Ensuring Nuclear Peace and Stability in India-Pakistan Relations

Matinuddin Kamal , “Nuclearisation of South Asia: Implications and Prospects”, Regional Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, Summer 1998, p. 9

Mattoo Amitabh , “India's Nuclear Policy in an Anarchic World”, in Matto ed., India's Nuclear Deterrent (Delhi: Har-Anand, 1998), p. 24

For details see Singh Jasjit , “Why Nuclear Weapons?” Singh Jasjit , ed., “Nuclear India” (Delhi, Knowledge World-IDS A, 1998), pp. 14–15 and 18–20; Dipanker Banerjee, “The New Strategic Environment', in Amitabh Mattoo ed., ibid. pp. 274-276 and for missile threat from China, see p. 287

According to Jasjit Singh “India does not require nuclear weapons for prestige or status…. India's prestige and status, in the ultimate analysis, will be decided by the way we solve our problems and how we conduct ourselves in the face of evolving geo-economic realities”. See Singh Jasjit , ed. Nuclear India (Delhi, Knowledge World-IDSA, 1998), pp. 9–10

Since 1987 relations between India and China are improving. In 1993 both the countries established a Joint Working Group to look at the entire gamut of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. In 1996 President Jiang Zemin's visit to India strengthened the arms control agreement signed in 1993 which is based on ‘mutual and equal security’

In 1978, India proposed an international convention to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in 1982 it called for a ‘nuclear freeze’ and prohibition of production of fissile materials for weapons and also nuclear weapons and concomitant delivery systems. In 1988 it put forward what is popularly known as Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for phased elimination of nuclear weapon. India is also opposed to the unlimited extension of NPT, finally putting a nail to a time-bound nuclear disarmament. For details see Subrahmanyam K. , “Indian Nuclear Policy-1964-98: A Personal Recollection”, pp. 26–53 and Manpreet Sethi, “The Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament” in Jasjit Singh ed., n. 4, pp. 75-95. For details regarding India's nuclear policy see Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal (Delhi: Knowledge World-IDS A, 2001), pp. 50-74

Clause 1.1, Preamble, India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine, Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board, Released on August 17, 1999

Clause 2.1, India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine

Clause 2.4, India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine

See Cohen Stephen The Pakistan Army (1998: Oxford University Press, Karachi), pp. 177–82, 152–58. He elaborates some thinking on this aspect through his interaction with the Pakistani military

Beg Mirza Aslam , “Development and Security: Thoughts and Reflections” (Rawalpindi: FRIENDS, 1994), p. 211. For Pakistan's nuclear logic, see Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (Delhi: Sage, 2000.), pp. 194-200

Beg Mirza Aslam , “Nuclear Programme and Political Rambling”, Defence Journal, vol. 19, no. 11-12, 1993, p. 21

For details regarding the Gates mission and 1990 Indo-Pak tension see Hersh Seymour M. , “On the Nuclear Edge”, The New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 56–73

See Bajpai Kanti Chari P. R. Cheema P. I. Ganguli Sumeet , “Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, University of Illinois, 1995, p. 30 and pp. 52-56. Also see the transcript of the views of various people involved in the crisis. Stimson Centre, Washington, 1991. Also see Chapter 5 & 6 on Operation Brass tack in Devin T Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons for South Asia (Cambridge: MIT, 1998)

Saleem Muhammad Asraf , “Nuclear Deterrence: A Subcontinental Logic”, Defence Journal, vol. 19, no. 11-12, 1993, p. 27

Smith Chris , “Security, Sovereignty and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, Faraday Discussion Paper no. 20, University of London, p. 14 as cited in Mirza Aslam Beg, Development and Security: Thoughts and Reflection (Rawalpindi: FRIENDS, 1994), pp. 216-17

Refer to Arif K. M. , “No Bargain on Nuclear Option”, Dawn (Islamabad), 6 December 1994 and Munir Ahmad Khan, “Understanding Pakistan's Nuclear Plan”, The News (Islamabad), 8 March 1995

See Dawn (Islamabad), 3 April 1994

Mazari Shirin , Muslim, 2 April 1991

Hoodbhoy Pervez , “Pakistan's Nuclear Future”, in Samina Ahmad and David Cortright ed. Pakistan and the Bomb, p. 71

While arguing for the nuclear option Assad Durrani, former Director General, wrote that other side must be led to believe that when our national objectives are threatened, for example a major crackdown on the ‘freedom movement in Kashmir,’ Pakistan would be desperate to use nuclear weapon. See Durrani Assad , “Pakistan Security and the Nuclear Option” (Islamabad: Institute for Policy Studies, 1995), P. 92 as cited in Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan's Nuclear Future”, in Samina Ahmad and David Cortright ed. Pakistan and the Bomb, p. 71

Shahi Agha Khan Zulfiqar Ali , “Responding to India's Nuclear Doctrine”, Dawn, 5 October 1999

Subrahmanyam K. , “Crisis of Confidence: No Winners in an Indo-Pak War”, Times of India, 4 May 1998

See the Kargil Review Committee report (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), Kenneth Waltz, in Scot Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, ed. The Spread of Nuclear Weapon (New York: Norton and Company, 1995)

