This paper aims to empirically examine the relationship between the performance of the agricultural sector and the crime against the socially marginalised group in India. We exploit the state-wise variations in the relative size of the agricultural sector in the overall economy and the crimes against scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (SCST) communities by the upper caste group for our analysis. Using state-level panel data from 19 major states for 2001–2019 and employing panel data regression methodology, we find that improvement in the relative share of the agricultural sector in the economy leads to lesser crimes against the SCST community. Further, we also find that an increased share of SCSTs in the population and improved connectivity significantly affect such crimes. Therefore, our findings have important policy implications; improving the economic role of the agricultural sector should be one of the primary policy goals to support the marginalised population of this country.
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