REFUGEE IMPACT AND PROBLEM – SOLVING: A CASE STUDY OF THE VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE ∗

See Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 June 1994, p. 13. This estimate, however, does not tally with the figures given in Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 July, 1996, p. 20, although in both cases the UNHCR is cited as the source. The discrepancy that is quite glaring is the reverse positioning of Indonesia and Thailand in the two presentations.

Thailand, which had the largest number of Indochinese refugees, was not surprisingly placed fourth in the UNHCR estimate, for it had overwhelmingly land refugees from Laos and Cambodia.

Singapore still had to handle about 32,000 in camps. What is important, however, is that most of them were awaiting transfer to other countries.

In August, 1980, Japan had only 1,380 officially recognised Vietnamese refugees. See The Asia Record, March, 1981, p. 15. Japan also did not figure at all in the list of countries of permanent reception receiving over 1,000 refugees from Indochina at that time. By September 1989, it settled just over 6,000 Indochinese refugees out of its self-declared quota of 10,000.

For the data used in this diagram see Asiaweek , 17 April, 1992, p. 35.

The figures are taken from the Oxford School Aflas, 1993 (Oxford University Press), p. 4.

Aznam Suhaini , ‘Another door shuts’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March, 1989, p. 24. As many as 248,000 of the Vietnamese refugees fleeing to Malaysia resettled in other countries by April 1996. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May, 1996, p. 13; see also, Gilley Bruce , ‘The Final Stretch’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 July, 1996, p. 20.

“We salute the fact that so many were given refuge in Hong Kong”, said Jean-Noel Wetterwald, representative of the UNHCR in Hong Kong. See Gilley , n. 7. Of course, just before the U.N. Conference in June 1989, amidst refugee arrivals which had swollen the refugee camps to the bursting point, Hong Kong threatened to suspend first asylum unless other countries helped end the influx. But Hong Kong’s action even under so much of pressure was restricted to only issuing the threat.

The Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs, Tan Sri Shafie Ghazali, had said on 31 May 1978 that the government declared as protected areas Pulau Besar Tengah to isolate the refugees from Malaysian residents in surrounding areas. Asian Almanac, 1978, p. 9025.

Thailand’s push-offs and redirection of the boat people may be noted in this connection. See Hiebert Murray , ‘Sink or Swim’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February, 1989, pp.27–28.

The Statesman, 21 June, 1977.

The Indonesia Times, 20 July, 1979.

The Daily Telegraph (London), 18 June, 1979.

The Indonesia Times, 21 July, 1979.

n. 15.

The Statesman, 28 July, 1979. Malaysia had even decided to deploy more than 35 ships to keep out refugees from its east coast.

The measures were actually more out of frustration than a wilful violation of the principle of first asylum. It could well be that the Malaysian Foreign Ministry was unaware of some of the actions, which were carried out by people on the ground.

The Statesman, 21 July, 1979.

We need only compare the following statements. Singapore’s Foreign Minister, Rajaratnam, remarked that the massive outflow of Vietnamese refugees constituted an export of subversion and that the source of the problem was Vietnam. “They (Vietnam) will have to turn it off at the source. There is no remedy otherwise”, he said. The Indonesia Times, 18 July, 1979. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, on the other hand, refrained from voicing any strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment. “There is no use wasting time in looking for a scapegoat since the objective is to find its solution”, he remarked. The Indonesia Times, 17 July, 1979.

The Statesman, 2 July, 1979.

The Asian Wall Street Journal, 19 September, 1989, p. 10. U.S. Senator Robert Doman echoed the sentiment. “The real villain in this tragedy is the government of Vietnam, which has driven its people to almost suicidal lengths to be free of tyranny”, he said. Asiaweek, 28 June, 1991, p. 20.

n. 20; see also Asiaweek, 18 October, 1991, pp. 55–57.

Ellithorpe H. , ‘Refugees: Hanoi taking risk’, Sunday Standard, 22 July, 1979.

Asiaweek, 16 October 1992, p. 17.

Ibid. After a slow start the ODP peaked in 1984-85 before stalling again. The authorities in Hanoi felt not enough people on their exit lists were considered for entry to the United States. Washington, on the other hand, considered not enough people on their lists were being given exit visas. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 November, 1988, p. 12.

Whereas initially the refugees had been mainly ethnic Chinese, in the 1980s a large number of them were local people — many of them Vietnamese farmers. Apparently they were leaving because of the deteriorating economic situation. Food shortages became acute and prices of all goods soared. Some 60-70 per cent of those heading for Hong Kong were northerners, whereas 99 per cent of those fleeing to Southeast Asia were from the South and more likely to qualify for resettlement. See Aznam , n. 7.

Aznam , n. 7, p. 25.

The important question arising out of the screening policy was not only as to what was to be done with those qualifying for refugee status after being screened, but also those who had arrived before the cut-off dates, and were entitled to that status automatically. The Western countries came forward and agreed to resettle all of them within three years. The United States agreed to take 50 per cent each of the two ctegories, and Australia agreed to take a further 11,000. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June, 1989, p. 22.

For the question of fairness of the screening process, see UNHCR Information Bulletin, (UNHCR Public Information Service), August 1995, p. 7.