Prominent Indian analysts like Praful Bidwai, Kanti Bajpai, Admiral Ramdas and Pakistani analysts like Zia Mian, Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, Khaled Ahmad and Western analyst like Eric Amett in his article “Nuclear Stability and Amis Sales to India: Implications for US Policy” in Arms Control Today, vol. 27, no. 5, August 1997 argues that the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan are deterrence-stable but not crisis-stable. Also see Neil Joeck “Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia”, Adelphi Paper 312 (Oxford: IISS, 1997), p. 12

Newsline, editorial, July 1999, p. 13

Lodhi Maleeha , “Anatomy of a Debacle”, Newsline, July 1999, p. 30. She refers to this rhetoric as “flexing of nuclear muscle by India”

In an interview with Dr. Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, Department of Physics, Quaid-Azam University, Islamabad

Lodhi Maleeha , “Anatomy of a Debacle”, Newsline, July 1999, p. 30. In the same article she points out that India would acquiesce to this capture just like Pakistan was compelled to swallow Delhi's seizure of the Siachen peaks, in violation of the 1972 Simla Agreement, p. 31. However, the Pakistanis have been engaged in such kind of operation after they achieved their nuclear capability in 1987

Pakistan Times, 6 December 1989

Muslim, ed., “The Bigger Threat From Israel”, 2 September 1999. A Camp David Accord kind of approach in Indo-Pak relations is unthinkable

Aziz Shahid , Muslim, 24 September

For details, see Subrahmanyam K. , “Indian Nuclear Policy–1964-98: A Personal Recollection”, pp. 26–53 and Manpreet Sethi, “The Struggle for Nuclear Disarmament” in Jasjit Singh ed., n. 4, pp. 75-95. For details regarding India's nuclear policy see Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal (Delhi: Knowledge World-IDSA, 2001), pp. 50-74

Singh Jaswant , “Against Nuclear Aparthied”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 1998, pp. 48–51

Khan Tanvir Ahmed , Frontier Post, 24 February 2000

CNN.com “Pakistan threatens Nuclear Defense”, June 19, 2001. The sanctions were lifted after Pakistan joined the United States - led alliance in the war against terrorism especially in the operation in Afghanistan

See Beg Mirza Aslam , Nation, 3 April 1999

Niazi M. A. , Nation, 20 February 2000; Agha Shahi, Frontier Post, 23 February 2000; Shirin Mazari, The News, 10 February 2000

Shahi Agha , Frontier Post, 23 February 2000

Frontier Post, 24 February 2000

The DCC would comprise five cabinet members chaired by the Prime Minister, with the service chiefs entitled to attend if they are invited

Farooq Umar , “Pakistan Tests New Missile and Revises Command Structure”, Jane's Defence Weekly, February 16, 2000, p. 3

Singh Jasjit , “Security in Nuclearised South Asia”, paper presented at the International Seminar on Japan-South Asia Co-operation During the; Post Cold War years, at IIC, March 8-10, 1999, pp. 6–7

Indo-Pak war is insensible considering the economic cost that it would imply. See Ahmad Khaled , Frontier Post, 8 September 1991

Heller Mark A. , “Arab-Israeli CSBMs: Implication's for South Asia” in Ganguly Sumit Greenwood Ted , ed, Mending Fences: Confidence and Security Building Measures in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 119

For details regarding confidence building measures see Pattartaik Dr. Smruti S. , “Proactive Confidence Building Measures” in Ahmar Moonis , ed, Confidence Building Measures in South Asia (Delhi: Har Anand Publications)

Heller Mark A. , “Arab-Israeli CSBMs: Implications for South Asia” in Ganguly Sumit Greenwood Ted , ed, Mending Fences: Confidence and Security Building Measures in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 119

Other guiding principles were rejection of force or threat to use force and inviolability of the frontiers

For details regarding Indian non-papers see Dixit J. N. , Anatomy of Flawed Inheritance (Konark: 1998), pp. 315–316

For the text of MoU see Hindustan Times, 22 February 1999

The Lahore Declaration and The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). For details see South Asian Survey, 6, 1, 1999, p. 112

Hindustan Times, 22 February 1999

For an American perspective of restraint regime see Talbott Strobe , “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, p. 121

For details regarding missile deployment and its posture, their safety and management see Sidhu W. P. S. , “India's Security and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures” in Sidhu W. P. S. Cloughly Brian Hawes John H. Schaffer Teresita , ed, Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in Southern Asia, Washington: Stimson Center Report no. 26, 1998, pp. 30–38

Lavoy Peter , “South Asian Military Programs: Characteristics, Trends, Implications”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 16 July 1998. See www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/southasia

For details on the issue of recessed deterrence see Sidhu W. P. S. , “India's Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures, Henry L. Stimson Center Report, November 1998. Also see Raja Menon, n. 13, pp. 201-206 and Ashley Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 211-249

This system envisages electronic locks built into the nuclear weapon systems. Only the authorized person in command of nuclear weapon would have electronic coded key to unlock the nuclear weapon

India's no first use policy is a unilateral nuclear risk reduction measure (NRRMs). For details regarding NRRMs especially between India and China so as to bring in some stability in Indo-Pak nuclear scenario see Krepon Michel , “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Is Cold War Experience Applicable to Southern Asia”, in Michel Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapon and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Report no 38 (Stimson, Washington, 2001), pp. 11-13

Gagne Chris , “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: Building on Common Ground', ibid, p. 49. For the non-paper exchanges between India and Pakistan in October 1998 Foreign Secretary talks, see Chris Gagne, ibid., pp. 49-50

Mattoo , n. 2, p. 25