U.S. Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992).
15.
ChaseRobert S.HillEmily B.KennedyPaul, “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, no. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 33–51.
16.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Witness, James Woolsey, Director Central Intelligence Agency, February 24, 1993, p. 2.
17.
USIS Official Text, “Progress Towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia” February 17, 1994 (New Delhi: USIS), p. 1.
18.
GalluciRobert L., “Non-Proliferation and National Security,”Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, no.3, April 1994, p. 14.
19.
Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, A New U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997).
20.
Report of an Independent Task Force, U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (The Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1998).
21.
HartmanArthur A.HillsCarla A., co-chairs Report of a Study Mission (New York: The Asia Society, 1994).
22.
KlareMichael, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 1–15.
23.
GalluciRobert L., “Non-proliferation and National Security”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, no. 3, 1994, p. 13.
24.
Ibid., pp. 13.
25.
HawesJohn, Nuclear Proliferation: Down to the Hard Cases, Program on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park, PRAC., Paper no. 6, pp. 3–4.
26.
Ibid., pp. 3–4.
27.
Klare, no. 21, p. 13.
28.
Ibid., p. 14.
29.
GalluciRobert L., “Non-Proliferation and National Security”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, no. 3, April 1994, p. 14.
30.
TalbotStrobe, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, no. 2; March/April 1999, p. 112.
31.
USIS Official Text, Progress Towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, p.9.
32.
HershSeymour H., “On the Nuclear Edge”, New Yorker, March 29, 1993.
33.
34.
35.
36.
USIS Official Text, Third Report to Congress: Update on Progress Towards Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), April 1994, p. 1.
37.
USIS Official Text, Progress towards Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), May 7, 1993, p. 2.
38.
See HarrisonSelig S.KempGeoffrey, India and America after the Cold War (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), pp. 1–77.
39.
Hersh, no. 32, p. 5.
40.
A series of stories published in Washington Post claimed that the Indian Prithvi missiles had been moved to forward deployment positions escalating tensions. India denied having deployed the missiles. See Jeffrey SmithR., “India Denies it has Deployed Missiles; Gujral Condemns U.S. Report of Arms Shift to Pakistani Border”, Washington Post, June 12, 1997.
41.
USIS Official Text, Progress Towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, p. 4.
42.
StephenP. Cohen, Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 338–340.
43.
For text of NPT see “Appendix A in Harald Muller, David Fischer and Wolfgang Kotter,”Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, Sipri (Oxford: Oxford University Press1994).
44.
TalbottStrobe, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, no. 1, March/April 1999, pp. 116–120.
45.
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, September 21, 1994, Roundtable on South Asia (Washington, D.C.: 1994). A New U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997). See also George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia”, Foreign Policy, no. 81, Summer 1993, pp. 85–104.
46.
As quoted in TalbottStrobe, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, p. 116.
47.
Remarks by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Congressional Research Service, “Seminar on the Future of Arms Control,” Washington, D.C., January 9, 1997, pp. 1–5.
48.
Ibid., p. 1.
49.
HolumJohn D., “The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament: The U.S. View”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 51, no. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 276–277.
50.
NPT, Articles IV — 2. Cited in ShueyRobert D.BowmanStevenDavisZachary S., Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1997, p. 3.
51.
Ibid., p.3.
52.
Ibid., p. 4.
53.
StumphWaldo, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement”, Arms Control Today, vol.25, no.10, December 1995/January 1996, pp-3–8.
54.
The North Korean problem has been listed as one of the major challenges of the non -proliferation regime. Robert D. Shuey, Coordinator, Steven R. Bowman, Zachary S. Davis, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., March 10, 1997, p. 20.
55.
DeutchJohn M., “The New Nuclear Threat”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, no. 4/1992, p. 120.
56.
SynnottHillary, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Paper 332 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 11–23.
57.
MandelbaumMichael, “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War,”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, no. 2, March/April 1995, pp. 24–25.
58.
For discussion of this point, see SmithGerard C.CobbanHelen, “A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation,”Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68no.4. Summer 1989, pp. 53–70.
59.
See USIS Official Text, Progress Towards Regional Non-Proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, pp. 7–9.
60.
CroninRichard P.Le PoerBarbara Leitch, South Asia: U.S. Interests and Policy Issues, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington D.C., February 12, 1993, p. 8.
61.
SibalKanwalNaqviAli Sarwar, “Nuclear Politics on the Subcontinent: Two Views”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 9–10.
62.
Ibid., p. 10.
63.
USIS Official Text, “Progress Toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, pp. 7,9.
64.
See website http://www.stimson.org.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
USIS Official text, “Progress Towards Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia” (New Delhi: USIS), February 17, 1994, pp. 2–3.
70.
U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan, Report of an Independent Task Force co-sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations1998), pp. 7–8.
71.
StephenCohenP., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 338–40.
72.
Ibid., pp. 338–40.
73.
CropseySeth, “The Only Credible Deterrent”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2 March/April 1994, pp. 14–20.
74.
CarpenterTed Galen, “Closing the Nuclear Umbrella,”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2, March/April 1994, pp. 8–13.
75.
Ibid., p. 13.
76.
USIS Official Text, Third Report to Congress (New Delhi: USIS) p. 1.
77.
DavisZachary, U.S. Non-proliferation Strategies Towards South Asia, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington D.C., May 3, 1995.
78.
USIS Official Text, February 17, 1994.
79.
Madeline Albright speech on CTBT, Association of the City Bar, New York, New York, September 23, 1999. As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C.
80.
HolumJohn D., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Most Important Year in the History of Arms Control: No Time For U.S. Retreat”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., January 18, 1995.
81.
MedaliaJonathan, Nuclear Endowment for Weapons Testing and Negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CRS Report, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1997, p. 3.
82.
Ibid., p. 3–4.
83.
Statement by H.E. Mr. K.J. Jele, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Resumed Session of the 50th session of the UN General Assembly, September 9, 1996. Cited in HolumJohn D., “CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament — The U.S. View,”Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 51, no. 1, Summer 1997 (New York: Columbia University), p. 273.
84.
CRS Issue Brief, Nuclear Testing and Negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, January 10, 1997, p. 8.
85.
HolumJohn D., Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Seminar on the Future of Arms Control,”Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C, January 9. 1997.
86.
LeonardJames F.ScheinmanAdam M., “Denuclearizing South Asia: Global Approaches to a Regional Problem,”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, no. 5, June 1993, pp. 17–20.
87.
Ibid., p. 18.
88.
Ibid., pp. 21–22.
89.
Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: December 1993), pp. 130–131.
90.
SchulzJohn, “Riding the Nuclear Tiger: The Search for Security in South Asia”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 23, no. 5, June 1993, p. 5.
91.
PerkovichGeorge, “Three models for Nuclear Policy in South Asia: The Case for Non-Weaponised Deterrence,” in The Road Ahead: Indo — US Strategic Dialogue, (ed.) SinghJasjit (New Delhi: Lancers International, 1994), pp. 89–123.
92.
See PerkovichGeorge, “A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia,”Foreign Policy, no. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 88–104.