Twenty Five Years of NPT: What Next?

For the text of the NPT. see U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1. pp. 258–262.

Bums Richard Dean , ed.. Encyclopedia of Anns control and Disarmament. Vol. III. New York: Charles Scribner’s. 1993. pp. 861–2. Hereafter cited as. Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament .

See Spector Leonard S. . “Meeting the New Challenges to the NPT.” Disarmament. Topical Papers 8. New York: United Nations. 1991. p. 178.

At the 1995 NPT extension conference, a simple majority of the NPT parties present will have the authority to determine how long the pact will be extended. This will offer the non-nuclear weapon states—which are mostly Third World countries—increased power, given their numerical strength in the Treaty’s membership. It is possible that these states might declare that they would support a substantial extension only if the discriminations in the Treaty are done away with and substantial progress is made towards CTB. Ibid .. p. 189.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist. July—August 1992, p. 19.

The contention that Article of NPT which states that “Nuclear weapons states pledge not to transfer nuclear explosive devices or the means to produce them to non-weapons states,” has not been fully observed does not imply that the suppliers of nuclear material and equipment have been internationally seeking to promote the development of nuclear weapons in the recipient states: in most cases their motivations have been of a commercial rather than apolitical nature, as the nuclear industry has been facing serious economic problems in nearly all supplier states. International efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons are thus being endangered by commercial pressures, and long-term security interests risk being sacrificed to short-term economic interests. See Goldblat Jozef . ed.. Non-proliferation: The why and the wherefore, London: Taylor and Francis. 1985, p. 6.

See Spector Leonard S. Smith Jacqueline R. . Nuclear Exports: The Challenge of Control. New York. Caregie Endowment for International Peace, 1990. p. 28.

IAEA Information Circular NO. 153 (INFCIRC/153). The structure and content of agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, paragraph 2.

Ibid.. Paragraph 28.

Fischer D. . Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: the Past and the Prospects London: Routledge. 1992. Chapter 5.

Fischer D. . “The International Atomic Energy Authority and Nuclear Safeguards,” in Hewlett D. Simpson J. , eds., Nuclear Non-Proliferation: a Reference Handbook, London: Longmans. 1992. pp. 39–40.

IAEA, IAEA Inspections and Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities, Vienna: IAEA. April 1992.

According to Iraq’s declarations to the United National Security Council, her clandestine nuclear activities included a three-track uranium enrichment programme which encompassed work on gas centrifuges, electromagnetic devices known as “calatrons.” and a chemical enrichment process, suitable only for low-enriched uranium production. See Gertz Bill , “Saddam Close to Nuclear Weapon.” Washington Times, 11 July, 1991.

U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1.

In l974, India exploded a peaceful nuclear device. but announced that it did not intend to manufacture any nuclear weapons.

See Disarmament (n. 3). pp. 77–78.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . n. 5, p. 22.

Disamament, n. 3, pp. 188–189.

Defense Monitor, Vol. XXII. No. 1 (1993). as cited in Bose T.C. . “The United States and South Asia. The Nuclear Proliferation Dimension.” Strategic Analysis, Vol.. XVI. No. 12. March 1994, p. 1610.

Encyclopedia of Anns Control and Disarmament, n. 2. p. 863.

U.N. Document A/35/257, p. 40.

U.N. Document A/44/551, p. 22.

In 1992. however, the US Congress enacted a legislation which changed the earlier stand of the US Govt. See. n. 36.

U.N. Document A/45/PV. 6. p. 53.

UN-NGO International Conference, “New Realities, Disarmament. Peace building and Global Security.” 20-23 April. 1993. Disarmament, Special Issue. New York. United Nations. 1993.

See Bose T.C. . “The United States and South Asia: The Nuclear Proliferation Dimension.” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI. No. 12. March 1994. p. 1604.