Screening was supported also by the UNHCR. “We fully support this approach”, said Christopher Carpenter, UNHCR’s representative in Japan. See Rubinfein Elizabeth , ‘A Surge in Refugees Stirs Debate in Japan’, The Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 September, 1989, p. 19.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 March, 1989, p. 12. ASEAN coupled its decision to introduce screening with an assurance that all boat arrivals would be given temporary refuge and accorded humanitarian treatment. See Aznam , n. 7. The decision to introduce screening might well have been taken earlier. For example, Thailand’s Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulanon, told the U.S. Secretary of State, Shultz, on 8 July, 1988 that while Thailand would continue its humanitarian policy on the Indochinese refugees, it could not afford to accept disguised refugees flowing out of Vietnam for economic reasons. Summary of World Broadcasts (FE/0200, 11 July 1988), p. A1/1.

For example, only 62 out of more than 10,000 arriving in Hong Kong between June 16, 1988 and January 1989 were found to be eligible for resettlement.

Britain and Hong Kong, backed by a number of Western countries, including Australia, and by other first asylum nations, notably Malaysia and Thailand, made it clear that in their view only mandatory repatriation of non-refugees could tackle the problem on the scale required. Far Eastern Economic Review, n. 30.

The U.S. proposal in late 1995 bore testimony to the strong distate for forcible repatriation. The proposal was put forward when the U.S. was discussing with Hanoi a programme aimed at persuading 40,000 Vietnamese boat people still remaining at that time in Southeast Asia to return home. The plan, known as “Track II”, was to offer the Vietnamese boat people the promise of an interview with immigration officials on possible resettlement in the U.S. if the refugees first returned to Vietnam within a specific period. See The Asian Age, 6 December, 1995, p. 4; for a detailed discussion of this plan and Vietnam’s reaction to it, see Schwarz Adam , ‘Run Aground: The last boat people are stranded in limbo’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 January, 1996, pp. 19–20.

For the detail of voluntary repatriation from 1989 to November 1995, see Schwarz , n. 36, p. 20. In this connection, it is important to note that it was enforced repatriation, which more than anything else encouraged more and more boat people to turn to voluntary repatriation. While in 1988 just a little over 600 had volunteered, the number rose to 36,281 by the end of 1992, and shot up to 73,352 at the end of November 1995. From Hong Kong alone more than 50,000 returned to Vietnam voluntarily. It is interesting that those forcibly repatriated from Hong Kong up to early May 1997 numbered 10,283. See The Asian Wall Street Journal Editorial, 13 December, 1989, p. 6; The Statesman, 10 August, 1996, p. 9; and The Asian Age, 10 May, 1997, p. 4.

The Asian Wall Street Journal Editorial, n. 37.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 November, 1988, p. 12.

Britain and Hong Kong opened top-level talks with Vietnam in June 1988. The talks were agreed after behind-the-scenes discussions between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Hong Kong Governor, Sir David Wilson and the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach during the June 13-14 U.N. — sponsored Geneva Conference. Far Eastern Economic Review, n. 30.

Asiaweek, 18 October, 1991, pp. 55–57.

The Asian Wall Street Journal Editorial, n. 37.

Asiaweek, 1 November, 1991, p. 33.

Asiaweek, n. 41, p. 50.

Asiaweek, n. 41, p. 57.

Ibid .

The Vietnamese authorities even welcomed the returning boat people with flowers and cookies. The Statemam, 10 August, 1996.

The U.S. State Department reaffirmed in late 1991 Washington’s disdain for non-voluntary repatriation. However, American Congressman, Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the foreign affairs sub-committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, strongly criticized the Bush Administration’s position as “totally hypocritical”, because it did not prevent the pushing back of Haitian boat refugees or protest against Hong Kong’s compulsory return of Chinese illegals. Asiaweek, 22 November, 1991, p. 36.

Asiaweek, 22 May, 1992, p. 54.

The May riots in Hong Kong prompted demands for tougher action, and even calls for the boat people to be loaded onto troop ships and sent home en masse. The Asian Age, 15 May, 1996, p. 5. The May incident was followed by yet another act of rioting next month at Hong Kong’s High Island detention centre in rural New Territories. The Asian Age, 12 June, 1996, p. 5. In spite of being euphemistically referred to as ‘orderly departure’, forcible repatriation (previously called mandatory repatriation) did involve, though not always, use of force to send back the resisting Vietnamese asylym-seekers.

See Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 February, 1994 p. 15.

Explaining the slow rate of progress in clearing the camps under the U.N. brokered Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), created in 1989, a senior U.N. official said: “Hanoi doesnt’t really want these people back, and the first asylum countries don’t have the commitment or money to force the issue”. See Schwarz , n. 36.

BBC, 15 January, 1996, 1300 hrs GMT.

As its seventh and final meeting in Geneva on 5 and 6 March 1996, the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Indochinese refugees confirmed that the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees should formally come to an end as of 30 June 1996. See UNHCR Executive Committee Report, Standing Committee, 9th meeting, (EC/47/SC/CRP.44), 15 August, 1997. The deadline for Hong Kong was set as “shortly thereafter”, but not precisely defined. Vietnam too wanted the issue wrapped up by May 31, 1997. See Katherine Stephan & Faith Keenan, ‘Handover Leftover’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 June, 1997, p. 17.

The Statesman, 16 January, 1996, p. 6.

The Asian Age, 26 June, 1996, p. 5.

See Sen Rabindra , ‘Row your boat gently down the stream’, The Telegraph, 30 June, 1997, p. 11.