The literature on this subject is very large. See the summary inChoucriNazliRobinsonThomas, eds, Forecasting in International Relations, San Francisco: Freeman, 1978.
See JervisRobert. “Loss Aversion in International Politics”Political Psychology. May, 1988, pp. 34–36. Kahneman and Tversky. “Choices, Values, and Frames.”American Psychologist, Vol. 39, No. 3, April, 1984, pp 341–350: LebowRichard NedSteinJanice, “Beyond Deterrence”. Journal Of Social Issues. Vol. 43, No. 4. Winter, 1987, pp. 5–17.
4.
A good example is MearsheimerJohn. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer1990.
5.
The best critique of the utility of theorizing based on the assumption of anarchy isMilnerHelen. “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique.”Review of International Studies. Vol. 17, No. 1, January1991, pp. 67–85.
6.
See EveraStephen Van. “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter, 1990/91 pp. 7–57: UllmanRichard H.. Securing Europe. Princeton. N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1991.
7.
BushGeorge states that the: “United States has deemed it a vital interest to prevent any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass.”but in fact neither the United States nor Britain was willing to trust the benign intentions of any state that seemed likely to control the continent. BushGeorge, The National Security Strategy of the United States. 1990-91. Washington. D.C.Brassey’s1980. p. 5.
8.
This point is stressed inMuellerJohn, Retreat from Doomsday; The Obsolescence of Major War. New York. Basic Books, 1989.
9.
For an unconvincing attempt, see FriedmanGeorgeLeBardMeredith. The Coming War with Japan. New York, St. Martin’s, 1990.
10.
See the discussion of vulnerability and sensitivity interdependence inCooperRichard. The Economics of Interdependence, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968; and KeohaneRobertNyeJoseph S.Jr.. Power and Interdependence, Boston, Little Brown, 1977; as well as the pathbreaking study byHirschmanAlbert, National Power and the Structure of International Trade. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980 (originally published in 1945).
11.
EveraStephen Van. “Why Europe Matters; Why the Third World Doesn’t: America’s Grand Strategy After the Cold War.”Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, June, 1990, p. 5.; Ever a, “Primed for Peace, pp. 14–16: KaysenCarl, “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay,”International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4, Spring1990, pp. 53–57.
12.
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 151–160.
Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday, For a discussion of changes in values among Europeans on matters of domestic society and ways of life, see InglehartRonald, The Silent Revolution, Princeton. N.J., Princeton University Press, 1977: and Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton. N.J., Princeton University Press, 1990. For a rebuttal, see ClarkeHaroldDuttNitish. “Measuring Value Change in Western Industrial Societies.”American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3. September1991, pp. 905–920.
15.
DoyleMichael, “Kant Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”, Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3. Summer, 1983, pp. 205–235; and Part II. Ibid. No. 4. Fall, 1983, pp. 323–353.
16.
EveraVan, “Primed for Peace”, pp. 9–10, 43–44.
17.
The incentives of ties to the rest of Europe, in conjunction with the active assistance of European politicians, facilitated Spain’s transition to democracy: see MalefakisEdward, “Spain and Its Francoist Heritage” in HerzJohn. ed., From Distatorship to Democracy, Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1982, pp. 217–219: and BarkerMary, “International Influences in the Transition to Democracy in Spain’, Columbia, Columbia University Press, Spring, 1988.
18.
SnyderKack, “Avoiding Anarchy in the New Europe.”International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4. Spring, 1990. pp. 5–41.
19.
It should be noted, however, that the conclusion about the future follows from the judgement of the past only if all other things remain equal. This ignores the possibility that the end of the Cold War will trigger processes that could compensate for the removal of the superpower restraint, or on the other hand, that would alter politics in the Third World in ways that are difficult to foresee For reasoning of this type, see JervisHermanSystems and Interaction, Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 1974.
20.
KraussClifford, “Democratic Leaders Divided on China Trade”. New York Times, October9, 1990, p. 8.
21.
GilpinRobert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 397–401.
22.
ArtRobert, “Defensible Defense; American Grand Strategy after the Cold War, “International Security” Vol. 15, No. 4, Spring1991, pp. 30–41: and EveraVan. “Why Europe Matters,” pp. 10–11.
23.
BushGeorge, National Security Strategy of the United States, p 7. This is part of Bush’s “new world order”. For a good exposition of this concept, see SlaonStanley. “The U.S. Role in a New World Order: Prospects for George Bush’s Global Vision,”Congressinal Research Service Report, March28, 1991. Also see KupchanCharlesKupchanClifford, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,”International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer, 1991, pp. 114–161.
24.
For the advocacy of this position, see Huntington. “America’s Changing Strategic Interests,” p. 13. SlocombeWalter, “The Continued Need for Extended Deterrence”. Washington Quarterly, Vol. 14, Autumn, 1991, pp. 160–167.