The nuclear weapon countries have characterised India’s stand on the NPT as a “blind alley.” But today when India is besieged by her critics, it is seldom appreciated that at a critical period when India was under the shadow of the Chinese nuclear threat, instead of deciding to become a nuclear weapon power, she opted for a non-nuclear weapon status risking her own security in defence of the very same principle for which she is now being pilloried. For a country which had the scientific potential and technological capability, going nuclear would have been the natural response: but India denied herself this opportunity in the greater interest of maintaining international peace and security. Hindustan Times. 28 December 1992.

Third World nations have questioned as to why the non-nuclear states parties to the NPT should refrain from the development of nuclear technology which can be helpful for their economic development, but which also has the potential to lead to the acquisition of nuclear capability—tire so-called horizontal proliferation—when there is no restriction on the nuclear-weapon powers to refrain from the production of nuclear weapons. See Bose T.C. . “Arms Control and Global Security: An Indian Perspective.” Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XLVI. No. 3. July-September. 1985. p. 327.

Although the SALT II Treaty had been signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1979. it remained unratified and subject to considerable criticism in the United States. Arms Control Today, Vol. X. No. 2, February 1980. p. 1. Also see. Nitze Paul H. . “Is SALT II a Fan Deal for the United States?” Issues 1972-1972 Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

However. India’s detonation of a peaceful nuclear device in 1974 led to a reexamination of nuclear supply policies by nuclear suppliers who mindful of their obligations under the NPT. moved to tighten conditions on the export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The action of the nuclear suppliers was seen at the time by some developing countries, including India, as inconsistent with ART IV of the NPT, since PNE was considered as a significant instrument for the economic development of developing countries: India was therefore, not prepared to accept a position under which PNE could become the monopoly of nuclear weapon powers alone.

Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament. n. 2. 866.

A compromise was eventually reached whereby the U.N. Security Council Resolution 487 was revoked for Israel’s attack together with wording related to safeguarded nuclear facilities and both Iran and Iraq had statements attached to the Final Document detailing their respective positions. See Simpson John Howlett Darryl . “The NPT Renewal Conference.” International Security, Vol. XIX (1), Summer 1994. p. 47.

For an elaborate discussion of the Fourth Review Conference, see Simpson John Howlett Darryl , The Need for a Strong Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Issues at the Fourth NPT Review Conference, Southampton: Southampton University Press, 1990. pp. 4–27.

See Disarmament: A Periodic Review of the United Nations, Vol. XIV. No. 1 (1991). p. 127.

Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, n. 2. p. 868.

The September 30, 1996 cut-off date in the Congressional Law of 1992 for nuclear testing will not be binding on the U.S. Govt, if a foreign state tests after that date. See Bundy McGeorge , et. al.. “Reducing Nuclear Danger.” Foreign Affairs, Autumn 1993, p. 149.

Cited in the Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC). London, No. 37 May 1993. p. 3. Hereafter cited as VERTIC.

See International Security, Vol. XIX (1). n. 32. p. 59.

VERTIC London, n. 37. No. 41 October 1993. p. 2.

Statesman. Calcutta, 23 January 1994, p. 1.

Bunn George . Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapons States, Washington DC. LAWS, 1993. p. 1.

Countries considering an agreement to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons have in the past sought assurances of assistance in the event they were threatened with attack. U.S. alliance commitments to Germany. Italy and Japan—each with advance nuclear technology—seemed essential to gain their acceptance of non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT during the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Ibid.. p.2.

See Dunn Lewis A. . “Containing Nuclear Proliferation.” Adelphi Paper 263, London: IISS. Winter 1991, pp. 43–44: 54–55.

The United States has continued to oppose any promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT because it was unwilling to give up the option to use nuclear weapons first even against adversary armed only with conventional weapons. See Bernauer Thomas . Nuclear Issues on the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, New York. United Nations, 1991. Chapter 4.

Ibid .. p. 9.

Bunn . Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances, n. 41, p. 9.