Females’ Representation in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Financial Distress: An Evidence from Family Businesses in India

Abstract

This study empirically examine the females’ representation (gender diversity) on the board as well as their impact on financial distress by taking the sample of Indian-listed family firms for a period ranging from 2013 to 2016. Descriptive statistics and logistic regression have been used to find out the influence of feminine on financial distress. The results of descriptive statistics show that on an average, there is just 9 per cent share of females on the board to a maximum of 28 per cent and only 2 per cent of firms have female chief executive officer (FCEO). Further, females have a diminutive impact on financial distress since their presence on the board is very low. Only one variable, females’ percentage (FPER) on the board is significant and negatively associated with financial distress. However, other insignificant variables are also negatively related with financial distress indicating that gender diversity on the board can minimise the financial distress. Consequently, practical implications derived from the present study are that there should be a considerable share of females on the board and executive positions so that their decisions could considerably impact the firm’s performance and be helpful to reduce the financial distress.

Keywords

Financial distress boardroom family business gender diversity India

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